General Expressways, Inc. v. Iowa Reciprocity Bd.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 53254,53254
• Citation: 163 N.W.2d 413
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: GENERAL EXPRESSWAYS, INC., Hall's, Inc., Little Audrey's Freight Lines, Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc., Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., Pre-Fab Transit Company, Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., Appellees, v. IOWA RECIPROCITY BOARD, Robert C. Barry, Bernard J. Martin and William F. Sueppel, Members of the Iowa Reciprocity Board, and Mrs. Joy Boyce Fitzgerald, Executive Secretary of said Board, Appellants, v. BILYEU REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT CORP., Bilyeu Transport, Inc., Safeway Truck Line, Inc., Wilson Brothers Transport, Inc., Producers Transport, Inc., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., Curtis, Inc., Intervenors-Appellees.

Page 413

163 N.W.2d 413

GENERAL EXPRESSWAYS, INC., Hall's, Inc., Little Audrey's Freight Lines, Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc., Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., Pre-Fab Transit Company, Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., Appellees, v. IOWA RECIPROCITY BOARD, Robert C. Barry, Bernard J. Martin and William F. Sueppel, Members of the Iowa Reciprocity Board, and Mrs. Joy Boyce Fitzgerald, Executive Secretary of said Board, Appellants, v. BILYEU REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT CORP., Bilyeu Transport, Inc., Safeway Truck Line, Inc., Wilson Brothers Transport, Inc., Producers Transport, Inc., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., Curtis, Inc., Intervenors-Appellees.

No. 53254.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 10, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Don R. Bennett, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles O. Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Jake More, Harlan, and Howard M. Downs, San Francisco, Cal., for appellees and intervenors-appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

On August 19, 1965, the original plaintiffs commenced their action for declaratory relief against the defendants, the Iowa Reciprocity Board and its members, alleging that chapter 302 of the Acts of the 61st General Assembly (hereinafter referred to as chapter 302) which amended chapter 326 of the 1962 Code was unconstitutional, that it was contrary to the provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Registration Proration and Reciprocity Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the uniform compact) between this state and other states, that it amounted to the impairment of the obligation of an interstate compact, and that they as proper parties were entitled to an injunction restraining the Iowa Reciprocity Board (hereinafter referred to as the board) from coercing the payment of disputed license fees by stopping plaintiffs' and intervenors' trucks and arresting their drivers. Although some of the original plaintiffs withdrew and several trucking firms intervened as party plaintiffs, we shall designate them only as plaintiffs.

Preliminary injunctions were issued in September and October, 1965, enjoining the board from efforts to collect the disputed fees, and bonds were furnished.

On February 23, 1968, after issues were joined, defendants moved for an adjudication of law points under rule 105, R.C.P., and pursuant to hearing thereon on March 27, 1968, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions, and judgment on April 23, 1968. It held that chapter 302 constituted an impairment of the obligation of a contract in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I, Section 21, of the Iowa Constitution, and insofar as it may require the apportionment fraction asserted by the board and permits the board to redetermine to 100 percent the fees of trucks owned by Iowa residents or trucks base-plated in Iowa, it is void. On May 13, 1968, the defendants appealed, and we resolved doubts as to the court's judgment being final by granting their right to take an interlocutory appeal on May 15, 1968.

Propositions relied upon for reversal are (1) that chapter 302, when read in light of various provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Registration Proration and Reciprocity Agreement, is not in conflict with that agreement; (2) that the plaintiffs lacked standing to question the validity of chapter 302 in that they are not parties to the compact, nor are they third party beneficiaries to that agreement; (3) that chapter 302, which amended chapter 326 of the 1962 Code, is valid, even assuming that the compact mile formula and the 100 percent redetermination provision found in the amending legislation conflict with the proration formula provisions of the compact, and the trial court erred in finding impairment of the compact obligation; (4) that the last paragraph of section 4 of chapter 302, which increased retroactive to January 1, 1965, the motor vehicle registration fees due Iowa from the plaintiffs, is not in violation of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution and does not constitute invalid retroactive legislation. Consideration of these issues will not be in that order, and propositions (1) and (3) will be considered together.

At this point a statement of facts set forth in the pleadings will be helpful.

Plaintiffs' petition reflects that they are common carriers engaged in interstate commerce traveling through Iowa, and that they each own or lease a fleet of two or more commercial vehicles. It alleges plaintiffs have paid the State of Iowa registration fees which were due and owing for the year 1965 prior to the effective date of the 61st General Assembly amendment to chapter 326 of the Code. It challenges this Act as being an impairment of a prior obligation of this state in violation of the federal and state constitutions and of the due process clause, because it was made retroactive to the beginning of the year 1965; as imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the federal constitution; as a denial of equal protection because it discriminates against interstate carriers; as an attempt to delegate legislative and judicial powers to the board; and as being so ambiguous and uncertain as to be unenforceable. We note here that only the first two issues were argued to and considered by the trial court in ruling on defendants' motion for adjudication of law points. We shall, therefore, confine this opinion to those issues.

In their answer defendants admitted that the State of Iowa entered into a valid and binding contract when it became a party to the compact, but denied that chapter 326 as amended violated any federal or state constitutional provision. Defendants counterclaimed for fees alleged due by virtue of the 1965 amendments, and alleged in plaintiffs' 1965 vehicle registration proration application they agreed in paragraph (e) that 'if the Iowa legislature enacts legislation providing for a different method of determining the prorate fees due Iowa for the year 1965 registration year, and a redetermination of prorate fees due from applicant for 1965 registrations is made, * * * applicant will remit all additional fees owed to Iowa * * *.'

Plaintiffs' reply admitted they had submitted the 1965 applications containing paragraph (e), but denied it was valid or had any effect because it was obtained by duress and was contingent upon events not within the control of either party.

Perhaps by way of background we should note briefly the prior legislation and operation of the board pursuant thereto until this action was commenced.

In 1959 Iowa enacted chapter 250, Acts of the 58th General Assembly. This act amended chapter 321 of the Code, which was later amended and codified as chapter 326 of the 1962 Code of Iowa. This forerunner to the law being challenged in the instant case was enacted to allow Iowa to become a party to the uniform compact. It authorized the Iowa reciprocity board to make agreements with other states whereby Iowa and other participating states would agree to charge only a prorated truck registration fee. Under the compact nonresidents would be exempt from paying the usual motor vehicle registration fees to Iowa for use of Iowa highways, but could not escape all fees formerly waived under straight reciprocity. In an attempt to obtain a fair share of such license fees the Iowa General Assembly enacted chapter 250, above referred to, which limited the authority of the board by provisions set out therein appearing in chapter 326 of the 1962 Code. Pursuant to that statutory authority, the Iowa board signed the uniform compact for the State of Iowa in 1959 and obtained approval of a specific Iowa appendix thereto attached. Iowa's participation became effective with the 1960 registration year.

Chapter 326, Code of 1962, in section 326.2, directed that such agreements could provide 'with respect to resident or nonresident owners of fleets of two or more (commercial) vehicles which are engaged in interstate commerce, * * * that the registrations of such fleets can be apportioned between this state and other states in which such fleets operate.' The formula to be used by the board in arriving at Iowa's share of the prorate registration fee was then set out as follows:

'The percentage of miles such fleets operate in this state as related to the total miles such fleets operate in all states, shall be used by the reciprocity board to determine the amount of registration computed on a dollar basis * * *. The apportioned registration fee computed on a dollar basis is equal to the amount obtained by applying the proportion of in-state fleet miles to total fleet miles to the fees which would otherwise be required for total fleet registration in this state and shall mean a percentage of the annual fee on each vehicle of an apportioned fleet, * * *.'

The uniform compact, in section 50, provided a like formula for prorating registration fees, but the compact also provided in section 52 that a different formula could be used if agreed to by the other members of the compact.

Prior to Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 137 N.W.2d 900, the Iowa board construed the language in the statutory formula, 'all states' and 'total fleet miles', to mean 'all apportioning states' and 'total fleet miles in apportioning states,' or, in other words, permitted the use of compact miles rather than over-all miles in computing the fee due this state. The board took the position that the statute provided for a determination of truck license fees by a formula that resulted in the equivalent of one full fee being divided among Iowa and those states with which it had agreed to prorate registration fees. This, it contends, was the intent and purpose of the Iowa appendix agreed to by the other contracting states when Iowa became a party to the uniform compact in 1960. We shall consider that contention in Division II infra.

The board also took the position...