General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Capitol Garage, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1967
• Citation: 154 Conn. 593,227 A.2d 548
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. CAPITOL GARAGE, INC.

Page 548

227 A.2d 548

154 Conn. 593

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. CAPITOL GARAGE, INC.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 7, 1967.

Irwin I. Krug, Willimatic, for appellant (defendant).

C. George Kanabis, New London, with whom, on the brief, was Harry R. Traystman, New London, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER and RYAN, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

The complaint alleged that the defendant converted to its own use a car owned by the plaintiff under an assignment of a conditional bill of sale from Leader Chevrolet Company, a retail automobile dealer located in West Springfield, Massachusetts. By way of special defense the defendant in essence claimed that it was a purchaser in good faith without knowledge of the interest of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff lost whatever security interest it may have had in the automobile by failing to file a financing statement in accordance with the laws of Massachusetts.

The finding, which is supported by the evidence and thus not subject to correction, may be summarized as follows: On March 25, 1960, Frederick E. Bemis of Wilbraham, Massachusetts, purchased a Chevrolet automobile from Leader Chevrolet Company. The transaction was financed by the plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, through an assignment of the conditional bill of sale. Neither Leader Chevrolet Company nor the plaintiff filed the conditional bill of sale in any public office in Massachusetts. Three days later, on March 28, 1960, Bemis sold the Chevrolet to the defendant, an automobile dealer in Willimantic, Connecticut. The plaintiff, when it became aware in July, 1960, of the sale by Bemis to the defendant, made a demand on the defendant for the return of the automobile. This demand was refused by the defendant, which had already sold the automobile on March 29 to another, individual purchaser. Bemis has defaulted on his obligation to the plaintiff, and it is agreed that the plaintiff's resulting interest in the security, if any, amounts to $2861.99.

The plaintiff in its complaint alleged that Bemis had purchased the automobile for his personal or family use. ¹ In proof of this allegation the plaintiff introduced the original conditional bill of sale. In a printed form, below the signatures to the conditional sale contract and on the same paper, was an acknowledgment of receipt of a copy of the contract and a representation that the purchase of the automobile was 'for use only for personal or family purposes,' signed by Bemis. The plaintiff also introduced evidence through representatives of Leader Chevrolet and the defendant of oral statements made to them by Bemis indicating he had purchased the Chevrolet for personal use. The defendant conceded that the document was admissible for certain purposes under the business entry rule but claimed that it was not admissible for the truth of the portion which had to do with the representation. See General Statutes § 52-180. This claim was under the theory that the probative force of the representation depended upon the competency and credibility of Bemis, who was neither a party to the suit nor a witness in the proceedings. The introduction of all this evidence was objected to by the defendant of the ground that it was hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections and, on the basis of the disputed evidence, found that Bemis had purchased the Chevrolet for personal or family use. From this finding the court concluded that the transaction between Bemis and Leader Chevrolet was exempt from the filing requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Massachusetts and thus that the plaintiff had not lost its secured interest, even though the conditional sale contract had not been filed. See Mass.Ann.Laws, c. 106, §§ 9-109(1), 9-302(1)(d). Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed, claiming error in the admission of the disputed evidence.

The written recital, described in the document as a representation, comes within the exclusionary hearsay rule since it 'was a statement out of court by one not a party to this action, offered to affect the defendant, not itself a party to the contract.' Brown v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 290, 294, 141 A.2d 634; Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 142 Conn. 558, 563, 115 A.2d 659; Burn v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 94 Conn. 1, 6, 107 A. 609. This general rule, which excludes hearsay evidence unless it comes within one of the recognized exceptions, applies to written statements as well as oral ones. The reason for the rule is basically that the sanction of an oath and the test of cross-examination are absent. While there are many exceptions to the rule, in general they have been created where the statements are made under conditions deemed to render them equal in reliability and trustworthiness to those which are made under the sanctions described. Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 275, 205 A.2d 773; Warner v. Warner, 124 Conn. 625, 638, 1 A.2d 911, 118 A.L.R. 1348.

The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the written declaration by Bemis was admissible without limitation as a regular business entry, and the trial court so ruled. See General Statutes § 52-180. The application and the interpretation of this statute have been considered in a number of cases involving the admission, as exhibits, of hospital records which may now be offered for admission under General Statutes § 4-104. (See Ianni v. Daily, 153 Conn. 445, 448, 217 A.2d 707, for a discussion of the history of §§ 52-180 and 4-104.) In passing upon the exclusion of an entry in a hospital record, where the record had been admitted without objection as a business entry under the provisions of § 52-108, we decided that, while this statute should be construed liberally, it should not be interpreted to allow the admission of every statement which happens to be contained in a business entry or record. Maggi v. Mendillo, 147 Conn. 663, 667, 165 A.2d 603; Stitham v. LeWare, 134 Conn. 681, 685, 60 A.2d 658. The statute may not be used for admitting statements which are collateral to the essential purpose of the business entry. D'Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 61, 97 A.2d 893, 38 A.L.R2d 772. Nor should it be allowed as a vehicle for admitting statements of third parties who had no business duty in relation to the entry made. D'Amato v. Johnston, supra, 59, 97 A.2d 893. In the present case, the business record in question contained a statement by Bemis, who had not official position with the maker of the record and no business duty to contribute to that record, regarding a matter which was essentially...