General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Henson, 18127

• Decision Date: 02 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18127,18127
• Citation: 243 S.C. 276,133 S.E.2d 798
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Respondent, v. Thornwell W. HENSON, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 798

133 S.E.2d 798

243 S.C. 276

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Respondent, v. Thornwell W. HENSON, Appellant.

No. 18127.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 2, 1963.

Harley L. Wooten, Greenville, for appellant.

Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

The defendant signed, as surety, a defendant's redelivery bond in claim and delivery proceedings instituted by the plaintiff for the repossession of an automobile. Judgment was entered in that action in favor of the plaintiff and this action was then instituted against the defendant to recover, under the bond, damages allegedly sustained by reason of the depreciation in value of the automobile during the pendency of the claim and delivery action. Upon the trial of this case and at the conclusion of the testimony, the lower court held, upon proper motion, that the testimony conclusively showed that the automobile in question had depreciated in value in the amount of $2400.00, and directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for that amount. From such judgment, the defendant has appealed. Our sole inquiry is whether the trial judge, under the testimony, properly withdrew the case from the jury and directed a verdict for the plaintiff.

It is well settled that, in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict, the testimony and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and, if more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the testimony or the inferences to be drawn therefrom are in doubt, the case should be submitted to the jury. However, if the evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the question is no longer for the jury but one of law for the court. Owens v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 239 S.C. 14, 121 S.E.2d 240; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Platt, 239 S.C. 103, 121 S.E.2d 351.

The plaintiff held a conditional sales contract covering a 1957 model automobile owned by one Donald H. Newton. Upon default on the contract, claim and delivery proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff in December 1957 for the repossession of the vehicle. Newton promptly filed a redelivery bond in the amount of $6500.00, with two sureties, one of whom was the defendant, and thereby retained possession on the property during the pendency of the action. On or about April 15, 1960, approximately twenty-nine months after the bond was filed, judgment was entered in the claim and delivery action in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the automobile, or in the event possession could not be had, then for its value in the sum of $3250.00. The automobile was promptly delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to the foregoing judgment and, after due advertisement, was sold at public auction on June 10, 1960, to the plaintiff for the sum of $650.00, being the highest bid therefor. Subsequently, the plaintiff was able to sell the automobile at a private sale for $850.00.

After the foregoing sale, this action was instituted by the plaintiff. In his answer, the defendant, in addition to a denial of the material allegations of the complaint, alleged that the automobile had been surrendered to the plaintiff within a reasonable time after judgment in the claim and delivery action in substantially the same condition as it was when the defendant signed the redelivery bond; that the sale of the automobile was not held at the time advertised, thereby preventing the vehicle from bringing its true value; and that any depreciation in value of the automobile was off-set by repairs made thereon during the period in question.

Section 10-2510 of the 1962 Code of Laws...