George v. School Dist. No. 24 of Red Willow County, 33387
| Decision Date | 18 December 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 33387,33387 |
| Citation | 157 Neb. 791,61 N.W.2d 401 |
| Parties | GEORGE v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 24 OF RED WILLOW COUNTY. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Section 79-491, R.R.S.1943, requiring that all claims for transportation allowance shall be filed for payment monthly is a mandatory prerequisite to the recovery of school pupil transportation by the person claiming the same.
2. That such claims for transportation 'shall be' so 'filed for payment monthly' means that they must be filed in writing with the proper district school board either at a meeting or with some member thereof, preferably the secretary, during the calendar month following the one in which the claimed transportation services were performed.
Van Pelt, Marti & O'Gara, Lincoln, LaFayette D. Hurley, McCook, Robert McNutt, Lincoln, for appellant.
Fred T. Hanson, McCook, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE and BOSLAUGH, JJ.
Plaintiff, Kathryn George, originally filed this action in county court seeking recovery of allowance for school pupil transportation from defendant, School District No. 24 of Red Willow County, under the provisions of section 79-490, R.R.S.1943. Her petition contained two causes of action, one upon a claim in her own behalf, and the other upon a claim of W. K. Coghill, who assigned the same to plaintiff. Fundamentally, the two claims are identical in principle and controlled by like propositions of law. Hereinafter the parties will be designated as plaintiff and plaintiff's assignor, or Mr. Coghill, and defendant district.
The county court, after hearing, rendered a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the district court. There, after a hearing, jury waived, the trial court also rendered judgment for defendant and dismissed plaintiff's action primarily upon the ground that plaintiff and her assignor had failed to file their claims with defendant's district board for payment monthly, as required by section 79-491, R.R.S.1943. Plaintiff's motion for new trial was overruled, and she appealed, assigning insofar as important here that the trial court erred in finding that the aforesaid statute was mandatory and that plaintiff and her assignor, having failed to file written claims for transportation allowance for payment monthly, could not recover. We conclude that the assignment has no merit. There were other assignments of error but discussion thereof is not required in order to dispose of the case upon its merits. In other words, whether or not under the circumstances plaintiff and her assignor could have selected any other school except district No. 4 at the expense of defendant district the trial court was not and this court is not required to answer in order to pass upon and dispose of plaintiff's right to recover. No claim for tuition is involved in this case.
The pertinent controlling facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff and her assignor were both residents in and electors of defendant district. Plaintiff, who is divorced, had a daughter in beginner's grade and Mr. Coghill had a son in second grade. Plaintiff lived from 2 to 2 1/2 miles one way from the school house in defendant district, and 2 miles one way from the school house in district No. 4, where, as hereinafter observed, her child could have attended school during the 1949-1950 school year. However, plaintiff was a teacher in district No. 121 and had personally arranged with its board to have her child attend that school. The child was in fact one of plaintiff's students there. Such school was 7 miles one way from plaintiff's home, so she transported her child back and forth to and from that school, and herin sought recovery for such transportation.
Mr. Coghill, plaintiff's assignor, lived from 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 miles one way from the school house in defendant district, and 1 mile one way from the school house in district No. 4, where, as hereinafter observed, his son could have attended school during the 1949-1950 school year. However, he had personally arranged with the school board of district No. 121 to have his son attend that school. His son was also one of plaintiff's students. Such school was 6 miles one way from Mr. Coghill's home, so his child was transported back and forth to and from that school, and plaintiff, as assignee of his claim, herein sought recovery for such transportation.
Defendant district had discontinued conducting school about 15 years previously, and at that time had made a written contract for instruction of its pupils in and with school district No. 4. However, ever since that time they have not made written contracts as required by section 79-486, R.R.S.1943, but have each year made oral agreements with such district for their instruction. Minutes of some of the intervening regular annual meetings appear in the record, including that held in June 1949, which minutes show that: 'We agreed to send to Marion as we have for several years and pay 10cents per mile per family.' 'Marion' was simply another name by which district No. 4 is known.
In that connection, there is competent evidence that at the June 1949 annual meeting of defendant district, a majority present voted to contract with school district No. 4 for the instruction of defendant district's pupils during the 1949-1950 school year, and at that meeting Mr. Coghill was elected treasurer of defendant district's school board. Be that as it may, he had sent his son to district No. 121 the year before, and had, before defendant district's annual meeting, already decided to send his son there again during the 1949-1950 school year. At that meeting he told those present that he was going to send his son there again whether or not defendant district had school or decided to send its pupils to district No. 4.
Pursuant to the action at such meeting and within about one week thereafter, the board of defendant district made an oral contract with the board of district No. 4 whereby the latter agreed to furnish instruction to defendant district's pupils. Thereafter, district No. 4 held school during the 1949-1950 school year, and was at all times ready and willing to furnish instruction to the children of both plaintiff and Mr. Coghill or to any other pupils from defendant district who presented themselves for such instruction. As a matter of fact, district No. 4 did furnish such instruction to at least one pupil from defendant district for at least part of that year.
Nevertheless, plaintiff and her assignor took their children to school district No. 121. In that regard, no statements of attendance or transportation trips actually made were ever filed monthly with the board of defendant district or the secretary thereof by the teacher of district No. 121, but a record of their attendance for the entire school year, executed and signed by the superintendent of schools, at plaintiff's request, was presented to Mr. Coghill, treasurer of defendant district, on May 23, 1950, prior to the 1950 annual meeting. It is clear, however, that such attendance record was in no actual sense or legal effect a claim for transportation services. There is some evidence that about once a month plaintiff made oral demands upon Mr. Coghill, the treasurer, and he likewise made oral demands upon certain members of defendant district's board for payment of transportation, but, without any logical reason or excuse therefor, neither plaintiff nor Mr. Coghill ever filed or attempted to...
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