General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Lyman
Decision Date | 03 December 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 17951.,17951. |
Citation | 78 S.W.2d 109 |
Parties | GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. LYMAN et al. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Allen C. Southern, Judge.
Action by the General Motors Acceptance Corporation against H. E. Lyman and others, wherein defendants Anthony V. Mura and another filed a counterclaim. Judgment for plaintiff, defendant Lyman's motion to correct the judgment and quash the execution issued thereon was sustained, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Leon Greenebaum, of Kansas City, for appellant.
Cowgill & Popham and John F. Cook, all of Kansas City, for respondents.
CAMPBELL, Commissioner.
This action was begun in the court of a justice of the peace in Kaw township, Jackson county, against H. E. Lyman, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, and others. The venue of the cause was changed to the court of another justice in the same township. The judgment in the justice court was in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff, ten days subsequent to the rendition of the judgment, appealed. The circuit court entered a judgment in the cause as follows:
The property of the defendant was seized under an execution issued upon the judgment. Thereafter defendant filed a motion to correct the judgment and to quash the execution. The motion was heard and sustained. Plaintiff has appealed.
The proceeding is based upon the claim that the defendant was not served with notice of the appeal from the judgment of the justice. Following the introduction by defendant of evidence of a preliminary nature, the plaintiff, having obtained leave to do so, introduced in evidence the affidavit upon which the change of venue was granted. The affidavit was signed, "H. E. Lyman by E. M. Faulkner." The plaintiff also introduced the jacket containing the papers filed in the cause in the court of the justice in which the judgment was rendered. Thereon is written the following: "E. M. Faulkner for defendant Lyman." Later in the trial plaintiff introduced in evidence a notice of appeal signed, "E. M. Faulkner agent for defendants." The defendant testified in substance that Faulkner did not represent him, never acted for or on his behalf, that he did not know that Faulkner signed his name to the affidavit for change of venue, and that he did not know that there was an appeal from the judgment of the justice until after the execution was issued.
Mr. Faulkner testified for defendant that he was not employed by the defendant; that he did not represent the defendant in the case; that he signed the defendant's name to the affidavit for change of venue "just to send the case from there"; that he was not a lawyer; that at the time he signed the notice of appeal he told plaintiff's counsel that he "represented Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Mura and signed on appeal as such." On cross-examination, Faulkner testified:
In the trial in the circuit court the parties waived a jury, tried the cause as though the question as to whether notice of appeal had or had not been given was properly presented in the motion, and that such question was one of fact for the determination of the trial judge. The notice of appeal was duly served on Faulkner. The issue in the trial was whether or not Faulkner was the agent of the defendant. The parties voluntarily tried that issue and neither of them may say on appeal that there was no such issue. Cook v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Mo. App.) 71 S.W.(2d) 73, 74. The finding of the court is supported by substantial evidence and is, therefore, conclusive on appeal.
The plaintiff contends that the court erred in permitting the defendant to show that "Faulkner had no authority to execute the change of venue for Lyman, thereby allowing respondent, through parol testimony, to impeach Justice Layton's docket in a particular wherein such docket is conclusive." When the defendant sought to prove that Faulkner was not his agent or attorney, the plaintiff objected for the reason "that the records of the justice court are the best evidence of who represented him in those...
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