Gentry v. Farruggia, (CC 748)
| Decision Date | 01 June 1949 |
| Docket Number | (CC 748) |
| Citation | 132 W.Va. 809 |
| Parties | Chester Gentry v. Charles Farruggia |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Res Judicata
Where the principle of res judicata is invoked in order for it to apply it must appear either that the parties in the present case are identical with those in the former litigation or that their privity with them was such as to give them a common interest in the outcome thereof.
2. Res Judicata
Under the principle of res judicata the relationship of principal and agent does not per se establish a privity of interest.
Certified Question from Circuit Court, Raleigh County.
Action of trespass on the case by Chester Gentry against Charles Farruggia to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, when a taxicab driven by plaintiff collided with a truck owned and operated by defendant. The circuit court sustained the defendant's plea of res judicata, and certifies to the Supreme Court of Appeals the question whether the doctrine of res judicata was applicable.
Reversed.
Fletcher W. Mann, for plaintiff.
Joseph Luchini, Scherer, Bowers & File, for defendant.
This action of trespass on the case was brought in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County by Charles Gentry against Charles Farruggia seeking to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff when a taxicab owned by Joe Bengey and driven by the plaintiff collided with a truck owned and operated by the defendant in Fayette County on January 7, 1948. After the filing of an amended declaration the defendant filed a special plea alleging that at the May term, 1948, of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County a verdict was returned and judgment entered in his favor in an action of trespass on the case brought by Joe Bengey against him, in which Bengey sought to recover for property damage to the vehicle owned by him and damaged in the same collision. The plea alleged that Chester Gentry, as the agent, servant and employee of Joe Bengey, was driving the taxicab at the time and place of the same collision alleged by the plaintiff here to have given rise to his right of action and alleged by Bengey in the former action as ground for his recovery.
The plea concludes with the allegation that the facts in issue in this action were determined by the jury and the court in the former action and therefore the defendant prays judgment. The Circuit Court of Raleigh County sutained the plea and, of its own motion, certified to this Court the following question:
"Is the final judgment in favor of the defendant in the case of Joe Bengey vs. Charles Farruggia heretofore rendered in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County a bar to the right of the plaintiff in this case to maintain this action."
The question presented rests upon the doctrine known as that of res judicata, spoken of as follows in 30 Am. Jur. at page 908:
"Briefly stated, the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction."
The doctrine includes issues of law and fact that actually were raised and decided in the former case and also such questions as, under certain circumstances, could have been decided there. The principle is based upon a recognized public policy to quiet litigation. It is not rigidly enforced where to do so would plainly defeat the ends of Justice.
Of course in this instance the parties are not identical, Bengey having been the sole plaintiff in the other proceeding and Gentry the sole plaintiff here, so that our inquiry is whether there existed a privity of interest as between them, so that a judgment for or against one would be conclusive of the interests of the other growing out of the same occurrence. We think not. It is true that Gentry testified in the former case, but his participation went no further. He exercised no control over its conduct.
The rights of Gentry and Bengey are entirely separate and distinct. Neither could assert them in whole or in part for or in the name of the other. Such rights as they had were in no degree held in common. Bengey's cause of action was for property damage to which a five year litigation applied. Gentry's is for personal injuries, barred in one year. Bengey's survives: Gentry's does not. Elder v. N. Y. & P. Motor Express, 284 N. Y. 350, 31 N. E. 2d 188, 133 A. L. R. 176; Pesce v. Brecher, 302 Mass. 211, 19 N. E. 2d 36.
Not only are their rights of action separate, but the subject matter thereof is entirely different. The relationship of principal and agent as between Bengey and Gentry is...
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...cognizant of the need to ensure that application of res judicata does not "plainly defeat the ends of Justice[,]" Gentry v. Farruggia, 132 W.Va. 809, 811, 53 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1949), such an exception must be based upon "extraordinary circumstances" and "courts should be loathe to exercise t......
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