General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Olivier

• Citation: 574 A.2d 1240
• Decision Date: 23 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-3-A,89-3-A
• Parties: GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. Richard R. OLIVIER et al. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 1240

574 A.2d 1240

GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. Richard R. OLIVIER et al.

No. 89-3-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 23, 1990.

Frank J. Manni, John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, for plaintiff.

Arlene M. Violet, Barrington, for defendants.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on the appeal of the defendants from a declaratory judgment entered in the Superior Court denying coverage under the uninsured-motorist provisions and medical-payment provisions of an insurance policy. We reverse. The facts of the case as agreed by the parties are as follows.

"AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS

"1. Plaintiff, on or about, October 10, 1982, issued and delivered to Susan E. Olivier, of 152 Carlson Drive, in Cumberland, Rhode Island, its Personal Auto Policy, bearing No. RPA45-356-59, with effective dates from October 10, 1982 to April 10, 1983.

"2. Said policy contains an uninsured motorist coverage section designated Part C, as well as a medical payments coverage section designated Part B.

"3. Defendants have asserted a demand for arbitration under the uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of the insured, Susan Olivier, and also presented a demand for payment to recover funeral expenses under the medical payments coverage.

"4. Plaintiff, General Accident Insurance Company of America, asserted that the policy did not afford uninsured motorist coverage for either claim and filed this complaint for declaratory judgment and obtained a stay of the arbitration proceeding pending resolution of the issue of coverage.

"5. On or about November 7, 1982, Susan E. Olivier was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Mark E. Sawaia, which was in collision with a motor vehicle operated by Richard W. Morin on Diamond Hill Road in Cumberland, Rhode Island.

"6. Subsequent to said accident, while the said Susan E. Olivier was present and while the accident was under investigation by members of the Cumberland Police Department, the said Richard W. Morin shot and killed the said Susan E. Olivier.

"7. Richard W. Morin's negligent operation of his motor vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident when he struck a vehicle in which the insured, Susan E. Olivier, was a passenger. Mr. Morin's vehicle was uninsured on the date of the accident.

"8. At the time Susan E. Olivier was shot and killed, she was not physically present in any motor vehicle, but was about 117 feet away from Mark Sawaia's vehicle in which she had been a passenger, and at the time she was shot, she was near the left rear wheel of Police Car 433.

"9. Cumberland Police Officer Joseph James, asked decedent, Susan E. Olivier, and Mark Sawaia to sit in Police Vehicle 433 where it was warm and to stay there until someone would come and talk to them, as the police intended to speak with them regarding the automobile accident, and in walking to Police Car 433, the insured, Susan E. Olivier, and Mark Sawaia walked from a point just south of the Morin vehicle, continuing about 15 feet past the rear of the Morin vehicle to get to Police Car 433.

"10. Officer Joseph James left them to go and retrieve Mr. Sawaia's registration and Susan E. Olivier's pocketbook from Sawaia's vehicle.

"11. The Sawaia vehicle was located at all times after the accident 1/2 on and 1/2 off the sidewalk in front of 1320 Diamond Hill Road facing south about 103 feet south of the Morin vehicle.

"12. The defendants are the duly appointed Co-Administrators of the Estate of Susan E. Olivier, having been appointed by the Cumberland Probate Court."

In support of their appeal, defendants, the co-administrators, argue that there is a sufficient nexus between the automobile accident clearly caused by the negligence of Richard W. Morin and the death of the decedent to warrant coverage under the policy conditions. We shall divide this contention into its component parts.

I Occupancy

The plaintiff insurer claims, and the trial justice held, that coverage under this policy must be denied as a result of the fact that at the time defendants' decedent was shot, she was not an occupant of her motor vehicle. The facts indicate that plaintiff had left the motor vehicle in order to furnish information to a police officer and was located approximately 117 feet away from the vehicle in which she had been a passenger. In determining whether the decedent came within the term "occupying," we are persuaded by the analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court contained in Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005 (1984). In that case the court found that a motorist who had been involved in an accident with another party was struck by another vehicle while he stood by a police car providing information relating to his driver's license and owner's card. The driver of the vehicle causing the accident was uninsured. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth criteria under which a motorist using an insured vehicle would be considered to be "occupying" that vehicle within the meaning of the policy.

"(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle;

"(2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it;

"(3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and

"(4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time." 504 Pa. at 336, 473 A.2d at 1009.

In applying the facts of the case to the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observed:

"At all times the decedent was engaged in transactions essential to his continued use of the vehicle, and it was only because of the mandated requirements of the statute and the police officer that decedent found himself physically out of contact with his vehicle. Finally, it was the use of the vehicle which precipitated the whole unfortunate series of events." Id.

In the case at bar, the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be most applicable. The decedent here was a passenger in an insured motor vehicle when the accident occurred. She was requested to leave that motor vehicle by a Cumberland police officer and sit in his police vehicle until they were interviewed concerning the facts relating to the accident. As in Contrisciane this transaction was related to her occupancy of the insured motor vehicle. She was certainly vehicle oriented at the time the fatal shot was fired. It was her status as a passenger in the insured vehicle that precipitated the whole unfortunate series of events. Consequently we are of the opinion that at the time the decedent was shot she came within...