Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Reville
| Decision Date | 28 February 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 36453,36453,1 |
| Citation | 95 Ga.App. 358,98 S.E.2d 210 |
| Parties | GEORGIA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY v. J. S. REVILLE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where motions to dismiss explicitly limit the attack on the plaintiff's petition to one specific ground, the court must consider only the ground to which the motions are confined.
2. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court in the consideration of a case can take judicial notice of the record and decision in another case. The same must be pleaded and proved.
3. The attack on the petition, sought to be made by the motions to dismiss, can not be made, since the attack is based on matter not contained in the petition and of which judicial notice can not be taken.
On February 4, 1956, a petition, brought in two counts, was filed by Julian S. Reville, against Georgia Casualty & Surety Company, which, after being amended, alleged in substance in count one that the defendant is engaged in the business of selling liability insurance to automobile owners; that on October 10, 1952, it issued a contract of insurance to indemnify Reville against loss to the extent of five thousand ($5,000) dollars, principal, for injuries to or the death of any one person, and a copy of the face of the policy was attached to the petition; that the policy indemnified Reville against liability which was imposed upon him by law and was in full force and effect during June, 1953, insuring a 1949 Ford coupe; that Reville was driving said automobile on June 23, 1953, and Harriss Sullivan was riding in the car with him when a collision occurred in which Harriss Sullivan was killed; that Mrs. Martha Sullivan, the widow of Harriss Sullivan, for the benefit of herself and three minor children, filed suit in the Superior Court of Columbia County, Georgia, which suit was served upon Reville and placed by him in the hands of the Georgia Casualty & Surety Company; and that the Casualty Company employed its own attorneys to represent Reville, and defensive pleadings were promptly filed in his name.
The petition, as amended, further alleged that Mrs. Martha Sullivan made an offer to settle her claim for five thousand ($5,000) dollars, which offer was made to Reville, who then sought to have his insurer, Georgia Casualty & Surety Company, enter into negotiations for settlement by orally requesting Honorable Earle Norman, attorney of record for Reville, to effect the settlement for five thousand ($5,000) dollars; that Reville feared the suit might result in a verdict against him for more than five thousand ($5,000) dollars because he had pleaded guilty to operating his vehicle while under the influence of whisky on the occasion of the collision. Even though this fact was known to the casualty company, it refused to entertain the idea of settlement and refused to negotiate for settlement because Honorable Earle Norman, the attorney for the company, said that the case could be won.
The petition, as amended, further alleged that the company at all times considered its own interest and placed the same in the forefront, and gave no consideration to Reville's interest and welfare, nor to the possible harm that might result to Reville through failure to settle within the policy limits; that the case was tried in the superior court and a jury returned a verdict for fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars, in favor of Mrs. Martha Sullivan for herself and her children, in which trial, the insurer introduced no evidence in Reville's behalf nor asked him any questions before the jury and failed to offer in evidence a map and board upon which drawings were made and testified about during the insurer's cross-examination of R. W. Tomlin, a witness for Mrs. Sullivan, which map was prepared and being produced at the trial by the insurance company; that after this verdict, Mrs. Martha Sullivan made a written offer to settle for five thousand ($5,000) dollars, with interest and cost, plus five hundred ($500) dollars medical expenses, which written offer was received by said Norman, and at the same time Reville requested the company to enter into negotiations for settlement and take action to prevent the judgment and verdict from standing against him, and to settle according to Sullivan's demands, but the company again refused to enter into negotiations but filed a motion for new trial, which was denied and appealed to the appellate courts without filing a supersedeas bond; that the company did not advise Reville, nor afford him an opportunity, to have the judgment superseded pending the appeal; that while the appeal was pending, Sullivan caused Reville's automobile to be levied on and sold under the levy in July, 1955, although Reville reported the levy and the...
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Smoot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 18815.
...distinguishes the following Georgia cases: Francis v. Newton, 1947, 75 Ga.App. 341, 43 S.E.2d 282; Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Reville, 1957, 95 Ga.App. 358, 98 S.E.2d 210; Reville v. Sullivan, 1955, 93 Ga.App. 23, 90 S.E.2d 609; Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Reville, 1958, 97 Ga.Ap......
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...of judicial proof, take notice of the judgment in another case between the parties in the same court.' See Georgia Casualty, etc., Co. v. Reville, 95 Ga.App. 358, 362, 98 S.E.2d 210. Thus absent some more specific identification of the case referred to, we cannot consider 223 Ga. 188, 154 S......
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...court nor this court can judicially know the record and decision in another case even in the same court." Georgia Casualty etc. Co. v. Reville, 95 Ga.App. 358, 362, 98 S.E.2d 210 and cases therein cited. We reiterated this principle in Spearman v. Jaudon, 145 Ga.App. 136, 243 S.E.2d 90 and ......