General Warehousemen and Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1977
• Docket Number: 76-1579,Nos. 75-3797,s. 75-3797
• Citation: 560 F.2d 700
• Parties: 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2482, 82 Lab.Cas. P 10,173 GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 767, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee. GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL 767, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiffs- Appellants- Cross Appellees, v. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 700

560 F.2d 700

96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2482,

82 Lab.Cas. P 10,173

GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 767, affiliated with

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of

America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL 767, affiliated with

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of

America, Plaintiffs- Appellants- Cross Appellees, v. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

Nos. 75-3797, 76-1579.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 11, 1977.

Rehearing En Banc Granted Dec. 15, 1977.

James L. Hicks, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for General Warehousemen and Helpers Local 767.

William L. Keller, Allen Butler, William F. Carroll, Dallas, Tex., for Standard Brands, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before TUTTLE, WISDOM and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to sound the treacherous waters in which judicial power and NLRB authority overlap and sometimes conflict. Appellant, a Teamsters local, seeks to enforce an arbitration award in its favor. Ordinarily, such awards are readily enforced. But the district court held that this award conflicted with a prior NLRB decision and hence could not be ordered into effect. The Teamsters have appealed; Standard Brands, the employer, has cross-appealed, asserting additional bases for refusing to enforce the award.

I. THE HISTORY OF THE CASE

Our perception of this case is inescapably and properly influenced by the facts. Certain background points are not controversial. On October 3, 1975, Standard Brands permanently closed its Dallas margarine plant, which it had operated since as early as 1943. In the early 1970s, Standard had begun looking for a new plant site in the Dallas vicinity, and in 1973 it selected a tract of land in Denison, Texas some 75 miles from Dallas. According to the arbitrator, the new plant went into operation in late October 1974 and formally opened on November 1, 1974.

On the day the plant opened, the Teamsters, who represented the employees of the Dallas plant, filed a grievance which asserted that the operation of the new plant would result in the closing of the old one, and sought to protect the contractual rights of the Dallas employees in that event. The arbitrator did not reach a decision in the case until shortly after the company announced the closing of the Dallas plant, an event which surely influenced his view of the case. He concluded that the Company had

discriminated against the Dallas employees because of their Teamsters Union membership and activities. . . . It was undisputed that the Company intended to operate Denison non-union, and it especially tried to operate it without the Teamsters Union and its contract.

This conduct violated a non-discrimination clause of the Contract (Part I, Section 14(e)). In the arbitrator's judgment, the company's conduct also violated the Dallas employees' right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to fill jobs at the Denison plant when their work was transferred there (Part I, Section 13(e) of the Contract), and failed to comport with the contractual recognition of the Teamsters as the Dallas bargaining agent (Part VIII, Section 1).

These findings convinced the arbitrator of the necessity for a thoroughgoing remedy. His award had several features: (1) Dallas employees were ensured a right to transfer to certain jobs in Denison; (2) the transferees to Denison were given "superseniority," based on the first day of Denison operations rather than the first day of their work in the new plant; (3) the former Dallas workers' "compensation and other benefits" at Denison would conform to the Dallas contract. ¹ This third element, the introduction of the Dallas contract terms to govern Denison work, was not to be permanent. The arbitrator believed that "the addition of these several manufacturing lines ² and newly transferred employees will materially alter the bargaining unit at Denison and . . . eventually the NLRB will have to determine the resulting questions concerning representation." The Dallas contract would apply only until that time.

Standard Brands discerns a conflict between this award and an NLRB certification of a different union, the International Association of Machinists, as the exclusive bargaining agent of the Denison employees. The IAM's organizing campaign had begun as soon as the new plant opened. Within a short time, on December 6, 1974, the IAM was able to file an election petition with the NLRB. The Teamsters were permitted a limited form of intervention in the proceedings on this petition, but the Dallas employees were not allowed to vote in the Denison election. The IAM won the election by a vote of 19 to 4, and, on appeal, the NLRB confirmed the resulting certification of the IAM. In short order, the IAM and Standard Brands reached agreement on a contract of which the arbitrator wrote,

"The wage rates in that agreement appear to be significantly lower than comparable rates in the Dallas Teamster agreement, although I make no absolute finding to that effect."

Although the Teamsters later sought to reopen the representational proceedings on the basis of the arbitrator's findings and award, the NLRB rejected this motion.

The district court concluded that the award did conflict with the NLRB certification, and therefore could not be enforced. The court's first action was to deny the union a preliminary injunction enforcing the award. ³ At that time, it was the court's understanding that the company had agreed to comply with all portions of the award except the provision applying the Dallas contract at Denison. Similarly, the district court's final conclusions of law discuss only the impropriety of the arbitrator's attempt to specify wages and working conditions at the Denison plant. It had become clear, however, at the subsequent hearing on the union's request for a permanent injunction, that the company was also resisting enforcement of the "superseniority" aspect of the award. Moreover, although the company did offer to let Dallas employees transfer to Denison, it did not offer to pay them according to the Dallas contract. Since the arbitrator's award in effect required the latter, more generous offer, the transfer issue was unresolved as well. The district judge suggested at the permanent injunction hearing that the seniority and transfer issues would only become pressing if our Court reversed on the question of wages. We conclude that all of these elements of the award are still before us. ⁴

II. THE COURTS AND THE NLRB: CONFLICT OR OVERLAP

The district court refused to enforce the arbitrator's award on the theory that it conflicted with an NLRB certification. The NLRB, however, had not and still has not declared enforcement of the award to be an unfair labor practice. Thus, the district court of necessity reached its own conclusion about the significance of the certification of the IAM. The principal constraint against such judicial interpretation of the Board's actions is the well-established principle that the Board is the authority primarily responsible for the administration of the National Labor Relations Act. In its broadest terms, this requirement has been seen as precluding original judicial proceedings wherever the conduct under scrutiny is arguably prohibited or permitted by the NLRA. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).

This principle, of course, does not mean that the NLRB defines the entire system of law regulating labor relations. Labor relations are commonly also governed by a contract or collective bargaining agreement, and enforcement of these agreements can be carried out by the federal courts under § 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a). In particular, courts have the authority to enforce awards entered in contractual arbitration proceedings, even when the conduct under scrutiny could also be the subject of an unfair labor practice charge before the National Labor Relations Board. See Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n. 9, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). The Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to judicial action under section 301 even in the context of an inter-union "jurisdictional" dispute, which like the present case perhaps involved the issue of which union should represent a workforce, Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 84 S.Ct. 401, 11 L.Ed.2d 320 (1964). ⁵

So long as the courts exercise this broad power under section 301, they may be asked to enforce arbitration decisions, presumably justified as far as the parties' contract is concerned, which violate the National Labor Relations Act. It is clear that a court will not enforce an arbitral decision that conflicts with an NLRB decision. See Carey, supra, at 272, 84 S.Ct. 401; New Orleans Typographical Union v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755, 767 (5th Cir. 1966). Similarly, courts have declared that a conflict between the promises of a contract and the demands of a statute would preclude ordering arbitration under the contract or enforcement of an arbitration award. See United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 734 (5th Cir. 1974) (claimed violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) ); Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1970) (arbitration would not be ordered if clause to be interpreted by arbitrator violated antitrust laws); Nursing Home Union Local 1115 v. Hialeah Convalescent Home, 348 F.Supp. 405, 411 (S.D.Fla.1972) (inescapable conflict with national wage-price control policy would be bar to arbitration). Cf. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Marine Workers Local 39, 344 F.2d...