George W. Collins, Inc. v. Olsker-McLain Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 February 1965 |
Docket Number | OLSKER-M |
Citation | 257 N.Y.S.2d 201,22 A.D.2d 485 |
Parties | GEORGE W. COLLINS, INC., Respondent, v.cLAIN INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant, and A. E. Ottaviano, Inc., Respondent, and 63 other actions. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Weaver, Maghran & McCarthy, Buffalo (Irving C. Maghran, Jr., Buffalo, of counsel), Raichle, Moore, Banning & Weiss, Buffalo (Arnold Weiss, Buffalo, of counsel), for appellant.
Ohlin, Damon, Morey, Sawyer & Moot, Buffalo, for respondent Ottaviano.
Fudeman & Renaldo, McCarville & Frizzell, Buffalo, for respondent George Collins, Inc. (Irving Fudeman, Buffalo, of counsel).
Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Wood & Goodyear, Buffalo, for plaintiff-respondents Canazzi and others (Irving Fudeman, Buffalo, of counsel).
Cohen, Swados, Wright, Hanifin & Bradford, Buffalo, for plaintiff-respondent Gluckman (Irving Fudeman, Buffalo, of counsel).
Magavern, Magavern, Lowe & Beilewech, Buffalo, for plaintiff-respondent Siegel (Irving Fudeman, Buffalo, of counsel).
Before WILLIAMS, P. J., and BASTOW, GOLDMAN, HENRY and DEL VECCHIO, JJ.
The order appealed from directs the consolidation and joint trial of 64 cases now pending in the Supreme Court of Erie County. We do not necessarily disagree with the result, but we definitely disagree with the procedures which were employed in an effort to obtain this result.
Some time prior to November 14, 1963 the defendant Ottaviano moved, at a Special Term for Motions in Erie County, for an order consolidating these actions. The plaintiffs and defendant Olsker-McLain opposed. The motion was properly returnable before Special Term for Motions under both CPLR 2212 (a) and under the Rules of the Supreme Court applicable in Erie County referring to Special Terms for Motions, which we quote:
It appears that all of the parties to all of the actions were before the court on the Special Term motion. The Special Term Justice denied the motion on the ground that prejudice and confusion in the minds of the jury might arise from such consolidation. There was no formal order signed or entered based upon the Special Term Justice's memorandum, but his determination is clear.
Later, in April of 1964, the defendant Ottaviano moved before Calendar Term of the Supreme Court in and for the County of Erie for an order directing that five of these actions be tried jointly. Another motion was made by the plaintiffs returnable at the same time before the Calendar Term requesting that all of the 64 actions be consolidated. In this instance, all of the parties joined in the motion with the exception of defendant Olsker-McLain who opposed it. Again all of the parties were before the court. Thus the question presented by the motion was identical with that submitted and decided previously at Special Term. Nevertheless, the Justice in Calendar Term ordered consolidation, a decision which was directly contrary to the prior decision of the Special Term Justice.
As we have said, we do not disagree with the substance of the Calendar Term Justice's order of consolidation. However, we cannot countenance the review, and in effect the reversal, of a previous determination of a judge of equal jurisdiction by another trial judge. The motion should not have been considered by the second judge but should have been referred to the first judge (CPLR 2217(a), 2221). We stated our position in Scott v. Scott, 8 A.D.2d 9, 12, 185 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417, as follows:
Our admonitions in the Scott case have been completely disregarded in the present case and recently in other cases.
The Civil Practice Law and Rules makes appropriate provision for the proper handling of matters when this question arises. Rule 2217(a) provides: 'Any motion may be referred to a judge who decided a prior motion in the action.' Moreover, Rule 2221 mandates that a motion affecting a prior order (Italics added.)
Furthermore, the Calendar Term Justice should have been guided by the decision of this court in Carey v. Moore, 244 App.Div. 763, 279 N.Y.S. 168, where it was said:
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...only lead to unseemly conflicts of decision and to protracting the litigation.”(see also George W. Collins, Inc. v. Olsker–McLain Indus.,22 A.D.2d 485, 488–489, 257 N.Y.S.2d 201 [4th Dept.1965]).Plaintiff argues that despite being a party to the action before the Surrogate, she is not bound......
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