Gendek v. Jehangir
Decision Date | 19 January 1988 |
Docket Number | 65054,Nos. 64870,s. 64870 |
Citation | 116 Ill.Dec. 230,119 Ill.2d 338,518 N.E.2d 1051 |
Parties | , 116 Ill.Dec. 230 Bernard GENDEK, Appellant, v. Jehangir M. JEHANGIR, M.D., Appellee. John E. SYLVESTER, Appellant, v. Robert STEINBERG, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
W. Loren Thomson, Rex L. Reu, Thomson & Weintraub, Bloomington, for appellant.
J. Mark McKinzie, Costigan & Wollrab, P.C., Bloomington, for appellee.
These consolidated causes raise a common question of whether or not a particular statutory provision, section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 13-217), permits a plaintiff to file more than one action within one year after the original action has been dismissed (voluntarily or for want of prosecution).
In the first of the consolidated causes, No. 64870, plaintiff, Bernard Gendek, filed a medical malpractice action against defendant, Jehangir M. Jehangir, M.D., in Federal court in Indiana on December 13, 1983, eight days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. On February 22, 1984, Gendek filed a motion for a voluntary dismissal. The motion was granted on a stipulation by the parties.
On March 9, 1984, Gendek filed the same action in Federal court in Illinois. On March 24, 1984, Gendek's motion to dismiss without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted.
Within one year of the second dismissal, Gendek filed this present action in State court. The circuit court, on motion of defendant, dismissed this action with prejudice. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed by the appellate court. (151 Ill.App.3d 1028, 105 Ill.Dec. 155, 503 N.E.2d 1161.) We allowed Gendek's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315).
In the second of the consolidated causes, No. 65054, plaintiff, John E. Sylvester, filed a personal injury suit in 1979 against defendant, Robert Steinberg, arising out of an automobile accident of September 26, 1977.
On February 22, 1984, Sylvester moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The motion was granted. On the same day, Sylvester refiled the same action. On April 4, 1986, he filed his second motion for a voluntary dismissal, which was granted. On May 12, 1986, he filed a new action. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The motion was granted. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. (152 Ill.App.3d 962, 105 Ill.Dec. 902, 505 N.E.2d 28.) This court granted leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and consolidated the two causes.
Is a plaintiff who takes a voluntary dismissal of his original action entitled to only one refiling within a year? This court has not previously discussed this precise issue.
Section 13-217 provides:
Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 13-217.
This section provides plaintiffs with the absolute right to refile their complaint within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, for the reasons specified therein. In each of the causes before the court, the plaintiff's motion was for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and in each cause the statute of limitations had run. (No. 64870--first filing was eight days before the statute ran; No. 65054--first filing was in 1979, date of accident was September 26, 1977.)
A Federal court in 1958 considered this issue under the previous section 24 ( ) of the Limitations Act and ruled that a plaintiff does not have the right to file multiple new actions more than one year after the original action had been dismissed. In Harrison v. Woyahn (7th Cir.1958), 261 F.2d 412, the court stated:
(Emphasis in original.) 261 F.2d at 413.
Other States which have considered extension statutes similar in wording to the Illinois statute have reached the same result. (Walker v. L. E. Meyers Construction Co. (1936), 175 Okl. 548, 53 P.2d 547; Reed v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1916), 136 Tenn. 499, 190 S.W. 458; Bush v. Cole (1913), 1 Ohio App. 269, 17 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 233.) In Cady v. Harlan (Mo.1969), 442 S.W.2d 517, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a dismissal of the plaintiff's second suit did not give rise to a second one-year period in which the action might be refiled. The court held that once the provisions of the extension statute are invoked, the plaintiff has one year to file the action, and the dismissal of an action so filed would not give rise to any subsequent periods of grace.
The appellate court of Illinois has also addressed the issue now under consideration. For example, Phillips v. Elrod (1985), 135 Ill.App.3d 70, 88 Ill.Dec. 470, 478 N.E.2d 1078, held that the statute "permits only a single refiling within a year of dismissal." (135 Ill.App.3d at 73, 88 Ill.Dec. 470, 478 N.E.2d 1078.) In Phillips, the plaintiff's decedent died as a result of injuries sustained while he was imprisoned. In July 1978, his mother filed a wrongful death action in State court. It was voluntarily dismissed in 1980. Subsequently, in 1980, she filed in Federal court, alleging her action was timely because it was filed within one year of her voluntary dismissal. The Federal action was voluntarily dismissed in 1981. Phillips filed her second State action in 1981. Subsequently, the court dismissed the second State action for lack of prosecution but vacated that order and dismissed it as untimely and unauthorized by the statute. The appellate court held that section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 83, par. 24a (now Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 13-217)) did not authorize successive refilings after the expiration of the limitation period of the same action, but permitted only a single refiling within a year of dismissal.
Also insightful is Smith v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 385, 24 Ill.Dec. 295, 385 N.E.2d 62. In Smith, it was determined...
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