General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle
| Citation | 1 Cal.Rptr. 581 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 28 December 1959 |
| Parties | GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ronald M. KYLE, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 23790. |
Getz, Aikens & Manning and Harold T. Tredway, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Arkin & Weissman and Stuart N. Arkin, Culver City, for respondent.
The present suit in claim and delivery to recover possession of a 1957 Chevrolet Sport Coupe was instituted by appellant as the assignee of a contract of conditional sale entered into between Milliken Chevrolet, Inc., the seller, and respondent Kyle, the buyer of the car. Following commencement of the action, the Chevrolet was delivered to appellant and was resold by Milliken. Kyle answered the complaint, alleging that the contract was void because it did not comply with section 2982(a) of the Civil Code, and by way of counterclaim he sought recovery of the vehicle or its value. The court made findings that appellant was guilty of conversion of the car and entered judgment adverse to appellant on its complaint and in favor of Kyle on his counterclaim in the sum of $2,643, which was stipulated to be the reasonable value of the car at the time of repossession.
On December 21, 1956, Kyle purchased the Chevrolet from Milliken, giving as a trade-in a 1951 Ford convertible. The contract provided that Kyle was to pay for the Chevrolet a cash sales price of $3,637.66, including a cash down payment of $787.47, less $250, the agreed trade-in value of the Ford; plus $180 for insurance, $54 for registration, transfer and other fees and a time price differential of $455.91; the contract balance of $3,290.10 was payable in 30 equal monthly installments of $109.67. The contract also provided for repossession by the seller in the event of the buyer's default in any payment. The copy of the contract delivered to Kyle was received in evidence; it did not bear the signature of Milliken or its authorized representative nor did the contract specifically set forth to whom the charges for fees were to be paid. The court found that the cash down payment actually made by Kyle amounted to only $285. This finding was based upon his uncontradicted testimony.
Kyle paid the first two installments due under the contract. He then consulted an attorney who sent a letter to Milliken and to appellant, stating the opinion of the attorney that the contract was void under section 2982(a) of the Civil Code and advising that since a tender of the Chevrolet had been refused by Milliken, his client would retain possession of the car but make no further payments on the contract balance. The present action was begun shortly thereafter.
Judgment was entered in favor of Kyle upon a theory that the contract was invalid and unenforceable by Milliken; that appellant, as Milliken's assignee, could not enforce it by repossession or otherwise; that appellant converted the car; and that the car having been resold, Kyle was entitled to recover its reasonable value as damages for the conversion.
Section 2982(a) of the Civil Code provides that every contract for the conditional sale of a motor vehicle shall be in writing and shall contain a complete statement of the terms of the contract. The statute also provides: 'It [the contract] shall be signed by the buyer * * * and by the seller * * *, and when so executed an exact copy thereof shall be delivered by the seller to the buyer at the time of its execution.' There are 10 items chiefly relating to the selling price of the vehicle which must be stated in the contract. One of them is the amount of the cash down payment, if any, made by the buyer. Another is a 'description and itemization of amounts, if any, which will actually be paid by the seller or his assignee to any public officer as fees in connection with the transaction * * *.' Failure to comply with these requirements renders the contract unenforceable by the seller. Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 203 P.2d 758; Estrada v. Alvarez, 38 Cal.2d 386, 240 P.2d 278; Lewis v. Muntz Car Co., 50 Cal.2d 681, 328 P.2d 968; City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851.
It is clear that the contract in the present case was invalid by reason of the failure of Milliken to comply with the provisions of the statute and that the invalidity of the contract would have furnished Kyle with a complete defense to an action brought by Milliken on the contract. Furthermore, Kyle could have recovered from Milliken the amount of his down payment and his payments on the contract balance, less an offset to the seller representing the detriment occasioned by his use of the Chevrolet. City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, supra, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851.
We will assume for the purpose of our discussion that appellant purchased the contact subject to the statutory defense which Kyle could have asserted in an action brought by the...
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