George W. Helm Co. v. Griffin

Decision Date07 March 1893
Citation16 S.E. 1023,112 N.C. 356
PartiesGEORGE W. HELM CO. v. GRIFFIN.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from superior court, Wayne county; BRYAN, Judge.

Action by the George W. Helm Company against C. F. Griffin on account for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

A letter written by a debtor to his creditors, concerning a debt which is barred by limitations, and reciting that the debtor felt delicate about asking further credit, knowing that he had been unable to pay what he owed them, but felt confident of paying bills contracted in the future, is not sufficient to remove the bar of the statute, since the letter contains no promise whatever.

Defendant in the above action pleaded the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff firm alleged a new promise by defendant, and introduced the following letter written by him to plaintiff "My Dear Sir: Your letter of last night to hand, and in reply thereto would say that I reckon I might as well hold on a while in taking hold of your snuff, as I feel quite a delicacy in asking your firm for further credit, knowing that I have been unable to pay what I owed them in Wilson. I have perfect confidence in paying what bills I may contract in the future, and am better able to do so now than I was then. Let me get straight with the world, then I will ask for their confidence, but never till then. What confidence is given me must be voluntary. With the highest regards for you, I am yours truly, C. F. GRIFFIN."

W. C. Munroe, for appellant.

CLARK J.

Under the former statute of presumptions, an acknowledgment of the nonpayment of a debt coming within its operation would rebut the presumption of payment arising from the lapse of time. Such was the purport of the decisions cited by counsel for the plaintiff. But now we have no statute of presumptions. The Code, § 138, [1] prescribes a statute of limitations only. The acknowledgment which is now requisite as evidence of a new or continuing contract must not only be in writing (Code, § 172, [2]) but it must be an unconditional promise to pay the debt, (Bates v. Herren, 95 N.C. 388; Greenleaf v. Railroad Co., 91 N.C. 33.) A mere acknowledgment of the debt, though implying a promise to pay it, will not revive it. Riggs v. Roberts, 85 N.C. 151; Faison v. Bowden, 76 N.C. 425. This section (172) provides that the statute is only waived by an acknowledgment or new...

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