George H. Lanier Memorial Hosp. v. Andrews

• Decision Date: 19 November 2004
• Citation: 901 So.2d 714
• Parties: GEORGE H. LANIER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and Jason Ivey v. Steven ANDREWS and Cynthia Shealey.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

901 So.2d 714

GEORGE H. LANIER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and Jason Ivey v. Steven ANDREWS and Cynthia Shealey.

1021885.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

November 19, 2004.

Robert C. (Mike) Brock and Ben C. Wilson of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery; and Claud E. (Skip) McCoy of Johnson, Caldwell & McCoy, Lanett, for appellants.

James V. Green, Jr., and Jill T. Karle, Alabaster; and S. Sanford Holliday, Roanoke, for appellees.

HARWOOD, Justice.

George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital ("the hospital") and Jason Ivey, R.N., appeal from the denial of a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law and the denial of their motion for remittitur or, alternatively, for a new trial. A jury found the hospital and Ivey liable for the negligent or wanton removal of the corneas of a deceased minor and awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages. We affirm.

On December 21, 1996, Cynthia Shealey brought her 12-year-old son Steven Shealey to the hospital's emergency room; Steven was suffering from a severe asthma attack. At approximately 6:28 a.m. that morning,¹ Steven died as the result of cardiac arrest secondary to the asthma attack.

After Cynthia was notified of Steven's death, nurse Jeani West requested that Cynthia sign various forms; among those forms was a form necessary to release Steven's body to a funeral home, which Cynthia signed at 7:20 a.m. West also asked whether Cynthia would like to donate any of Steven's organs. Ivey, a nurse who had come on duty around 6:45 a.m., was standing nearby and overheard the conversation between West and Cynthia. He testified that Cynthia expressed to West a willingness to donate Steven's organs. Another nurse, Shannon Strength, also saw West and Cynthia talking, but did not hear their discussion. Cynthia testified that when West asked her about organ donation, she simply stated that it "really didn't matter."

West began searching for an organ-donation consent form, and because she could not immediately find the form, she led Cynthia to a nearby room, known as the "quiet room," where Cynthia waited for West to return. After approximately 20 minutes, Cynthia left the quiet room, informed West that she was leaving the hospital, and departed. Shortly thereafter, West's shift ended. At this time, Ivey took over as the charge nurse.

Unaware that Cynthia had left the hospital, Ivey took an organ-donation consent form to the quiet room for Cynthia's signature. Discovering that Cynthia had left the hospital, Ivey proceeded on the assumption that Cynthia desired to donate Steven's organs, although Ivey did not regard Cynthia's earlier statements as unequivocally manifesting consent.

Ivey telephoned the Alabama Organ Center, representing that Steven was "a potential donor." The Alabama Organ Center notified Ivey that Steven did not qualify for organ donation and suggested that Ivey telephone the Alabama Eye Bank ("the Eye Bank").

Ivey directed Strength to telephone the Eye Bank, which she did. Strength left a message with the Eye Bank's answering service. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Paul Cau, an employee of the Eye Bank, telephoned the hospital and spoke with Ivey. Ivey informed Cau that the hospital had "a possible [cornea] donor" and that he was in the process of obtaining telephone consent for the organ donation. After some discussion, the two determined that the consent form the hospital had on file for the Eye Bank was outdated. Cau faxed an updated form to the hospital, directed to Ivey's attention.

While these events were occurring at the hospital, Cynthia drove to the home of Steven's father, Steven Andrews, to inform him of their son's death.² She arrived at Andrews's house around 8:00 a.m. She informed Andrews of Steven's death, and some 30 minutes later, when he prepared to go to the hospital, she left for her house. Cynthia arrived at her house, which was approximately a 15-minute drive from Andrews's house, at roughly 9:00 a.m. Andrews, meanwhile, left for the hospital, where he arrived around 9:00 a.m.

At the hospital, between 9:00 a.m. and 9:20 a.m., Ivey received the faxed copy of the updated consent form from Cau at the Eye Bank. Ivey located Strength and brought her to the nurse's station to secure telephonic consent from Cynthia. Ivey dialed the number given by Cynthia, which was actually the telephone number of Cynthia's neighbor in her apartment complex. The neighbor answered the telephone and summoned Cynthia to the telephone.

When Cynthia was on the line, Ivey began to talk to her about organ donation. He asked her the questions on the Eye Bank consent form; Cynthia answered each question, and Ivey noted her response. At this point, Strength joined the conversation on another telephone so that Cynthia, Ivey, and Strength were simultaneously on the same line. Ivey then told Cynthia that if she desired to donate Steven's organs, she needed to state the words, "I give permission for Steven Shealey to be an organ donor."

According to both Ivey and Strength, Cynthia repeated that statement or a statement of substantially similar import, thereby consenting to donate Steven's organs. Further, both Ivey and Strength testified that no mention of Andrews was made during that telephone conversation, either by them or by Cynthia. Rather, they each testified, Andrews arrived after Cynthia had consented to donation. Ivey testified that he personally informed Andrews of Cynthia's consent and requested Andrews's signature on the consent form so that the hospital would have in-person consent. Ivey further testified that Andrews immediately handed back the consent form and told Ivey, "I don't want to deal with this right now."

Cynthia and Andrews's account of events is very different. Andrews testified that when Ivey asked him for his consent, he immediately handed the consent form back and responded simply, "No." Cynthia testified that she received the telephone call from the hospital after Andrews had been approached for consent. She said that when she talked with Ivey, she answered Ivey's preliminary questions, but that when he asked for her consent, her response was that "it still really didn't matter." Additionally, Cynthia testified that Ivey sought her help in changing Andrews's mind about consenting to the donation of Steven's corneas. According to Cynthia, her response to Ivey was that if Andrews had said no to organ donation, her answer was also no.

Around 9:20 that morning, Cau at the Eye Bank telephoned the hospital. He spoke with Ivey, who informed him that Cynthia had given her telephonic consent to the donation of Steven's corneas. Around 9:30 a.m., Cau left the Eye Bank in Montgomery and traveled to the hospital. He arrived around 11:00 a.m., and at approximately 11:45 a.m., he removed Steven's corneas.

Cynthia and Andrews filed this action in the Chambers Circuit Court against the hospital, Ivey, and Strength, alleging several different theories of tort liability. The first time the case was tried, the jury awarded Cynthia and Andrews damages. This Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial based on the determination that the trial court's instruction to the jury, taken from a criminal statute concerning the treatment of corpses, was prejudicial to the defendants. George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 809 So.2d 802 (Ala.2001).

On remand, Cynthia and Andrews relied only on the count alleging negligence/wantonness. At the close of all evidence at the second trial, the hospital, Ivey, and Strength moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), which motion the trial court denied. The court then instructed the jury; among the instructions given was a statement that the law allowed only four methods by which consent to donate organs could be effectuated.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Strength but finding the hospital and Ivey (hereinafter "the defendants") liable and awarding Cynthia and Andrews $100,000 each. The defendants renewed their motion for a JML, and, alternatively, filed a motion for a remittitur or for a new trial. The trial court allowed those motions to be denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The hospital and Ivey appeal.

Standard of Review

"`When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying the motion. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate issue is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case or issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). In an action filed after June 11, 1987, the nonmovant must present substantial evidence to withstand a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Id. If the question is one of law, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1992).'

"Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Ala.1999)."

Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Land Energy, Ltd., 886 So.2d 787, 791-92 (Ala.2004).

In reviewing jury instructions, we must keep in mind that

"`"[a] party is entitled to proper jury instructions regarding the issues presented, and an incorrect or misleading charge may be the basis for the granting of a new trial."' King v. W.A. Brown & Sons, Inc., 585 So.2d 10, 12 (Ala.1991) (citation omitted). When an objection

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