Geo-Western Petroleum Development, Inc. v. Mitchell, GEO-WESTERN

Decision Date18 September 1986
Docket NumberGEO-WESTERN,No. 10-86-017-CV,10-86-017-CV
PartiesPETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellant, v. Judge MITCHELL, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

John Hand, Waco, for appellant.

Robert G. Carter, Marlin, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

Appellee Judge Mitchell pleaded in the trial court for removal of a cloud cast upon his title to fifty acres in Falls County by an oil and gas lease. Appellee was the lessor of the lease and appellant Geo-Western Petroleum Development, Inc., was the successor in interest of the original lessee by a quitclaim conveyance. The form of the lease was one commonly used in Texas and contained a habendum clause that provided for a primary term of one year and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals were produced from the land or as long as the lease was continued in effect as otherwise provided therein. Another clause provided, in effect, that if production should cease from any cause after expiration of the primary term the lessee must commence operations for drilling or reworking within sixty days after such cessation or the lease would terminate. Appellee claimed in the trial court that the lease expired under its terms because production ceased after the primary term and no operations for drilling or reworking had been commenced within sixty days.

The case was tried to a jury. However, at the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court withdrew the case from the jury and rendered judgment for appellee.

Appellant presents three points of error. The first two question the legal sufficiency and the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that production had ceased for a period of more than sixty continuous days after the primary term of the lease. The third assigns error to the judgment on the ground that the uncontroverted evidence established that the wells on the lease "had been producing during the interim" and that a reasonable operator could have operated the lease for a profit. We overrule these points of error, and we affirm the judgment.

The judgment contains these recitals:

After both parties appearing had rested, it was stipulated that production on the lease in question ceased after its primary term and that no operations for drilling or reworking were commenced within 60 days after the cessation of such production, and that a reasonably prudent operator could have produced oil in paying quantities and made a profit from his operations during the 60-day period.

Intervenor Judge Mitchell made a motion for a directed verdict and the court, having considered the evidence and stipulations, finds that there are no fact issues and that intervenor is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The statement of facts reflects this colloquy between counsel for the parties and the court immediately after the closing of the evidence:

APPELLEE'S COUNSEL: The plaintiff makes this motion for an instructed verdict because all the testimony shows that there was a cessation of production after the primary term of more than sixty days during which no re-working operations or drilling operations were commenced, and that the lease expired under its own terms.

THE COURT: Both of you agree there is nothing for the jury to answer?

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: That is exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The question is before the Court that all the facts have been developed, and your contention is that the lessee, if it can be produced in paying quantities, is absolutely under no obligation to produce the well at all.

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: No, that is not my contention. It is a little different. I'm saying the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove that for the time period we are talking about, which is a little over sixty days, sixty to ninety days, that a reasonable and prudent operator could...

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11 cases
  • Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 10, 1989
    ...stipulated facts. As an appellate court, we are bound by the facts as expressly stipulated by the parties. See Geo-Western Petroleum Dev., Inc. v. Mitchell, 717 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.App.--Waco 1986, no writ); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bellmead State Bank, 396 S.W.2d 163, 172 (Tex.Civ.Ap......
  • Freeman v. Samedan Oil Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 18, 2001
    ...916 (1952); Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff, 802 S.W.2d 123, 126-27 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1991, no writ); Geo-Western Petroleum Dev. v. Mitchell 717 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.App. — Waco 1986, no Appellees rely upon a series of cases in support of their interpretation of the lease. See Mi......
  • Garner v. Long
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 17, 2003
    ...to specific facts, such agreements are binding upon the parties, trial court, and court of appeals. See Geo-Western Petroleum Dev. Inc. v. Mitchell, 717 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ). Because Henry stipulated to using and receiving the benefits of the $30,000 in cash, the t......
  • Sadler v. Duvall
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 1991
    ...is bound thereby. State Bar of Texas v. Grossenbacher, 781 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1989, no writ); Geo-Western Petroleum Development v. Mitchell, 717 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.App.--Waco 1986, no writ); Amoco Production Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co., 614 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App.--Housto......
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