General Council of Assemblies of God v. Fiadah

• Decision Date: 16 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. Civil No. 02-2360(SEC).,Civil No. 02-2360(SEC).
• Citation: 382 F.Supp.2d 315
• Parties: GENERAL COUNCIL OF the ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, Plaintiff v. FRATERNIDAD DE IGLESIA DE ASAMBLEA DE DIOS AUTONOMA HISPANA, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

382 F.Supp.2d 315

GENERAL COUNCIL OF the ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, Plaintiff v. FRATERNIDAD DE IGLESIA DE ASAMBLEA DE DIOS AUTONOMA HISPANA, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. Civil No. 02-2360(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 16, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Enrique J. Mendoza-Mendez, Mendoza & Baco, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Mireya Baltazar-Suazo, Barceloneta, PR Jorge L. Couto-Gonzalez, Manati, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket # 37).¹ Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Docket # 61) and Defendants have replied (Docket # 71). After examining the parties' filings, the case record and the applicable law, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.

Factual Background

On September 9, 2002 Plaintiff General Council of the Assemblies of God ("GCAG"), a religious organization with its principal place of business in Springfield, Missouri, brought suit against Defendants Fraternidad de Iglesia Asamblea de Dios Autónoma Hispana, Inc. ("FIADAH") and Reverend Juan A. Echevarría, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for unfair competition and deceptive practices under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (herein the "Lanham Act"), common law trademark, unfair competition, deceptive practices, and damages under federal and Puerto Rico law. Plaintiff alleges that Co-defendant FIADAH, although properly registered under the previously stated name with the State Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in practice calls itself, designates other churches and promotes its business by the name "Asambleas de Dios" (Assemblies of God), all in violation of Plaintiff's trademark rights over said name. In addition, Plaintiff avers that Co-defendant Echevarría is also liable since he is the person who registered FIADAH with the State Department, directs its affairs and has performed acts such as designating and promoting FIADAH and other churches as "Asambleas de Dios" (Assemblies of God).

Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims (Docket # 37). Defendants raise a plethora of arguments in support of said dismissal, to wit: (1) failure to join indispensable parties; (2) lack of standing to sue in Puerto Rico; (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (4) failure to plead under Rule 9(b) and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (5) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (6) Plaintiff is not entitled to a monetary award of damages; and (7) lack of individual liability against Co-defendant Echevarría. Plaintiff has filed a timely opposition to said motion which addresses each one of the alleged grounds for dismissal and Defendants replied.

Standard of Review

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986); NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 29 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401.

In this regard, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that for a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992); see also Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) ("[a] `genuine' issue is one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.") (citations omitted).

By like token, "material" means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994). "A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues that have been properly raised by the parties." 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2725 at p. 419. "Not every genuine factual conflict necessitates a trial. It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 983-84 (1st Cir.1995).

In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). Summary judgment "admits of no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails." Id. (citing Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987)). Accordingly, if the facts permit more than one reasonable inference, the court on summary judgment may not adopt the inference least favorable to the non-moving party. Casas Office Machs., 42 F.3d at 684.

While the moving party has the burden of initially establishing that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1984); the nonmovant has a "corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions." Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, "the nonmovant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trialworthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.")

Local Rule 56(b), moreover, requires the moving party to file annexed to the motion "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Unless the non-moving party controverts this statement, all the material facts set forth therein "shall be deemed to be admitted." Id.; Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2004). This is the so-called "anti-ferret rule." See, e.g., Orbi, S.A. v. Calvesbert & Brown, 20 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D.P.R.1998). While failure to comply with this rule does not automatically warrant the granting of summary judgment, "it launches the nonmovant's case down the road toward an early dismissal." Tavarez v. Champion Prods., Inc., 903 F.Supp. 268, 270 (D.P.R.1995).

In a recent opinion, the First Circuit reaffirmed the validity of the well-known anti-ferret rule previously codified in Local Rule 311.12. Cosme-Rosado, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (noting that "parties ignore [it] at their peril") (quoting Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000) (citations omitted)). As such, the Court is not required to "ferret through the record" lurking for facts that may favor the parties when those facts were not proffered as required by Local Rule 56(c). Morales v. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001).

Applicable Law and Analysis

1. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties

To this end, Defendants avers that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure to join: (1) other religious organizations which once belonged to GCAG as well; (2) other religious organization which also use the name "Assemblies of God"; and (3) the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As to the first two groups, Plaintiff avers that possible claims against "other potential infringers is simply irrelevant" to their claims against Defendants (Docket # 61 at p. 10). As to the Department of State, Plaintiff contends that the argument is frivolous since no remedy is sought against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Docket # 61 at p. 10). We agree on both accounts.

Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a person should be joined in a pending action when: (1) complete relief cannot be afforded to those who are already parties, (2) or the person claims to have an interest in the action and his absence would (i) hinder his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave a person who is already a party "subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). In tune with the above-stated test, we first analyze whether complete relief can be afforded to Plaintiff in the absence of other religious organizations and/or the Department of State. Defendants do not provide any basis for making this determination. Also, given that Plaintiff is suing Defendants for their alleged illegal use of the "Assemblies of...