Gen. Motors, LLC v. Buchanan

Decision Date01 June 2022
Docket NumberS21G1147
Parties GENERAL MOTORS, LLC v. BUCHANAN et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Keith Robert Blackwell, Cari Katrice Dawson, Jamie S. George, Alston & Bird LLP, One Atlantic Center, 1201 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Laurie Webb Daniel, Webb Daniel Friedlander LLP, 119 The Prado NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3400, Charles B. Marsh, Myrece R. Johnson, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers LLP, 1355 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 300, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3238, Brian Patrick Kappel, Michael Lester Bell, Rachel McCulley Lary, General Counsel, Christopher Cameron Yearout, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, 400 20th Street North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, Jonathan Bradley Spital, Holland & Knight LLP, 1180 West Peachtree Street NW, Suite 1800, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, for Appellant.

Richard B. North, Jr., Christopher Shaun Polston, Steven H. Campbell, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 201 17th Street NW, Suite 1700, Atlanta, Georgia 30363, Nicole A. Saharsky, Minh Nguyen-Dang, Mayer Brown LLP, 1999 K. Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006, Charles Haake, Alliance for Automotive Innovation, 1050 K Street NW, Suite 650, Washington, DC 20001, David Edward Bright, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 1050 K Street NW, Suite 650, Washington, DC 20001, Alexander Bunnen Feinberg, Mary Kathryn Mangan, John Cowles Neiman, Jr., Maynard Cooper & Gale P.C., 1901 Sixth Avenue N, Suite 1800, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, Leah Ward Sears, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, 1105 W. Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 1000, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3608, William V. Custer, IV, Christian James Bromley, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, 1201 West Peachtree Street NW, 14th Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3471, Rocco Eugene Testani, Lee Alexander Peifer, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, 999 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2300, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Philip S. Goldberg, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, 1800 K Street, NW, Suite 1000, Washington, Washington, DC 20817, Anna Sumner Pieschel, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, 1230 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1200, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3591, Andrew Thomas Bayman, Chilton D. Varner, Billie Barker Pritchard, KING & SPALDING LLP, 1180 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Paul Alessio Mezzina, King & Spalding LLP, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20006-4707, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Drew F. Waldbeser, Stephen John Petrany, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, for Amicus Appellant.

Patrick Alan Dawson, Lance Alan Cooper, The Cooper Firm, 531 Roselane Street, Suite 200, Marietta, Georgia 30060, James Darren Summerville, The Summerville Firm, LLC, 1226 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30306, Anna Green Cross, The Cross Firm, LLC, 520 W. Ponce de Leon Avenue #1858, Decatur, Georgia 30030, for Appellee.

Darren Wade Penn, Kevin M. Ketner, Penn Law LLC, 4200 Northside Parkway, NW, Building One, Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30327, Jonathan Andrew Pope, Hasty Pope Davies, LLP, 509 Green Street, Gainesville, Georgia 30114, Nkosi John Bey, American Association for Justice, 777 6th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20001, Christopher Dean Glover, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., 2839 Paces Ferry Road, SE, Overlook II, Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30327, Lindsay Alexandra Forlines, Forlines Law, LLC, 1226 Ponce de Leon Avenue NE, Suite 200, Atlanta, Georgia 30306, Stephen Roberts Chance, Watkins, Lourie, Roll & Chance, PC, 5607 Glenridge Drive, Suite 500, Atlanta, Georgia 30342, for Amicus Appellee.

Bethel, Justice.

In a civil lawsuit in Georgia, the discovery process allows litigants to gather information about a case from other litigants and third parties in an orderly and defined manner. Georgia, like most states, also provides various mechanisms for litigants and third parties to seek relief from the demands of discovery. One such method is by moving for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), which provides that upon a showing of "good cause," a trial court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including limiting or otherwise prohibiting the requested discovery.

In this wrongful death case in which the plaintiffs allege a faulty vehicle component caused the deadly accident, the plaintiffs have sought to depose the Chief Executive Officer of General Motors, LLC, and General Motors has sought a protective order barring that deposition. General Motors urges us to adopt the so-called "apex doctrine," or some variation thereof, as a means of determining whether "good cause" exists for granting the protective order it seeks. That doctrine provides courts with a framework for determining whether good cause exists to forbid or limit the deposition of a high-ranking corporate executive1 who lacks personal, unique knowledge of facts relevant to the litigation. We granted General Motors’ petition for a writ of certiorari to consider "what factors should be considered by a trial court in ruling on a motion for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) that seeks to prevent the deposition of a high-ranking officer" and "the appropriate burden of proof as to those factors."

We conclude that, to the extent these factors are asserted by a party seeking a protective order, a trial court should consider whether the executive's high rank, the executive's lack of unique personal knowledge of relevant facts, and the availability of information from other sources demonstrate good cause for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). However, we decline to hold that a trial court must find that good cause is presumptively or conclusively established in each instance that a movant has demonstrated that an executive is "sufficiently high-ranking" and lacks unique personal knowledge of discoverable information not available through other means.

Additionally, while motions for a protective order relying on factors associated with the apex doctrine and any other basis argued to constitute good cause are entitled to consideration by the trial court, the burden of persuasion remains on the party seeking the protective order. Applying that standard here, we conclude that the trial court did not fully consider all of the reasons asserted by General Motors as a basis for the protective order it sought in the motion. Thus, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's order and remand this case with direction that the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court's order and remand the case for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

1. Background

Robert Randall Buchanan's wife, Glenda Marie Buchanan, was killed in a single-vehicle accident in November 2014 while driving her 2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer, which was manufactured by General Motors Corporation, the predecessor to General Motors, LLC (collectively "GM"). Buchanan brought a wrongful death action against GM alleging that the fatal accident was caused by a defect in the "steering wheel angle sensor," a component of the car's electronic stability control system, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

As part of that suit, Buchanan noticed the deposition of GM's current CEO, Mary Barra. Buchanan predicated his request on previous statements Barra made in testimony before Congress and other public statements she made about GM's commitment to safety, including the "Speak Up for Safety" program under which the Trailblazer steering system angle sensor was investigated by GM. At the conclusion of that investigation into the Trailblazer steering system, GM decided that no action would be taken.

GM responded to Buchanan's notice of deposition by moving for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), arguing that good cause existed to prohibit Barra's deposition because she had not been identified as a witness having relevant knowledge during discovery, did not have "personal, unique, or superior knowledge of information" relevant to the case, was not involved in the investigation of the alleged defect at issue, and did not have any knowledge relevant to the design of the steering wheel angle sensor for the car at issue in Buchanan's suit or the investigation into it. GM also argued that any knowledge Barra might have could be obtained through "other, less intrusive means." In support of its motion, GM cited cases primarily from federal courts applying the framework for assessing good cause commonly known as the "apex doctrine."

GM supported its response with Barra's affidavit, in which she averred that she was "not personally involved with" and did not have "direct personal knowledge regarding[ ] every aspect of each vehicle that is or has been manufactured by GM." More specifically, Barra averred that she "was not involved in the design, development, or manufacture" of either the steering wheel angle sensor or the 2006 to 2009 Trailblazer, did not conduct any Speak Up for Safety program investigations, did not receive individual reports about each investigation conducted under the program, was not involved in any investigation of the steering wheel angle sensor, and did not have "any direct, unique, specialized, or superior knowledge about the design, manufacture, and marketing" of the steering wheel angle sensor, the 2007 Trailblazer, or any internal investigations or results from investigations into the same.

In response to GM's motion, Buchanan again pointed to Barra's congressional testimony in relation to a different alleged defect across several vehicles in which she stated that she would work with GM's new vice president of global vehicle safety to quickly identify and resolve product-safety issues and that she would review all future death inquiries in GM vehicle crashes. Buchanan also pointed to Barra's public statements and general knowledge about GM's safety culture and efforts to eliminate safety...

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3 cases
  • Stratford v. UMPQUA Bank
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 14 Septiembre 2023
    ...1282, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 365-67 (1992), while at least seven states have rejected it, see, e.g., Gen. Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 874 S.E.2d 52, 64 (2022); BlueMountain, 465 P.3d 122; Crest Infiniti II, LP v. Swinton, 2007 OK 77, ¶ 17, 174 P.3d 996, 1004; State ex rel. Ford Motor......
  • Kudzu Capital, LLC v. City of Decatur
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 7 Junio 2023
    ... ... S.E.2d 687) (1993), disapproved on other grounds by ... General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan , 313 Ga. 811, 826 ... (2) (d) n.6 (874 S.E.2d 52) (2022), Brookhaven ... ...
  • Cooper v. Pollard
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 21 Diciembre 2023
    ...in General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811 (874 S.E.2d 52) (2022), "the scope of discovery under the Civil Practice Act is broad." Id. at 814 (2). To this end, "[t]he discovery procedure is to be construed liberally in favor of supplying a party with the facts." (Citation and punctuati......

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