General Motors Corp. v. Florida Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, s. 91-2502

• Decision Date: 22 September 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 91-2502,91-2503,s. 91-2502
• Citation: 625 So.2d 76
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2101 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES; Florida Automobile Dealers Association, and South Florida Auto Truck Dealers Association, Appellees. ED MORSE CHEVROLET OF SEMINOLE, INC., Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES; Florida Automobile Dealers Association, and South Florida Auto Truck Dealers Association, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 76

625 So.2d 76

18 Fla. L. Weekly D2101

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES;

Florida Automobile Dealers Association, and South

Florida Auto Truck Dealers Association,

Appellees.

ED MORSE CHEVROLET OF SEMINOLE, INC., Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES;

Florida Automobile Dealers Association, and South

Florida Auto Truck Dealers Association, Appellees.

Nos. 91-2502, 91-2503.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Sept. 22, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 1993.

Dean Bunch of Cabaniss, Burke & Wagner, P.A., Tallahassee, for General Motors Corp., Michael A. Fogarty and Richard E. Fee of Glenn Rasmussen & Fogarty, Tampa, Lee Stracher of Stracher & Harmon, P.A., Plantation, for appellant Ed Morse Chevrolet of Seminole, Inc.

Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, Michael J. Alderman, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Tallahassee, for appellee State of Florida Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.

William C. Owen of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee Florida Auto. Dealers Ass'n.

James D. Adams of Adams & Quinton, P.A., Boca Raton, for South Florida Auto Truck Dealers Ass'n.

WEBSTER, Judge.

In these two consolidated appeals, appellants seek review of a final order entered by a Division of Administrative Hearings hearing officer. In that final order, the hearing officer concluded that Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-1.008 and Proposed Rules 15C-7.004(4)(a), (4)(b) and (7)(d) do not constitute invalid exercises of authority delegated to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) by the legislature; and, accordingly, denied appellants' challenges to those rules. On appeal, appellants address only rule 15C-1.008, which they argue is inconsistent with chapter 320, Florida Statutes (1989); and exceeds the rulemaking authority granted to the Department by the legislature. We affirm.

Rule 15C-1.008 is intended principally to implement section 320.642, Florida Statutes, which addresses the procedure to be followed to determine whether an application for a motor vehicle dealer license should be granted when a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor or importer of motor vehicles "proposes to establish an additional ... dealership or permit the relocation of an existing dealer to a location within a community or territory where the same line-make vehicle is presently represented by a franchised ... dealer or dealers." Sec. 320.642(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). Subsection (2) of that section requires the Department to deny an application for a motor vehicle dealer license when "[a] timely protest is filed by a presently existing franchised ... dealer with standing," and the manufacturer, factory branch, distributor or importer "fails to show that the existing franchised dealer or dealers who register new motor vehicle retail sales or retail leases of the same line-make in the community or territory of the proposed dealership are not providing adequate representation of such line-make motor vehicles in such community or territory." Sec. 320.642(2)(a)1. & 2., Fla.Stat. (1989). Subsection (2) requires, further, that, in making a determination regarding the adequacy of existing representation in the community or territory, the Department consider evidence directed to certain enumerated issues, or "questions." Sec. 320.642(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989).

Appellants object only to the last portion of rule 15C-1.008, which reads:

The Director may make such further investigation and hold such hearing as he deems necessary to determine the questions specified under Section 320.642. A determination so made by the Director shall be effective as to such license for a period of twelve (12) months from the date of the Director's Order, or date of final judicial determination in the event of an appeal, unless for good cause a different period is set by the Director in his order of determination.

(Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that, because no such time limit is contained in section 320.642, the Department lacks the authority to adopt one by rule. They do not argue on this appeal that the time limit chosen is unreasonable and, therefore, arbitrary or capricious. Rather, they argue that any such time limit is beyond the Department's authority. We are unable to accept appellants' argument.

The legislature's intent in adopting sections 320.60 through 320.70 is expressed as follows:

It is the intent of the Legislature to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state by regulating the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor vehicle dealers.

Sec. 320.605, Fla.Stat. (1989). As to chapter 320 generally, the legislature has provided that "[t]he [D]epartment shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and may adopt such rules as it deems necessary or proper for the administration hereof." Sec. 320.011, Fla.Stat. (1989). The legislature has reiterated its intent in this regard in section 320.69, which relates specifically to sections 320.60 through 320.70: "The [D]epartment may make such rules and regulations as it shall deem necessary or proper for the effective administration and enforcement of this law." Sec. 320.69, Fla.Stat. (1989).

"[R]ulemaking authority may be implied to the extent necessary to properly implement a statute governing the agency's statutory duties and responsibilities." Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers v. Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, 475 So.2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Accord Fairfield Communities v. Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 522 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Moreover,

[i]t is well established in Florida that the Legislature, having enacted a Statute complete in itself which declares a legislative policy or standard and operates to limit the power delegated, may authorize an administrative agency to prescribe rules and regulations for its administration.... Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act", the validity of regulations promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious.

Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (citations omitted). Accord General Telephone Co. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 446 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1984). We believe that the portion of rule 15C-1.008 to which appellants object constitutes a valid exercise of the Department's implied rulemaking authority.

Sections 320.011 and 320.69 clearly give the Department the authority to adopt such rules as it deems necessary effectively to administer and to enforce the law, consistent with the legislative intent. The expressed intent is "to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state by regulating the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor vehicle dealers." Sec. 320.605, Fla.Stat. (1989).

"The purpose of [section] 320.642 ... is to prevent powerful manufacturers from taking unfair advantage of their dealers by overloading a market area with more dealers than can be justified by the legitimate interests of the manufacturer and its dealers, existing and prospective." Bill Kelley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Calvin, 322 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1180 (Fla.1976). Accord Plantation Datsun, Inc. v. Calvin, 275 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Consistent with that purpose, section 320.642(2) requires the Department to determine whether an additional (either new or relocated) dealership is justified, economically and otherwise, from the viewpoints of the existing dealers and the public, respectively. The types of evidence which the statute requires the Department to consider include demographic and market data. Clearly, such data changes over time, as does the economy. What may be a perfectly defensible determination based upon today's data, might well prove to be indefensible at some point in the future. It seems to us that, in order effectively to administer section 320.642, it is essential that the Department have the authority to limit the life of a determination made pursuant to that section. Accordingly, we conclude that the authority to adopt rule 15C-1.008 is fairly implied from chapter 320 generally and, more particularly, sections 320.60 through 320.70. Fairfield Communities, 522 So.2d at 1014; Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, 475 So.2d at 942.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, J., concurs.

BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion.

BOOTH, Judge, dissenting:

A careful review of chapter 320, Florida Statutes, fails to reveal any basis for the challenged portion of Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-1.008, which provides for automatic expiration of a previously approved application for license. ¹ The following is the sum total of the rule on this matter:

A determination so made [granting an application] by the Director shall be effective as to such license for a period of twelve (12) months from the date of the Director's Order, or date of final judicial determination in the event of an appeal, unless for good cause a different period is set by the Director in his order of determination.

This is no small "procedural" matter, as the requirements for obtaining approval of such application are among the most arduous and expensive of any under Florida law. ²

Briefly, the facts are...