General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 26822,26822 |
| Parties | , 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2605, 67 Lab.Cas. P 52,698 GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 528 et al. v. ALLIED FOODS, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert L. Mitchell, Atlanta, for appellants.
Mitchell, Pate & Anderson, William M. Pate, Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
On the verified complaint of Allied Foods, Inc., against General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and two named individuals, a judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County on November 20, 1970, issued a temporary restraining order. On December 8, 1970, before the date set for the hearing on said interlocutory injunction, the complainant filed a motion praying that the union and named individuals be adjudged in contempt of court for specific violations of the temporary restraining order. Pursuant to a rule nisi issued on that motion, a hearing was held on December 21, 1970. Thereafter an order was passed finding that the union had knowingly violated the restraining order on each of 18 days since November 20, 1970, and found it to have committed acts of contempt on each of such days. The order also found that William R. Towe, an individual, had knowingly violated the said restraining order and found him to be in contempt of court. The union was fined $200 for each of the 18 days of violation of the restraining order, and was ordered to pay an attorney's fee for the benefit of the complainant in the amount of $1,500. William R. Towe was fined $200. This order was appealed to this court but was dismissed as being premature. General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc., 227 Ga. 830, 183 S.E.2d 374. Thereafter, the Union and Towe filed a motion for discharge from contempt based on various grounds. The motion was overruled on each ground. The appeal is from that judgment. Held:
1. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering judgment against them without first finding the facts specially and in failing to state separately its conclusions of law as required by Code Ann. § 81A-152(a). This Code section provides: 'In all actions in superior court tried upon the facts without a jury, except actions involving only uncontested divorce, alimony and custody of minors, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered pursuant to section 81A-158, Ga.L.1969, pp. 645, 646; 1970, pp. 170, 171.
The trial court made certain findings in this case which included the following:
In 5A Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 2706, § 52.06(1) it is stated: 'The purpose of findings of fact is threefold: as an aid in the trial judge's process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review.'
The findings of the trial court in this case are sufficient to enable this court to understand clearly the basis of its decision and the conclusions of law reached by it. The conclusions of law are separately stated based on the facts found by the trial court.
These contentions are without merit.
2. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding the Union and Towe guilty of contempt and assessing fines against them because the temporary restraining order upon which the contempt citation was based was vague, indefinite, uncertain and confusing and failed to put them on notice as to what they were required to do or prohibited from doing.
Code Ann. § 81A-165(d) provides: 'Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.' Ga.L.1966, pp. 609, 665; 1967, pp. 226, 240.
The injunctive order provides: '. . . that the defendants, their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons acting in association with them be and they hereby are restrained until 3:00 o'clock p.m., on the 18th day of December, 1970, from threatening, assaulting or throwing objects at plaintiff's employees or supervisors or other persons, or throwing objects at vehicles in which any such employees, supervisors or other persons are riding, in the vicinity of plaintiff's plant, or at any other place, from blocking the ingress to or egress from plaintiff's plant or premises by any persons, and from congregating or gathering in the vicinity of plaintiff's plant or along Hills Avenue and Hills Place between the two entrances to plaintiff's plant and office, or in the vicinity of plaintiff's parking lot on Hills Avenue located immediately across the creek from plaintiff's plant, in numbers larger than two pickets at a time at each of the two entrances.'
The injunction sufficiently complies with this Code section. If the defendant is in doubt as to what acts he may or may not do under the order, he should request a modification or construction of its terms. If he proceeds under his own construction, he does so at his own peril. Warner v. Martin, 124 Ga. 387, 52 S.E. 446; Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 152(2), 8 S.E.2d 786; DeRose v. Holcomb, 226 Ga. 289, 174 S.E.2d 410.
In Lassiter v. Swift and Company, 204 Ga. 561, 50 S.E.2d 359, this court held: 'Where, as here, the judgment excepted to is one finding the employees guilty of contempt of court for violation of an injunction order issued on the petition of the employer, the rights of the employer and employees growing out of their relationship and the validity of the injunction order are not under review, but the sole question for this court to decide is whether or not the court's order is shown to have been violated by the empoyees.'
It follows that these contentions are without merit.
3. The evidence in this case shows that the attorney for the Union was present at the time when the trial judge signed the restraining order on November 20, 1970; that the union failed to give notice to the strikers or picket captains of the restraining order; that the union made no effort to bring the strikers and pickets into compliance with the court's order despite the fact that the union continued to meet with them and schedule and instruct the pickets; that...
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