General Motors Corp. v. Jernigan
| Decision Date | 12 December 2003 |
| Citation | 883 So.2d 646 |
| Parties | GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Wilbert JERNIGAN, individually and as father and next friend of Jeffrey Jernigan, a minor child. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Warren B. Lightfoot and M. Christian King of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; Robert D. Hays, Jameson B. Carroll, and L. Frank Coan, Jr., of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia; and David M. Heilbron, Frank M. Hinman, Christina M. Wheeler, and May Lee of Bingham McCutchen, LLP, San Francisco, California, for appellant.
Frank M. Wilson, Montgomery; Jere Locke Beasley and J. Greg Allen of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, PC, Montgomery; Fred D. Gray, Sr., and Walter E. McGowan of Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan, Gray & Nathanson, Tuskegee; and Lynn W. Jinks III of Jinks, Daniel & Crow, Union Springs, for appellee.
George M. Walker of Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Mobile; and Walter Dellinger, Brian D. Boyle, and Matthew M. Shors of O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in support of the appellant.
General Motors Corporation ("GM") appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Wilbert Jernigan, individually and as father and next friend of Jeffrey Jernigan, a minor child (the father is hereinafter referred to as "Jernigan"), and from the trial court's order denying its postjudgment motion. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On December 10, 1999, Jeffrey Jernigan and his older brother Nickolas Jernigan were involved in an automobile accident. Nickolas, who was 17 years old, was driving a 1993 Oldsmobile Delta 88 automobile ("the Oldsmobile") owned by Jernigan. Jeffrey, who was 12 years old, was a passenger in the front seat of the Oldsmobile. Both boys were wearing their seat belts. The Oldsmobile, traveling at a speed of 50 to 55 miles per hour, crashed into an oncoming 2000 Pontiac Grand Prix automobile ("the Pontiac") traveling at approximately the same speed. The right front corners of both automobiles took the brunt of the impact. In this offset frontal (almost head-on) collision, the Oldsmobile's right front structures crushed toward Jeffrey, striking his head and pinning his feet in the wreckage. He was thrown forward and sustained grave injuries, primarily a skull fracture that required surgical removal of a portion of the left frontal lobe of his brain, resulting in permanent and severe brain damage, personality changes, and learning deficits; he also sustained a second-degree burn to his left foot.2 Neither Nickolas nor the driver of the Pontiac sustained serious injuries.
Jernigan sued GM and other defendants,3 seeking compensatory and punitive damages individually and on behalf of Jeffrey based upon the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("the AEMLD"). The case was tried before a jury from April 22 to May 2, 2002. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jernigan, awarding $20 million in compensatory damages to Jernigan on behalf of Jeffrey, $2 million in compensatory damages to Jernigan, individually, and $100 million in punitive damages.4 The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. GM filed a postjudgment motion renewing previously filed motions for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), requesting a new trial, or, alternatively, requesting a remittitur of the damages awards. The trial court remitted the punitive-damages award to $60 million (three times the compensatory damages awarded on Jeffrey's behalf as required by § 6-11-21(a), Ala.Code 1975),5 but otherwise denied the postjudgment motion. GM appealed.
Jernigan filed his action in the Bullock Circuit Court. He was a police officer in Bullock County for 20 years before he was elected the county's circuit clerk, a position he held when the case was tried. Jernigan and his family were known and respected in the community.
Jernigan's office is in the same courthouse as the office of the trial judge, L. Bernard Smithart, the only circuit judge in Bullock County. Before he became a judge, Judge Smithart was a partner in one of the law firms that represents Jernigan in this case. In January 2001, GM moved for Judge Smithart to recuse himself, arguing in its motion that he and Jernigan had a "special relationship" and that "it would be improper to have Mr. Jernigan's case litigated in the Court where Mr. Jernigan works daily and before the judge with whom he stands in such a unique relationship." GM also argued that the foregoing circumstances created the appearance of impropriety, thus requiring Judge Smithart's recusal. After a hearing, Judge Smithart denied GM's motion. GM did not seek review of that ruling by this Court.
In early April 2002, Judge Smithart took a three-day vacation trip to Mexico with several lawyers, one of whom was Greg Allen, one of Jernigan's lawyers in this case. Before taking the trip, Judge Smithart contacted the Judicial Inquiry Commission and asked whether taking a vacation trip that included a lawyer involved in a case before him involved a breach of judicial ethics. The executive director of the Judicial Inquiry Commission told Judge Smithart that there would not be any problem with the trip and that it was not necessary to inform the parties about the trip. Nevertheless, in late March, Judge Smithart did inform the parties in writing and offered to cancel the trip if either party objected. GM did not formally respond, although two lawyers for GM told lawyers for Jernigan that GM had no objection. On April 1, however, GM renewed its motion to recuse, and on April 2, filed a motion for a change of venue, citing the trip, Jernigan's prominent position in the community, and the "relationship" between Jernigan and Judge Smithart. After Judge Smithart returned to Alabama, GM supplemented its motion to recuse with further argument about the trip. After a hearing on the evening before trial began, Judge Smithart denied both motions. GM then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court on April 25, three days after trial had already begun, seeking either Judge Smithart's recusal or a change of venue. This Court denied the petition. Ex parte General Motors Corp. (No. 1011450, April 30, 2002).
The jury venire for this case consisted of 70 prospective jurors. The attorneys for both parties and the trial court questioned the venire at length. Ten veniremembers had dealt with Jernigan in his capacity as circuit clerk, 7 either worked in the courthouse or had relatives who did, 13 knew Nickolas, 11 knew Jeffrey, 8 knew about the accident, and all but 2 responded positively when asked whether they were sympathetic to the Jernigan family. Thirteen veniremembers were or had been clients of one of the law firms representing Jernigan, and six had consulted one of those firms.6 Only three veniremembers indicated that they could not be impartial, however, and they were struck for cause.
Myron Penn, a lawyer who is of counsel to the law firm of Jinks, Daniel & Crow, one of the firms representing Jernigan, was present in the courtroom for jury selection, but did not participate in the trial.7 The venire included Juanita Penn, whose husband is Myron's uncle; Irene Penn, whose husband is Myron's first cousin; Willie Ann Penn, whose husband is Myron's uncle; and Clarence Penn, who is Myron's second or third cousin. Three of the Penns and three other veniremembers either had worked on Myron Penn's campaign for state senate or had displayed bumper stickers on their vehicles and/or signs in their yards advocating his election. Another veniremember, Tawanda Shepherd, is a cousin of Walter McGowan, a lawyer with Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan, Gray & Nathanson, a firm that also represented Jernigan in the trial. Shepherd is employed by the Bullock Probate Court and previously had worked with the Jinks firm and with Carmella Penn, a relative of Myron Penn's and an attorney at Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., another law firm representing Jernigan. In response to individual questioning, all five of these veniremembers said they could be fair and impartial in the case. GM moved to strike all five for cause, but the trial court denied those motions. GM exercised peremptory strikes as to Irene Penn, Juanita Penn, Clarence Penn, and Tawanda Shepherd; it did not strike Willie Ann Penn, who would become an alternate juror.
One veniremember had consulted James L. Martin of Eufaula, who participated in the trial on behalf of GM, about a legal matter. Another veniremember's uncle had worked until his retirement for King & Spalding, an Atlanta law firm representing GM. Four veniremembers had been sued by the Beasley firm or the Jinks firm. In response to individual questioning, all said they could be fair and impartial in the case. However, Jernigan struck several of those veniremembers. Jernigan also struck a veniremember who counsel thought "might [have] some animosity" toward Myron Penn because of his work as chairman of the Bullock County Commission.
The veniremembers were questioned about the "Jere Beasley Consumer Report" newsletter the Beasley firm distributes to a large mailing list. Three veniremembers said they or a relative regularly received the newsletter; only one said she reads it.
A 15-member jury was selected. The jury included three alternates, one of whom was Willie Ann Penn. The alternates were excused before the jury began its deliberations.
The structural portions of an automobile relevant to this case include upper rails (sometimes referred to by the parties as "shotgun beams"), hinge pillars, rocker beams, lower rails, A-pillars, B-pillars, door-guard beams, the floor pan, and the toe pan.
The upper rails are horizontal structures in the fender area above the front wheel wells that run from the front of the vehicle toward...
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