General American Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 06 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 37258,37258
• Citation: 539 S.W.2d 693
• Parties: GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. Vera Jean ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant, Vanita M. Rogers et al., Defendants-Respondents, and Bernice Swaim, Defendant. . Louis District, Division Three
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 693

539 S.W.2d 693

GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. Vera Jean ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant, Vanita M. Rogers et al., Defendants-Respondents, and Bernice Swaim, Defendant.

No. 37258.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Three.

July 6, 1976.

James F. Hespen, St. Louis, for appellant.

Dale L. Rollings, St. Charles, for respondent.

Joel D. Monson, St. Louis, for plaintiff.

James E. Hawk, Jr., St. Louis, for defendant Bernice Swaim.

SIMEONE, Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Vera Jean Rogers, the wife of deceased, Eugene Leroy Rogers, from a summary judgment entered by the circuit court of the City of St. Louis which denied her any rights in the proceeds of a group life insurance policy issued by General American Life Insurance Company on the life of the decedent. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment.

Prior to May 23, 1972, Eugene Leroy Rogers and Vanita M. Rogers were husband and wife. Four children were born of the marriage--Terry, Vickie, Bruce and Holly. Mr. Rogers was employed by Union Electric Company of Missouri and was insured under a group insurance policy issued by General American to Union Electric. He became insured under the policy on September 17, 1953. Over the years the policy increased in value.

On May 23, 1972, Eugene and Vanita were divorced by decree of the circuit court of Warren County. On the same date, they executed a 'Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement,' which was incorporated by reference into the decree. On July 27, 1974, Mr. Rogers was killed accidentally and as a result accidental death benefits became due and owing to his proper beneficiary. The proceeds of the policy amounted to $30,000 death benefits and $30,000 double indemnity, for a total of $60,000.

On November 18, 1974, General American filed its petition in interpleader pursuant to Rule 52.07 and alleged that conflicting claims had been made for the proceeds of the policy by (1) appellant, Vera Jean Rogers, the wife of decedent at the time of his death, (2) by a trustee for his children, Bernice Swaim, under a change of beneficiary form, and (3) by his four children and his former wife, Vanita, on behalf of the minor children.

All these parties were made defendants. The petition prayed that they be required to interplead and that General American be discharged from liability with costs.

The conflicting claims to the proceeds of the policy arise because of the legal effect of the stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into by Eugene and Vanita at the time of their 'divorce.' In the document, Mr. Rogers agreed in paragraph 8: (1) to cause the Union Electric Group policy in the amount of $4,500.00 ¹ 'to be continued in full force and effect'; (2) to continue to permit deductions from his pay to be made in order to retain the policy in full force and effect; (3) 'to designate as beneficiaries of the aforementioned group life insurance (policy) the children of the marriage of the parties, equally'; (4) in the event he remarries and has children, he may 'be entitled to name and to designate said subsequent born children also as beneficiaries on the afore-described life insurance policies, provided that all of his children, whether born of this marriage or hereafter, shall remain on an equal and irrevocable basis'; (5) to designate the 'present children of his marriage as irrevocable beneficiaries'; and (6) 'to perform whatever acts are necessary to effect the irrevocable beneficiary status of his children. . . .'

On June 9, 1972, Mr. Rogers executed a change of beneficiary form with General American naming as his beneficiaries his four children, Terry, Vickie, Bruce and Holly Renee, 'equally if living, or to the survivor(s) among them.' And he named his sister, Bernice Swaim, as trustee to receive any amount due 'a beneficiary who is a minor when amount becomes payable. . . .'

Then, on January 25, 1973, he executed another change of beneficiary form which added his second wife, Vera Jean, as an additional beneficiary.

After all pleadings were closed, and interrogatories were filed and answered, each of the conflicting claimants--Vera, Bernice Swaim, Vanita and the four children--filed a motion for summary judgment together with supporting affidavits. Rule 74.04. The four children prayed the court to enter summary judgment in their favor and requested that they each receive a one-fourth share of the proceeds of the policy and that the shares payable to the minor children, Bruce, Holly and Vickie, be paid to their natural mother, Vanita. Vera sought summary judgment and prayed that the court distribute from the proceeds of the policy a one-fifth interest to her and to 'Bernice Swain (sic), the one-fifth interests due the' children.

Bernice Swaim, as trustee, prayed that the interests due the minor children (Bruce, Vickie and Holly) be distributed to her as trustee.

After discharging General American from any further liability in the cause, the motions were argued and submitted. The trial court held that (1) the cause was a proper one for summary judgment, (2) the four children, as a result of the stipulation and settlement, acquired a property interest in the proceeds of the policy which could not be divested by subsequent attempts by Mr. Rogers to change the beneficiaries contrary to the stipulation, (3) Mr. Rogers had no power to add his second wife, Vera Jean, as a beneficiary, and (4) the contention of Vera that Mr. Robers by the stipulation attempted to guarantee to his children a total of $4,500.00 only, was without merit because the 'use of the figures totaling $4,500.00 in paragraph 8 of the Agreement was only an attempt to aid in the designation or description of the policy and not an attempt to limit the proceeds.' ²

The court therefore concluded that the children were the proper beneficiaries and ruled that Vanita was the proper person to receive the proceeds due the minor children, subject to the jurisdiction, instruction and guidance of the probate court. The court therefore overruled the motions for summary judgment of Vera and Bernice Swaim and sustained the motion of Vanita and the four children. The court ordered that one-fourth of the funds be awarded the adult child, Terry, the other three children be each paid a one-fourth share and that their mother establish a guardianship of the estates of the minor children and upon exhibition of letters, the three shares for the minor children be paid to her as guardian.

Vera Jean Rogers appealed. On this appeal she contends that the court erred (1) in finding that Mr. Rogers could not add her as a beneficiary thus entitling her to one-fifth of the proceeds of the policy, and (2) in not finding that the intent of the parties to the divorce stipulation was to limit the proceeds of the policy 'so that the insured was to set aside for his children' only $4,500.00 rather than the total amount of the proceeds. She argues that paragraph 8 of the stipulation shows that Mr. Rogers had entered into a contract for only a portion of the '$30,000.00 . . . Group Policy' and '(a)s to the remaining proceeds ($30,000 less $4,500?), the insured could add additional beneficiaries as long as he did not encroach on the . . . $4,500.00 . . . of the proceeds of such policy. . . .' ³

She bases her contention on the principle that where a policy of life insurance is issued reserving to the insured the right to change the beneficiary, the issuance of the policy does not confer a vested right in the beneficiary, and the insured has the right to change a beneficiary without the knowledge or consent of the original beneficiary. Postal Life and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Tillman, 287 S.W.2d 121, 125--126 (Mo.App.1956). She also argues that the thrust of the settlement agreement was to limit the proceeds to the children in the amount of $4,500, since paragraph 8 is clear and unambiguous, and the other provisions of the stipulation show that Mr. Rogers was designating only $4,500 for his children, and hence he had a right to include his wife, Vera, as an additional beneficiary, thus reducing the childrens' shares to one-fifth, rather than one-fourth. ⁴

We disagree with the contentions raised by appellant and affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial court.

This is a proper case for summary judgment. Rule 74.04(c) provides that if the 'pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,' summary judgment shall be rendered. See also Hurwitz v. Kohm, 516 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.App.1974). The material facts were not substantially in dispute; the question was one of law to be determined by the trial court.

As to appellant's first point, that the court erred in finding that Mr. Rogers could not add the appellant as an additional beneficiary, she claims that under the law the insured has the right to change a beneficiary in this case as long as Mr. Rogers did not encroach on the $4,500 given to the children. But this principle must be reconciled with the law in Missouri and elsewhere that where beneficiaries have a vested equitable interest or a property right in the proceeds of the policy by contract of the parties, that interest may not be defeated by an effort to change the beneficiaries without their consent. The law in Missouri and elsewhere ⁵ is clear that a contract obligating the insured to maintain a present policy in full force and effect for the benefit of certain beneficiaries named pursuant to an agreement is valid and that the beneficiaries so named acquire a right in the proceeds of the policy which will be protected against subsequently named beneficiaries who have no superior right. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Gibson, 421 S.W.2d 26, 33--34 (Mo.App.1967), and cases cited therein; Perry v....