Gentry v. State
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | CR-22-279 |
| Citation | 2022 Ark. 203 |
| Parties | MARKUS GENTRY APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 16JCR-19-54] HONORABLE CINDY THYER, JUDGE.
Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
This appeal follows the circuit court's denial of multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel made by Markus Gentry, who was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Gentry filed the petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. The circuit court denied the petition by a detailed written order but did not hold a hearing. Gentry now argues the circuit court erred on seven separate claims of ineffective assistance. We affirm on all points.
Markus Gentry received a life sentence after he was convicted of second-degree murder. We affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Gentry v. State, 2021 Ark. 26. The factual circumstances involved Gentry going to a barbershop in Jonesboro where Lewis Gamble worked. A gunfight ensued. Both men were shot, and Gamble died from his wounds.
Gentry argued on direct appeal that insufficient evidence supported the conviction because the killing was justified by self-defense. We rejected that argument by recounting the following evidence:
Gentry, 2021 Ark. 26, at 6 (internal citations omitted). The State also introduced evidence about Gentry's membership in a gang. The State's theory was that Gentry, active at the time in the Piru gang, shot Gamble out of revenge because he had disrespected Jackie Jones. Id. at 9. It had been established at trial that Gamble owed money to Jones, Gentry's maternal figure. After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the trial proceeded to a separate sentencing hearing. Gentry had been previously convicted of four crimes involving violence: two counts of terroristic acts and two counts of first-degree battery. The jury could therefore sentence Gamble as a habitual offender to a prison term of between forty years and eighty years, or life. The jury imposed a life sentence.
After our mandate issued, Gentry filed a Rule 37 petition alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gentry later filed an amended petition. The circuit court dismissed the amended petition with prejudice by issuing a detailed written order. On appeal, Gentry argues the circuit court erred on seven distinct allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under the two-prong standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Holland v. State, 2022 Ark. 138, at 2, 645 S.W.3d 318, 321. For the first prong, the petitioner must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel deprived the petitioner of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Sandrelli v. State, 2017 Ark. 156, at 5, 517 S.W.3d 417, 420. We presume counsel was effective, and petitioner must highlight specific acts or omissions that did not result from reasonable professional judgment. Coakley v. State, 2021 Ark. 207, at 2, 633 S.W.3d 328, 330.
For the second prong, petitioner must show the deficient performance resulted in prejudice so pronounced that it deprived the petitioner of a fair trial whose outcome cannot be relied on as just. Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. 459, at 3, 504 S.W.3d 603, 605. Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the jury's decision would have been different but for the deficient performance. Id. Both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown before a court can grant relief. See id. "There is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective-assistance claim to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 3, 504 S.W.3d at 605-06.
When the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the circuit court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3; Lacy v. State, 2013 Ark. 34, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 746, 748. Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Barber v. State, 2016 Ark. 54, at 9, 482 S.W.3d 314, 322. We will not reverse unless the circuit court's findings were clearly erroneous. Holland, 2022 Ark. 138, at 2, 645 S.W.3d at 321.
At trial, the jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and reckless manslaughter. They convicted Gentry on second-degree murder. Gentry claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask for an extreme-emotional-disturbance jury instruction, too. The circuit court rejected this claim because Gentry could show neither deficient performance nor prejudice. The court reasoned that, throughout the trial, Gentry had maintained that he had shot Gamble in self-defense. The court concluded Gentry could not show that submission of the extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter instruction would have led to a different outcome.
Gentry argues the circuit erred on the prejudice prong because the jury had convicted him of the lesser-included defense of second-degree murder; this shows that the jury was inclined to convict him of a crime with a less-culpable mental state. Had the jury also been instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, it would have had "the full panoply of possible resolutions before it."
We affirm because the circuit court did not clearly err when it concluded the lack of an extreme-emotional-disturbance instruction caused no prejudice. As the circuit court noted, Gentry's defense all along was self-defense and "he never claimed emotional disturbance." Gentry never argued at trial that the shooting was a crime of passion. We have held that a jury should be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter when the evidence shows that the defendant killed the victim in the moment following sufficient provocation, such as "physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon." Fincham v. State, 2013 Ark. 204, at 10-11, 427 S.W.3d 643, 650. The emotional disturbance or "passion" must have been "caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible." Douglas v. State, 2019 Ark. 57, at 8, 567 S.W.3d 483, 490. The evidence falls short of that here.
Consider the facts presented at trial. This evidence showed that Gentry went to Gamble's barbershop with intent to settle a score. Gentry had been upset that Gamble failed to pay his maternal gang figure, Jackie Jones, for damage Gamble's relatives caused to her car. Various Facebook posts showed Gentry's intent to avenge this act of "disrespect." And most importantly, Gentry armed himself with a gun for the encounter and fled from the scene rather than calling for help. Nor did Gentry's own testimony provide evidence of extreme emotional disturbance.
The jury also had options other than just convicting Gentry of first-degree murder or second-degree murder. For example, the jury could have convicted Gentry of reckless manslaughter, a lesser-included offense. Or the jury could have acquitted Gentry based on his justification defense. As the jury rejected his justification defense and the reckless-manslaughter instruction, an added instruction for extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter was unlikely to yield a different jury decision. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's holding that the existence of the additional jury instruction was not reasonably probable to change the outcome of the trial.[1]
In his next claim, Gentry argues that trial counsel should have objected to several alleged misstatements by the prosecutor during closing argument about the justification defense. The prosecutor told the jury that, to acquit on the basis of self-defense, it must have "reasonably believed Lewis Gamble was using, or about to use physical force, and that [Gentry] only used such force as he reasonably believed necessary." Gentry argues this misstated the law because the justification defense instead required the jury to acquit if there was any reasonable doubt on the issue.[2] The prosecutor also stated that the jury could consider the justification defense only after considering guilt on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and reckless manslaughter. Gentry argues this misstated the law because the jury had to consider justification alongside each murder count.
The circuit court denied relief because, at trial, it provided the jury instructions that accurately stated the law. The jury received AMI Crim. 2d 705 regarding application of the justification defense. The court correctly noted that jurors are presumed to follow the law. See Gwathney v State, 2009 Ark. 544, at...
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