Gentry v. Richmond & D. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1893 |
| Parties | GENTRY v. RICHMOND & D. R. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Spartanburg county; J. H HUDSON, Judge.
Action by L. Miles Gentry against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company. From a judgment entered on a verdict, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Nicholls & Moore and Bomar & Simpson, for appellant.
Duncan & Landers, for respondent.
This action was commenced in February, 1890, for the purpose of recovering damages alleged to have been done to plaintiff's property by the defendant company. In the complaint three causes of action are stated: (1) Because the defendant so negligently constructed a culvert under an embankment where the railroad runs through plaintiff's land as that the water on the north side of the road was backed up on plaintiff's land, so as to render the same almost worthless; and, further, that, owing to the improper and insufficient construction of said culvert, the plaintiff's land on the south side of the railroad has been so washed and covered with sand as to greatly impair the value of said land; (2) because plaintiff's land has been injured by fires originating from sparks escaping from defendant's locomotives, or from other sources for which defendant company is liable; (3) for removing a fence which plaintiff had built for the purpose of inclosing his pasture land, whereby he could not keep his cattle confined therein. It seems from the evidence that the embankment and culvert were originally constructed in the year 1881, and that in May, 1886, during a freshest in the stream over which the road crossed on said embankment, the culvert was washed out and the plaintiff's land on the south side of the railroad was washed and covered with sand,--to what extent was one of the questions of fact in the case. From the judgment rendered in the cause, the plaintiff appeals, upon the following grounds, alleging error as follows: "(1) In requiring the plaintiff to testify what he received for other lands near the lands damaged, sold by him long after the freshet in 1886, and in holding such evidence competent (2) in allowing the witness J. H. Montgomery, who had never examined the land until the trial, and did not go over it then, to testify that he only saw one fourth of an acre that had been damaged by the freshet; (3) in holding there was no evidence to sustain the plaintiff's third cause of action, and in granting a nonsuit as to the same; (4) in holding and charging the jury that, in estimating the damage to plaintiff, they could not take into any consideration the loss of any crops from the land, but that the only measure of damages would be the difference between the value of the land immediately before and after the freshet; (5) in instructing the jury that, in estimating the damages, they could only go back to 1886,--time the embankment broke,--thus cutting them off from any opportunity of giving damages for injury done to the land above the embankment before it broke; (6) in refusing the motion for a new trial."
Passing by, for the present, the third and sixth grounds of appeal, it will be observed that the others raise three general questions: (1) Whether there was error in the rulings as to the admissibility of the testimony of the plaintiff and Montgomery; (2) whether there was error in regard to the measure of damages; (3) whether the circuit judge erred in restricting plaintiff's right to recover to such damages only as were sustained after the embankment was broken, in May, 1886.
As to the first question, we do not think that there was any error of law either in receiving the testimony of the plaintiff above referred to, or that of Montgomery. While it was very true that such testimony was not calculated to throw much light upon the material inquiry in the case, and might have been entitled to but little weight, yet it certainly was competent, and it was for the jury alone to consider whether it was of any value at all, and, if so, what weight should be attached to it. The material inquiry being how much the land was damaged, its comparative value before and after the...
To continue reading
Request your trial