Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2016–15–Appeal (PC 12–6179),2016–15–Appeal (PC 12–6179)
• Citation: 161 A.3d 1150
• Parties: Amberleigh HUDSON v. GEICO INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance Company.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

161 A.3d 1150

Amberleigh HUDSON

v.GEICO INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance Company.

No. 2016–15–Appeal (PC 12–6179)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 16, 2017

Joseph J. Altieri, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Mark P. Dolan, Esq., Mark P. Dolan, Jr., Esq., for Defendant.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Amberleigh Hudson (plaintiff), is before the Supreme Court on appeal from a Superior Court judgment in a jury-waived trial in favor of the defendant, GEICO Insurance Agency, Inc., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance Company (defendant or GEICO), in this underinsured motorist (UM) insurance case. This appeal first came before the Court on October 25, 2016, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we concluded that cause had been shown and assigned this case to the regular calendar for further briefing and argument. We heard oral arguments on April 5, 2017. For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The parties in this case entered into an agreed statement of facts. In the early morning hours of February 11, 2012, plaintiff and her then-boyfriend, Gregory Hurst (Hurst), left Murphy's Pub in Providence and headed south on Allens Avenue toward the Amazing Super Store, located on the corner of Allens Avenue and Thurbers Avenue. Hurst was driving his Saab, which was insured by defendant (the GEICO policy), and plaintiff was a passenger. Hurst pulled into the parking lot and parked the vehicle "with a plan to then exit the vehicle and go into the Amazing Super Store." Hurst and plaintiff remained in the vehicle "for a minute or two to talk," when they heard the sound of a crash, signifying an automobile collision, on nearby Allens Avenue. The couple exited the Saab, crossed the parking lot of the Amazing Super Store, and the two southbound lanes of Allens Avenue in order to reach the nearby accident scene. While Hurst called 9–1–1, plaintiff went to the rear of the vehicles to retrieve the license plate numbers. While looking down at a license plate, plaintiff heard somebody yell "car." A third vehicle, traveling north on Allens Avenue, then struck the accident vehicles, adjacent to where plaintiff was standing. She was injured as a result of this impact.

The plaintiff settled a claim against the operator of the vehicle that hit her; however, she has alleged that this did not fully compensate her for her injuries. Consequently, plaintiff filed a claim with defendant seeking relief through Hurst's GEICO policy that insured the Saab. The GEICO policy afforded protection to passengers "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. The policy defined "occupying" as "in, upon entering into or alighting from [the vehicle]." The defendant denied plaintiff's claim, on the ground that she was not "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of her injuries. The plaintiff filed this action in Superior Court on November 30, 2012, and the case was reached for trial on June 17, 2015.

Prior to trial, and based on the agreed statement of facts, the parties filed cross-motions for judgment as a matter of law, stipulating that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the sole issue before the Superior Court was whether plaintiff was "occupying" the Saab at the time of the accident. In its motion, defendant maintained that plaintiff was precluded from recovery based upon the unambiguous language of the GEICO policy. The plaintiff responded that she was entitled to coverage in light of the broad interpretation of "occupying" set forth by this Court in General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Olivier , 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990).¹ In a written decision issued on August 4, 2015, the trial justice rejected defendant's argument that the plain language of the GEICO policy should be the focus of the coverage analysis and, instead, analyzed the term "occupying" in light of the four prongs of Olivier .

The trial justice concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between the insured Saab and her injuries and, therefore, could not move past the first prong of Olivier . Although declaring that the failure to meet the first prong of Olivier rendered the remainder of the analysis moot, the trial justice noted that plaintiff also failed to satisfy the third requirement that she was "vehicle oriented" at the time of the injury. Accordingly, the trial justice held that plaintiff could not recover UM benefits under the terms of the GEICO policy because she was not "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the incident giving rise to her injuries. A final judgment was entered in favor of defendant on October 9, 2015, from which plaintiff has appealed to this Court.²

Standard of Review

"This case was tried upon a set of stipulated facts. Review of the trial justice's decision in these cases is 'narrowly defined.' " Delbonis Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Richmond , 909 A.2d 922, 925 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Hagenberg v. Avedisian , 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 2005) ). "[T]he trial court does not play a fact-finding role, but is limited to 'applying the law to the agreed-upon facts.' " Id. (quoting Hagenberg , 879 A.2d at 441 ). "[Q]uestions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court." Hagenberg , 879 A.2d at 441 (quoting Webster v. Perrotta , 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001) ). Likewise, "[o]ur review of a trial justice's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law is de novo ." McGarry v. Pielech , 47 A.3d 271, 279 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Medeiros v. Sitrin , 984 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I. 2009) ).

Analysis

Before this Court, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erroneously interpreted the Olivier factors as applied to the facts of this case, and she maintains that, at the time of her injuries, she was "occupying" the insured vehicle. The plaintiff agrees with the trial justice's finding on the second prong of Olivier —that she was in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle at the time of her injuries—but she claims on appeal that the trial justice erroneously interpreted the first prong by applying too strict a standard in considering the existence of a causal connection between the insured vehicle and the accident. As to Olivier 's third prong, plaintiff urges the Court to abandon the third prong—which mandates that the injured person be "vehicle oriented" at the time of their injury—suggesting that it is "ambiguous, confusing, and indeed, useless." In regard to the fourth prong, plaintiff submits that this Court should hold that, in light of the mandate in G.L. 1956 § 11–56–1, the rendering of reasonable assistance as a Good Samaritan, constitutes an "essential transaction" for purposes of UM coverage. Section 11–56–1 provides, in pertinent part:

"Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor * * *."

The defendant on the other hand contends that plaintiff waived her § 11–56–1 argument by not raising it at trial and that the issue is moot because whether plaintiff was acting under compulsion of the statute when she rendered aid at the scene of the accident is a factual determination which should be reserved for the trial justice. Alternatively, defendant claims that a Good Samaritan can only be "occupying" an insured vehicle if each of the four prongs of Olivier is satisfied and that the trial justice properly found those elements to be lacking in this case.

This is the first occasion on which this Court is called upon to address the particular interplay between § 11–56–1, the Good Samaritan Act, and the term "occupying" a motor vehicle, as defined in an insurance contract. As a threshold issue, we pass on defendant's contention that this seminal argument is waived or otherwise moot. We reject that argument.

"This Court's 'raise-or-waive' rule precludes our consideration of an issue that was not raised or articulated at trial." In re Miguel A. , 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010) (citing Resendes v. Brown , 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I. 2009) ); see also Hydro–Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser–Roth Corp. , 640 A.2d 950, 959 (R.I. 1994) ("It is well settled that a party may not 'advance new theories or raise new issues in order to secure a reversal of the lower court's determination.' " (quoting Nedder v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank , 459 A.2d 960, 963 (R.I. 1983) )). We cannot agree with defendant's contention that the raise-or-waive rule precludes this Court from considering plaintiff's argument that she acted as a Good Samaritan pursuant to § 11–56–1. Certainly, plaintiff advanced her Good Samaritan theory to the lower court, as the decision of the trial justice is replete with references to plaintiff's rescue efforts as having been those of a Good Samaritan. Indeed, the trial justice recognized that this Court "has yet to address whether rendering aid as a Good Samaritan" satisfies the requirements of Olivier .

We also reject as meritless defendant's contention that plaintiff's argument is moot and that our resolution thereof would be equivalent to an advisory opinion. "[A] case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy." City of Cranston v. Rhode Island Laborers' District Council, Local 1033 , 960 A.2d 529, 533 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Seibert v. Clark , 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I....