Genrich v. City of Rice Lake

• Decision Date: 11 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-0597.,03-0597.
• Citation: 268 Wis.2d 233,673 N.W.2d 361,2003 WI App 255
• Parties: William L. GENRICH and Frances L. Genrich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF RICE LAKE, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

268 Wis.2d 233

2003 WI App 255

673 N.W.2d 361

William L. GENRICH and Frances L. Genrich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF RICE LAKE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 03-0597.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on briefs October 6, 2003.

Decided November 11, 2003.

On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Joe Thrasher of Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish & Franti, Ltd. of Rice Lake.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Frederick W. Fischer of Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C. of Eau Claire.

Before Cane, C.J., Hoover, P.J., and Peterson, J.

¶ 1. CANE, C.J.

The City of Rice Lake levied a $44,612.25 special assessment against property owned by William and Frances Genrich. The assessment was for improvements the City made that included paving a street and installing sidewalks, curbs, gutters, and water and storm sewers. The Genrichs challenged the assessment and the circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The Genrichs appeal, arguing (1) the circuit court must first determine whether the nature of improvements is general or local before it considers the propriety of the special assessment, (2) the City's purpose for making the improvement determines its nature, and (3) there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the City's purpose for constructing the improvement. In the alternative, even if the improvement is local, they argue that the assessment was not made on a reasonable basis because their property did not receive any benefits.

¶ 2. We agree with the Genrichs that the initial question to be resolved is what type of improvement was made. However, we conclude that the City's purpose for making the improvements is not solely determinative on this question, but rather is a relevant factor the circuit court must consider in light of the benefits the improvements confer on the property. Because the inquiry into the nature of an improvement presents a question of fact, and because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the City's purpose for making the improvements and whether the Genrichs' property received any special benefits from them, summary judgment was improper. The City is, however, entitled to partial summary judgment with regard to the special assessment for the value of the sidewalk improvement because benefits need not accrue to the property in order to support the assessment's levy. On remand, if the circuit court decides the other improvements are local, it must then determine whether the special assessment is reasonable based on uniformity and uniqueness concerns. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3. In 1997, the Genrichs purchased a two-acre parcel of land in the City of Rice Lake located on Kern Avenue off a T-intersection with South Street.¹ The property included two structures, a residence and an airplane hangar, which were not connected to water or sewer utilities, and a private roadway that spanned the length of the property and provided access to Kern Avenue. The Genrichs' property was zoned residential at the time of purchase but was subsequently rezoned commercial. East of the Genrichs' property is a public park, Moon Lake Park. The park is comprised of several soccer fields and restroom facilities. The City created the park in 1998 from an abandoned airport, and, like the Genrichs' property, this land was not serviced by public utilities. Through a series of land transactions involving properties surrounding the park, the City effectively, though inadvertently, landlocked the park from vehicular traffic.

¶ 4. Faced with several options to provide access to the park's west property line, the City opted to purchase a parcel of land north of the Genrichs' property to construct an extension and improvement of South Street. In the end, the project consisted of a 528-foot paved extension of South Street with curbs, gutters, and sidewalks, along with the installation of public water utilities including sanitary and storm sewers to serve the park and the surrounding properties. In total, six properties were affected by these improvements. By use of its police power, the City levied special assessments against these properties under WIS. STAT. § 66.0703.² Using the "front-foot" method for valuation, the City assessed the Genrichs' property $44,612.25.

¶ 5. The Genrichs subdivided their land into two parcels, purportedly to help pay for the special assessment, and appealed the levy to the circuit court pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 66.0703(12).³ The court granted summary judgment to the City. It concluded the Genrichs' property was benefited by the improvements, both in its current use as a residence and in its potential future use as commercial property, and that the method used to value the special assessments, the front-foot method, was per se reasonable. The Genrichs appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6. When reviewing a summary judgment, we perform the same function as the trial court, making our review de novo. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). Summary judgment must be entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; therefore, the moving party must clearly be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Village of Fontana-On-Geneva Lake v. Hoag, 57 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 203 N.W.2d 680 (1973). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, State Bank of La Crosse v. Elsen, 128 Wis. 2d 508, 512, 383 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1986), and "[a]ny doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are to be resolved against the moving party." Hudson Diesel, Inc. v. Kenall, 194 Wis. 2d 531, 546, 535 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶ 7. The Genrichs argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the City because it did not first consider whether the nature of the improvements was general or local. Because special assessments can only be levied for a local improvement, they argue the circuit court erred by beginning its analysis with the correctness of the special assessment. We agree. ¶ 8. Public improvements usually fall into one of two categories: general or local. Duncan Develop. Corp. v. Crestview San. Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964). A general improvement is one that confers a general benefit, that is, a "substantially equal benefit and advantage" to the property of the whole community, or benefits the public at large. Id. In contrast, a local improvement, although incidentally beneficial to the public at large, is primarily made for the accommodation and convenience of inhabitants in a particular locality and confers "special benefits" to their properties. Id. The distinction between the two kinds of public improvements holds significant consequences for property owners. Id. at 264-65. General improvements are funded by general taxes and must comply with the rule of uniformity, whereas local improvements may be financed by special assessments levied against individual properties and are not limited by the rule of uniformity. Id. at 264.

¶ 9. Because special assessments can only be levied for local improvements, before the propriety of a special assessment can be addressed the circuit court must initially examine whether the improvement is local. This examination presents a question of fact. See Duncan, 22 Wis. 2d at 265 (It is "difficult to classify improvement abstractly as local or general. ... What may be called a local improvement under one set of facts may well constitute a general improvement in the context of different facts."); see also Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 118, 334 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1983) (existence of benefit presents question of fact); 14 McQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 38.11 at 83 (3rd ed. 1998) ("[W]hether the facts in a particular case show the improvement to be local or general is a question of fact determinable from the conditions and circumstances.").

¶ 10. The next issue concerns how the circuit court should properly resolve this factual determination. The Genrichs seem to argue the City's purpose for initiating the improvements will determine the nature of the improvement because this purpose will significantly dictate the improvements' effects. The City claims its purpose is not germane. Instead, the City suggests the central query should be on the benefits conferred by the improvements. We disagree with both parties. Taking the middle path, we conclude the City's purpose for making the improvements is relevant to resolving the nature of the improvement, but not determinative because the court must also consider the benefits the property receives.

¶ 11. Purpose is relevant to determining the nature of the improvement because of the manner in which local improvement is defined. Again, a local improvement is a type of improvement primarily made for the accommodation and convenience for inhabitants of a particular locality that grants special benefits to their property. Duncan, 22 Wis. 2d at 264. The phrase "primarily made" connotes that consideration be given to the City's motivations for making the improvements. In so considering, the circuit court must decide what the primary purpose for the improvements was and who the primary objects of that purpose were. Specifically, the City's purpose for initiating improvements must be for reasons of accommodation and convenience (the "what" question), and the object of the purpose must be primarily for the people in a particular locality (the "who" question) for an improvement to fall within the local improvement category. See id.

¶ 12. Our conclusion finds support in McQUILLIN ON...