General Elec. Co. v. International Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.-C.I.O.)
| Decision Date | 08 September 1952 |
| Citation | 108 N.E.2d 211,50 O.O. 399,93 Ohio App. 139 |
| Parties | , 64 Ohio Law Abs. 231, 50 O.O. 399 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (U.A.W.-C.I.O.), et al. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
J. Mack Swigert and Robert T. Keeler, Cincinnati, for plaintiff-appellee.
Thomas F. Hilbert, Jr., New York City (Charles F. Steele, Cincinnati, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Sol Goodman, Cincinnati, for defendant-appellants.
While this case was pending in the Common Pleas Court, a temporary restraining order was entered enjoining the defendants from committing any act in violation of a certain written contract entered into as of March 15th, 1951, between the plaintiff and the defendant unions, fixing wages, hours, working conditions and other provisions as they affected the plaintiff's employees, who were members of said unions. An appeal from that order was attempted which was dismissed by this court, on motion, on the ground that the order appealed from was not final, and, that, therefore, this Court had no jurisdiction to review it. That appeal is numbered 7632 upon the docket of this Court.
Thereafter, on a final hearing of the issues made by the pleadings, the Common Pleas Court found in favor of the plaintiff and a final judgment was entered granting a permanent injunction against the defendants. This appeal is from that judgment. We find part of the original papers filed under one number and part under the other. As the parties considered all of them filed under No. 7639, the Court will treat them as so filed.
On the trial de novo of the issues by this Court, the parties stipulated to submit the cause upon the record made in the Common Pleas Court, supplemented by the testimony of two witnesses taken before a Notary Public.
In its petition, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unions and the individual defendants,--all members of one or both unions--are actively and in concert engaged in inducing and participating in a work stoppage and strike in violation of certain terms of a contract entered into between it and them to regulate their relations as employer and employee for one year from March 15th, 1951, and automatically renewable from year to year under the conditions therein set forth, to-wit: 'and thereafter from year to year unless not later than sixty (60) days prior to any anniversary of the effective date of this Agreement either party notifies the other in writing of its intention to terminate this Agreement in which event the Agreement shall terminate on the anniversary date following the notice.'
It alleges that neither party notified the other in writing of its intention to terminate the agreement, and that by its terms the contract will continue in effect until March 15th, 1953.
The plaintiff also alleges that the action of the defendants in engaging in a strike and work stoppage violates the following provision of said contract:
'Any individuals causing or taking part in any action contrary to the provisions of this section shall be subject to disciplinary action at the discretion of the Company.'
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants, jointly and severally, have caused employes of the plaintiff to cease work and to absent themselves from its plant, have caused pickets to be stationed in great numbers at the entrances to its plant for the purpose of preventing employees and others having business with the plaintiff from entering its place of business, have made threats, engaged in mass picketing and acts of intimidation and coercion in furtherance of its purpose to enforce a work stoppage and block all means of ingress and egress at its place of business, all in violation of the above quoted provision of said contract and, that, by reason thereof, many employees and others having business with the plaintiff have been coerced and intimidated into not entering plaintiff's place of business and plaintiff has been forced to cease production which consisted in manufacturing jet engines under a contract with the United States of America, and which are of vital and emergent importance to it in its progress of preparation for National Defense, and cannot be obtained elsewhere.
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants, unless restrained, will continue to violate their contract as aforesaid, to its irreparable damage and that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
The prayer of the plaintiff is for a temporary and permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from permitting to continue in effect any instructions, orders, requests or other communications therefor issued or communicated to the members of said unions and other employees to suspend work at its plant in Lockland, Ohio, or interrupt or impede such work or engage in a work stoppage or strike or in any other way interfere with production there. By its prayer, the plaintiff seeks a prohibitory injunction against engaging or encouraging others to engage in the many acts incident to a work stoppage and strike, and a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant unions to give written notice in such form as is approved by the court to all their members and to all the plaintiff's employees that the work stoppage and strike have ended and that they should return to work.
The defendants by answer deny that there is any contract as alleged by the plaintiff, deny the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and generally deny each and every allegation contained in the petition. However, at the trial, the defendants did not dispute that the unions and their members had jointly and severally quit work and engaged in picketing the plaintiff's business establishment and endeavored to dissuade persons from entering. In other words, they were conducting a strike against the plaintiff and would continue to do so until their demands were met, unless enjoined.
The plaintiff offered no evidence of any fraud, violence intimidation, or other illegal acts that would be denounced by the law, and enjoined to prevent irreparable damage. The gravamen of the plaintiff's case is, that, assuming that in the absence of any contract, its employees would have the right to do all the acts complained of, these defendants have no such right, because they have surrendered such right in a binding enforceable contract. The defendants deny that any such contract exists now or existed at the time of the commission of the acts sought to be restrained.
It becomes necessary at the outset to examine the evidence to determine that issue.
There is no dispute that an agreement in writing containing the provisions heretofore quoted was entered into between the defendant unions and the plaintiff for one year ending on March 15th, 1952, unless automatically renewed by failure of either party to give notice as provided in Article XXV, heretofore quoted. The defendant unions claim that they gave a notice to terminate the contract more than 60 days prior to March 15th, 1952, and it is not disputed that a notice was given. The dispute is as to whether the notice served on the plaintiff by the defendant union was a notice to terminate, or a notice to modify or both, or an ambiguous notice, ineffective as either a notice to terminate or modify. The written contract was introduced in evidence, and to understand the controversy as to the legal effect of the notice served upon the plaintiff, we should have before us Article XXIV thereof. It is as follows:
The evidence shows that the defendant unions had printed and kept in supply a form of notice to be used by them when they desired to serve notice of their intention either to terminate or to modify. They used one of these forms to serve on the plaintiff. The following is a copy of that form, with the blank spaces filled in the one served upon the plaintiff:----
'60-Day Notice to Employer
Date, January 3, 1952
'To General Electric Company--Gas Turbine Division
(Name of Employer as it appears in the contract)
'This is a 60-day notice to you
(Address of Employer)
'This is a 60-day notice to you that we propose to (modify) (terminate) our collective bargaining contract.
(Strike out one)
'We hereby request you to meet and confer with us for the purpose of negotiating the terms of a (modified) (new) contract.
(To be filled out if modifications are proposed.)
The modifications which we propose are, among other, as follows:
1. Wages
2. Automatic Progression
3. Classification
Etc. Union Security and other issues
'While this notice is given pursuant to the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, the undersigned Union waives none of its rights and hereby expressly reserves all objections to the constitutionality, validity, and applicability of each and all of the provisions of said Act.
'International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, (UAW-CIO), Local #647
(Name of local Union as it appears in the Contract)
'By, George Jent--President
(Name and Title of each Officer signing this Notice)
'Form of Notice Approved:
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