General Motors Corp. v. Hammock

• Decision Date: 18 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. A02A0849.,A02A0849.
• Citation: 255 Ga. App. 131,564 S.E.2d 536
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. HAMMOCK.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

564 S.E.2d 536

255 Ga. App. 131

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. HAMMOCK.

No. A02A0849.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 18, 2002.

Adams Barfield, Dunaway & Hankinson, David B. Dunaway, Thomaston, for appellant.

Richard H. Bishoff, Thomaston, Alonzo J. Bentley, Jr., for appellee.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

We consider Keith Hammock's motion to dismiss the appeal of General Motors Corporation from a discovery order which General Motors contends is directly appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 287 S.E.2d 7 (1982) (direct appeal of denial of plea of double jeopardy); Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431(1)(c), 297 S.E.2d 469 (1982) (direct appeal of cancellation of lis pendens notice).

Hammock filed the underlying wrongful death action against General Motors and other defendants, alleging product liability and other causes of action arising from a claimed defect in the design/manufacture of the 1995 Geo Prism automobile.

Discovery ensued, and the trial court, after in camera inspection of 12 boxes of evidence which General Motors contended was privileged, ordered the production by General Motors of numerous documents, including the June 29, 1973 Ivey Memo, entitled "Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed Fire Related Fatalities." General Motors then filed its notice of appeal in the trial court,¹ which Hammock seeks to dismiss.

As acknowledged by General Motors, Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, 226 Ga.App. 77, 485 S.E.2d 525 (1997), a six-to-four full court decision, is a major impediment to its argument that this discovery dispute is directly appealable. In that case, a majority of this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's rationale in finding discovery disputes not subject to the collateral order doctrine. As stated in Johnson & Johnson, "`in the rare case when appeal after final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling. (Cit.)' Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981)." Id. at 82, 485 S.E.2d 525.

General Motors further argues that, based on In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 513 S.E.2d 219 (1999), because the work product rule protects the attorney as well as the client, this matter should be considered directly appealable because it involves a nonparty, the attorney. In re Paul, however, involved a reporter issued a subpoena by a grand jury seeking unpublished notes about an interview with an accused murderer. Both the State and the accused wanted to ask the reporter questions and, at the trial court's direction, submitted written interrogatories in the criminal proceeding. In response, Paul asserted the reporter's privilege, OCGA § 24-9-30. The trial court ordered Paul to answer interrogatories of both parties. In this context, the Supreme Court concluded that

[b]ecause of the collateral nature of the reporter's privilege issue in most cases, we conclude that reporters who are not parties in the underlying action should not have to wait until the case is concluded before appealing an order that requires them to disclose information. The disclosure order typically is a final decision concerning the news reporter. In this case, for example, the order rejecting the privilege claim and compelling

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