Georgia Cas. Co. v. Jones

Decision Date12 October 1923
Docket Number3766.
Citation119 S.E. 721,156 Ga. 664
PartiesGEORGIA CASUALTY CO. v. JONES.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Compensation for the loss of a member, under section 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state, is in full for such specific injury, and excludes compensation for temporary total disability arising solely from the loss of such member.

Whether an employee would be entitled to compensation for a temporary total disability, not due solely to the loss of such member but due to some other cause, is not now for decision by this court.

Certiorari from Court of Appeals.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Henry Jones for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Georgia Casualty Company. An award of compensation was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the superior court, and on error proceedings to the Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed (30 Ga.App. 207, 117 S.E. 467), and defendant brings certiorari. Reversed.

Brock Sparks & Russell, of Macon, and Arnold & Battle, of Columbus for plaintiff in error.

A. W Cozart and W. Cecil Neill, both of Columbus, for defendant in error.

HINES J.

This case is in this court upon a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals therein. The facts of the case and the opinion of the Court of Appeals will be found in Jones v. Georgia Casualty Co., 30 Ga.App. 207, 117 S.E. 467. The Court of Appeals held that sections 30, 31, and 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (Acts 1920, p. 167; 9 Park's Ann. Code, § 3154 [a] et seq.)--

"should be so construed that, upon an injury being received entailing total disability, the employee is entitled to receive compensation therefor under the provisions of section 30; that, where such total disability is succeeded by partial disability, he is entitled to recover additional compensation therefor either under section 31 or section 32--under section 31 on account of all injuries, except of the particular kind and character scheduled in section 32, but exclusively under section 32 if the partial disability is permanent and is occasioned by an injury of the character therein described."

The sole question for decision by this court is whether this construction of this act is correct. Section 30 of this act provides that:

"Where the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the employer shall pay, * * * as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee during such total incapacity a weekly compensation equal to one half his average wages, but not more than twelve dollars, nor less than six dollars a week; and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than three hundred and fifty weeks, nor shall the total amount of all compensation exceed four thousand dollars."

This section provides compensation for total incapacity for work, temporary or permanent, with the limitations as to the time and amount therein specified. Here compensation is given for total incapacity to work; and would cover all cases of total incapacity to work unless there are excepted cases in the statute. Section 31 provides that: "Except as otherwise provided in the next section hereafter, when the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, * * * as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee during such incapacity, a weekly compensation equal to one half the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than twelve dollars a week, and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than three hundred weeks from the date of the injury. In case the partial incapacity begins after a period of total incapacity, the latter period shall be deducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial incapacity."

Here provision is made for compensation for temporary or permanent partial incapacity for work or disability; and it covers all cases of such incapacity, "except as otherwise provided in" section 32. It is clear that this section makes provision for compensation for injuries resulting in partial incapacity, except in the instances and cases named in section 32.

Section 32 provides compensation for injuries resulting from the loss of certain members or organs of the human body. It fixes the period of incapacity to work in the case of the loss of each of such members or organs and the compensation to be paid for the injury which results in such loss. This section declares that:

"The compensation so paid for such injury shall be as specified therein, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation."

By the express words of this section, compensation for the injuries specified therein is "in lieu of all other compensation." If the workman can recover compensation for such an injury under both sections 30 and 32, then his compensation under section 32 is not in lieu of all other compensation. To adopt a construction of this statute which would permit double compensation under these sections would be in the teeth of the plain and distinct declaration of the legislative intent. In plain and distinct language this section provides the sole and exclusive compensation for all disability caused by the loss of the particular members therein specified, except in cases of the loss of both arms, legs, feet, or any two of these members, or total loss of vision of both eyes, when compensation is to be made under section 30. When the Legislature plainly and distinctly declares its intention, the act is not open to construction. It requires and can receive none. Such an act is its own interpretation. The courts have nothing to do but enforce it. Such a statute excludes interpretation. Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104, 110. It was the purpose of the Legislature to declare the loss of a member, specified in section 32, to be a permanent partial disability, to compensate the workman for such loss as a permanent partial disability, and to make such compensation exclusive of all other compensation, just as it declares that:

The "loss of both arms, hands, legs, or feet, or of any two of these members, the permanent total loss of vision in both eyes, shall be deemed permanent total incapacity and shall be compensated under section 30."

The purpose was to create a certain and fixed compensation for these specific injuries, and make it exclusive of all other compensation for such injuries. The Legislature evidently intended that the loss of a specific member or organ deserved the compensation fixed in the schedule, and that such compensation should be in lieu of all other compensation for these specific injuries. The Legislature separated these specific injuries from other partial disabilities, and fixed a compensation for each; and thus conclusively determined that the compensation provided for the loss of one of these members was proper compensation. "The language is plain and unambiguous, and is not susceptible of other construction." Hull v. U.S. Fidelity, etc Co., 102 Neb. 246, 166 N.W. 628. To attempt to put a different interpretation upon this act would be to disregard its plain language and meaning. "If the act works unscientifically, absurdly, or unjustly, that is for the Legislature to correct." Nitram Co. v. Court of Common Pleas in...

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