Gensman v. West Coast Power Co.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1940 |
| Docket Number | 27745. |
| Citation | 101 P.2d 316,3 Wn.2d 404 |
| Parties | GENSMAN v. WEST COAST POWER CO. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Action by E. A. Gensman against the West Coast Power Company to recover damages for breach of an oral agreement for continuous or lifetime employment and to recover wages for overtime. From judgment for wages for overtime, defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals in so far as the judgment denied claim for damages for breach of contract of lifetime employment and applied three-year statute of limitations to claim for overtime.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Pacific County; John I O'Phelan, judge.
Clifford & Campbell, of Olympia, and Fred M. Bond, of South Bend, for appellant.
V. D Bradeson, of Olympia, and Welsh & Welsh, of South Bend, for respondent and cross-appellant.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for breach of an oral agreement for continuous or lifetime employment, alleged to have been made with him by the West Coast Power Company, defendant, and, also, to recover wages for overtime, alleged to be due under an oral agreement.
Certain preliminary facts may be taken as undisputed. The Ilwaco Light and Power Company installed an electric light plant at Ilwaco in 1921. The plaintiff was employed in its installation, and, after completion, continued as plant engineer for the company. He remained in this employment until his discharge by the defendant in November, 1937. Throughout the period of his employment, he worked under direction of Clyde A. Woodham, who was, first, president and later, manager of the company, with authority to hire and discharge men regularly employed in the plant.
At first, the plaintiff was assisted in the plant by two other men. He was paid $125 a month and the two men assisting him $100 or $110 a month each. In 1924, the plant force was reduced to two men, the plaintiff and his son. The plaintiff's salary was increased to $200 a month, and the son was paid $150, that is to say, the father and the son were paid approximately what had theretofore been paid to the three men. The plaintiff had authority to employ extra help when needed on special occasions. While Woodham was manager, M. V. Watson seems to have been an executive officer of the company, with some general authority over its operations.
In August, 1926, the Ilwaco plant was purchased by the Peoples West Coast Hydro-electric Corporation; the name of this corporation was later changed to the West Coast Power Company. Woodham and Watson continued with the new owner and had the same relation to its management as Before the purchase. Watson died shortly after the institution of the present action and Before the trial.
After the 1929 depression, the plaintiff's monthly salary was reduced to $170, in accordance with a general reduction of fifteen per cent made in the salaries and wages of the company's officers and employees; later, in 1933, his salary was increased to $180, and continued at this rate until his discharge. At the time of his discharge, his age was a little short of seventy-two years.
In the complaint, it is alleged that, after plaintiff had been engaged in unloading heavy machinery from barges on the Columbia river and installing it in the plant, he complained of the excessive hours of employment required of him and told his employer that, unless additional help was supplied, he would give up his job and quit. The supervising official of the company informed him that, if he would continue his services and do all that was asked of him and serve long hours at his labor and not quit his job, but continue in the West Coast Power Company's employment, that company would always take care of him and see that he would have 'continued and perpetual employment' with it as long as he desired it; that there-upon, '* * * in consideration of the representation of an authorized agent of the defendant as having been made in good faith, this plaintiff did then and there, and has ever since such time, up to the 31st day of November, 1937, accepted such promise and has worked exceedingly long hours without proper sleep or rest and in reliance upon such representation that plaintiff would be later relieved thereof and paid for such excessive hours and also have perpetual employment during his ever advancing years.'
With respect to the agreement for pay for extra time, it is alleged that, on many occasions since the year 1926, the officers and agents of the defendant represented, and led the plaintiff to believe, that a third operator would be employed at the electric plant, so that each operator would work but eight hours daily; and that, in so far as plaintiff should work in excess of eight hours, the defendant company would make it right and see that he had perpetual employment, and he had continued the employment and refrained from quitting and from pressing his claim for overtime in consideration of such promises of the defendant.
In its answer, the defendant admitted the employment of the plaintiff subsequent to August 2, 1926, and that, on certain occasions subsequent to that date, plaintiff requested extra help, which was given to him.
By way of affirmative defense, it is alleged that the plaintiff had been fully paid for all services rendered by him; that, if any promise, agreement, or contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant pertaining to labor or services, the existence of which is denied, such contract was void under the terms of § 3809, Remington's Revised Statutes, having relation to the employment by corporations of their officers and employees; and that, if any contract was made, it was void under the statute of frauds as not having been made in writing. The statute of limitations was also pleaded as a bar to any claim for overtime beyond the period of three years from the date of the institution of the action.
Plaintiff filed a reply denying the affirmative matter contained in the answer.
After trial of the cause to the court, sitting without a jury, the following findings of fact were made:
I. The court finds that the plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proving a contract for life-time employment between the plaintiff and defendant.
Appropriate conclusions of law were made upon these findings, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount found to be due him. The defendant appeals from the judgment, and the plaintiff cross-appeals in so far as the judgment is adverse to his claim for damages for breach of the alleged contract of life employment and applies the three-year statute of limitations to his claim for overtime. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 159, subd. 3. The plaintiff, although he has cross-appealed, will be referred to simply as respondent, and the defendant as appellant.
The issues raised by the assignments of the parties are three: (1) The correctness of the finding that the respondent did not sustain the burden of proving a contract for permanent or lifetime employment; (2) the correctness of the finding that the respondent had worked overtime, for which he was entitled to compensation from the appellant; and (3) whether the three-year statute of limitations applies to toll any recovery beyond that period, assuming that his evidence established that he had rendered overtime service under an agreement entitling him to compensation in addition to his monthly salary.
The witnesses supporting the respondent's claim were himself, his wife, and son. The conversations forming the basis for his claim of an agreement with the corporation for lifetime employment were had with M. V. Watson, who visited the Ilwaco plant some three or four times a year. While Mr. Woodham was district manager for the appellant and had immediate charge of the company's operations at Ilwaco and the hiring and discharging of employees, the respondent did not testify to any agreement had with him touching this question. The respondent testified:
Q. Who was present if anyone when he made that statement? A. Well my wife was...
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