General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann

• Decision Date: 22 December 1998
• Docket Number: (SC 15935)
• Citation: 247 Conn. 274,722 A.2d 1205
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. EUGENE DOHMANN

247 Conn. 274

722 A.2d 1205

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. EUGENE DOHMANN

(SC 15935)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 22, 1998.

Officially released December 22, 1998.

Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, JS. Albert A. Zakarian, pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Garry Desjardins, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Steven M. Rutstein, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (intervening defendant).

Opinion

CALLAHAN, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Connecticut "lemon law," General Statutes §§ 42-179 through 42-186,¹ requires the plaintiff, General Motors Corporation, to provide the defendant, Eugene Dohmann, with a replacement vehicle.

The arbitration panel to which the matter had been referred subsequent to the defendant having instituted an arbitration proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 42-181 reasonably could have found the following facts. On October 26, 1996, the defendant purchased a new Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck (truck) from Maritime Motors (Maritime),² a General Motors dealership located in South Norwalk. The following day, the defendant noticed defects in the paint on the truck's hood, roof and bumpers. The defendant promptly notified Maritime of the defects and requested that the dealership provide him with a replacement vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 42-179.³ Maritime agreed to inspect the truck for defects, but refused the defendant's request for a replacement vehicle.

After inspecting the truck, Maritime agreed that the truck's paint was defective, but again refused to provide a different vehicle. Instead, the dealership offered to replace the truck's hood, the part of the truck on which the paint defects were most visible, with a hood taken from another vehicle of the same color. The defendant allowed Maritime to undertake that repair attempt. The replacement hood, however, did not fit properly and the paint was not an exact match. Dissatisfied with the repair attempt, the defendant told Maritime to reinstall the original hood, and Maritime complied.

Maritime subsequently suggested two other possible methods of curing the defects in the paint: (1) wet sanding and (2) repainting the affected areas of the truck. The defendant, however, rejected these suggestions because he believed that both wet sanding and repainting would remove the truck's original factory finish. In the defendant's view, the factory process produces a paint finish superior to that of a body shop. As a result, he informed Maritime that he would not accept any repairs that would remove or alter the factory finish of the truck. Because both of the suggested repairs involved processes that would alter the truck's original factory finish, the defendant refused to authorize additional repair attempts.

Thereafter, the defendant initiated an arbitration proceeding against the plaintiff pursuant to § 42-181.⁴ After a hearing, a three member arbitration panel determined that: (1) the truck had been subject to a reasonable number of unsuccessful repair attempts, and (2) the defective paint substantially impaired the truck's value to the defendant. See General Statutes § 42-179 (d) and (e). Consequently, the panel concluded that, under § 42-179, the defendant was entitled to a new, comparably equipped replacement vehicle.

The plaintiff filed a timely application in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award. See General Statutes § 52-418.⁵ The Connecticut department of consumer protection subsequently was granted leave to intervene as a party defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 99, now § 9-18, and General Statutes § 52-107. The trial court agreed with the arbitration panel and, therefore, denied the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly affirmed the decision of the arbitration panel. Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the arbitrators' findings that: (1) the truck had been subject to a reasonable number of repair attempts, and (2) the defects in the paint substantially impaired the value of the truck to the defendant. See General Statutes § 42-179 (d) and (e).

I

Our analysis begins with a brief overview of Connecticut's lemon law legislation. "In 1982, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Acts 1982, No. 82-287 (Lemon Law I). That act is codified as General Statutes § 42-179. For consumer buyers of new motor vehicles, the act provides supplemental remedies of repair, replacement and refund to facilitate the enforcement of express warranties made by the manufacturers of such vehicles. These supplemental remedies come into play whenever a manufacturer or authorized dealer, after a reasonable number of repair attempts, is unable substantially to conform a new vehicle to the terms of the express warranty....

"In 1984, the legislature enacted Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338 (Lemon Law II), now codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184. The purpose of Lemon Law II is to provide, for consumer purchasers of new motor vehicles, an alternative to civil litigation. The key provision is § 42-181, which authorizes the department of consumer protection to establish `an independent arbitration procedure for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of motor vehicles which do not conform to all applicable warranties under the terms of section 42-179.'" Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 70-71, 523 A.2d 486 (1987).

As a threshold matter, we note that judicial review of lemon law arbitration awards is governed by § 42-181 (c) (4), which provides in relevant part: "The court shall conduct a de novo review of the questions of law raised in the application.... In reviewing questions of fact, the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial evidence in the record...." Pursuant to this test, a reviewing court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the arbitrators' findings of fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.⁶Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 216 Conn. 627, 639, 583 A.2d 906 (1990). Moreover, "[i]n determining whether an [arbitration panel's] finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the [arbitration panel's] right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 218 Conn. 646, 660-61 n.15, 591 A.2d 101 (1991); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 640. "This limited standard of review dictates that, [w]ith regard to questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the [arbitration panel]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 247 Conn. 95, 117-18, 717 A.2d 1276 (1998); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 51, 57, 591 A.2d 1231 (1991). With these principles in mind, we address the merits of the plaintiffs arguments.

II

The plaintiff first claims that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the arbitrators' finding that the defendant's truck had been subjected to a reasonable number of unsuccessful attempts to repair its paint. Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that, because the additional repairs suggested by the dealership were capable of producing a paint finish that met factory standards,⁷ the single attempt⁸ to cure the defect by replacing the truck's hood was insufficient to constitute the requisite reasonable number of repair attempts. See General Statutes § 42-179 (e). We disagree.

Section 42-179 provides in relevant part: "(d) If the manufacturer, or its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect or condition which substantially impairs the use, safety or value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of [repair] attempts, the manufacturer shall replace the motor vehicle with a new motor vehicle acceptable to the consumer .... (e) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of [repair] attempts have been undertaken ... if ... the same nonconformity has been subject to repair four or more times.... No claim shall be made under this section unless at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity has been made...." (Emphasis added.)

When the lemon law was enacted in 1982, the precursor to § 42-179 (e) did not include the requirement that "[n]o claim shall be made under this section unless at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity has been made...." See General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 42-179 (d). The legislature added that language in 1989, in response to a report of the legislative program review and investigations committee. See Public Acts 1989, No. 89-173; see also General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 42-179 (e).⁹ We previously have concluded that reports from blue ribbon commissions and legislative committees, such as the legislative program review and investigations committee, are instructive of legislative intent. See Ensign-Bickford Realty Corp. v. Zoning Commission, 245 Conn. 257, 272-73, 715 A.2d 701 (1998); Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 196, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998). Specifically,...