Georgia Coal & Iron Co. v. Bradford
| Decision Date | 15 August 1908 |
| Citation | 62 S.E. 193,131 Ga. 289 |
| Parties | GEORGIA COAL & IRON CO. v. BRADFORD. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Employés of a common master, engaged in labor for the furtherance of the general purpose of the business in which they contract to serve, are "fellow servants," within the purview of Civ. Code 1895, § 2610, providing that, "except in case of railroad companies, the master is not liable to the servant for injuries arising from the negligence or misconduct of other servants about the same business."
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, §§ 475-479.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp 2716-2730; vol. 8, p. 7662.]
Under this rule a teamster employed by a coal and iron company to assist in hauling a boiler from the furnace plant of the company to its coal mines, to be there used in getting out coal for consumption in the furnace and locomotives of the company, is a "fellow servant" with the engineer and fireman of a locomotive operated in the yards of and in connection with such furnace plant, and therefore not entitled to recover damages from the master for injuries attributable to their negligence.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, § 486.]
Error from Superior Court, Dade County; A. W. Fite, Judge.
Action by L. E. Bradford against the Georgia Coal & Iron Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Tye & Bryan, for plaintiff in error.
Payne & Payne, for defendant in error.
L. E Bradford brought an action against the Georgia Coal & Iron Company, a corporation, for damages alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of the negligence of the defendant's servants and agents, and obtained a verdict. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and that ruling was brought to this court by writ of error. The facts disclosed by the record, necessary to an understanding of the decision here made, are as follows: The defendant company was engaged in the operation of a furnace plant at Rising Fawn, Ga., and desired to move a boiler from its plant there to be used at its coal mines, from 10 to 14 miles distant, in getting out coal for use in its locomotives and furnaces. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant, at a stated price per day, to furnish a team of mules and himself to assist other teamsters in hauling this boiler from the plant to the coal mines. He reported at the furnace plant on the morning he was to begin work, hitched his mules, threw his "stretcher" across his shoulders, and started with them to the place where the wagon on which the boiler was to be hauled was standing. A railroad track ran through the yards of the furnace plant of the defendant company, passing between the point at which the plaintiff hitched his mules and the place where the wagon was, which track was used by the defendant company in connection with its furnace plant. As the plaintiff was walking over a crossing leading across this track to the defendant's furnace, carrying the "stretchers" to the wagon, he was struck and thrown from the track by the rear end of an engine used in hauling products from the furnace, which was then backing along the track on its way to a water tank, sustaining the injuries for which he brought suit. He alleged that he was not guilty of any negligence, but that his injuries were occasioned solely by the negligence of the servants of the defendant who were operating the engine which struck him.
It appears from the evidence contained in the record that the master mechanic of the defendant (who the plaintiff testified was the "company's boss foreman there about the place, giving any orders") made the contract of employment with the plaintiff; and the undisputed evidence, including that of the plaintiff himself, is that he was to furnish his own labor and that of his team of mules at an agreed price per day, and was to be subject to the control and direction of the said Johnson in and about the work to do which he was employed. When the plaintiff, pursuant to his contract, reported on the premises of the defendant, and was engaged in carrying a part of the outfit furnished by him to the wagon to be used in hauling the boiler, he had already entered on his employment, and the relationship of servant and master existed between him and the defendant. It remains to be determined whether, with this relation existing, under the peculiar facts of this case he occupied the further relation of fellow servant with the crew of the engine to whose negligence he attributes the injuries which he received. It is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff, and such is the law, that if the latter relation also existed, notwithstanding his injuries be chargeable to the negligence of such fellow servants, the master would not be liable to respond to him in damages therefor.
The courts have experienced great difficulty in laying down any fixed rule by which to determine when the relationship of fellow servant exists. Indeed, it is well-nigh impossible to do this, since of what are termed personal relations, that of master and servant most frequently receives the attention of the courts, and gives rise to such a flood of cases that no criterion can be established sufficiently accurate to cover the ever-shifting facts involved in the various decisions. The difficulty has been greatly enhanced, and a diversity of opinion created among the various courts, by the application of different theories as to what constitutes the rationale underlying the liability of the master. Some authorities have entertained the view that considerations of public policy give rise to the exemption of the master from responsibility for the negligent acts of a fellow servant, on the idea that to hold the servants alone responsible to each other tends to promote regard and...
To continue reading
Request your trial