Georgia Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk
Decision Date | 19 May 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 38475,38475 |
Citation | 249 Ga. 543,291 S.E.2d 524 |
Parties | GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. SISTRUNK, et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Vivian Davidson Egan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Georgia Dept. of Human Resources.
Bobby L. Hill, Hill, Jones & Associates, Inc., Savannah, Michael J. Egan, Jr., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, for Kenneth Sistrunk et al.
This case began with the filing by the Sistrunks of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Georgia Department of Human Resources. It comes to us, however, on a matter purely collateral to the relief sought.
The Sistrunks are represented by Bobby L. Hill, Jr., a member of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Georgia. The Department filed in the trial court a motion to disqualify Hill as attorney for the Sistrunks upon its assertion of conflict of interest. The trial court held hearing on the motion, and prepared, in his usual scholarly manner, a comprehensive order which denied the motion to disqualify Hill, the essence thereof being as follows: "As long as he earns that livelihood in a manner that does not conflict with his responsibilities as a member of the General Assembly, then he cannot be disqualified, under the Department's fiduciary theory, from practicing his profession for compensation before a unit of the Executive or Judicial branch of government."
The Department appealed, urging that Hill's representation, ipso facto, runs afoul of Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I, of the Constitution of Georgia of 1976 (Code Ann. § 2-201), which states in part: "Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people, and at all times, amenable to them." The Department further urges that his representation is violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code Ann. Title 9 Appen.)
Hill asserts that the legal representation by legislators of private clients against the State is a practice sanctioned by two centuries' usage; that no other jurisdiction in the Republic has created by court rule any such disqualification; and that nothing suggested by the Department is contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As to Hill's last contention, we agree. There is no dual representation in these circumstances, for the plain reason that a member of the General Assembly represents not the government of our State, nor any of its branches, departments, or agencies, but the electorate which is his constituency. With regard to his first two contentions, we disagree. The fact that a practice has endured for centuries by no means establishes its propriety, as all of history abounds in ancient evils. Nor is the want of authorities within our sister states persuasive, as we see it our responsibility to apply the Constitution of Georgia to the facts before us, whether or not that be consistent with the holdings of other states.
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The issue in this case is, then, the meaning of the Constitutional provision declaring that "[p]ublic officers are the trustees and servants of the people, and at all times amenable to them." 1
This language has been brought forward unchanged from its initial appearance in Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Constitution of 1877, that paragraph reading as follows: Earlier Constitutions embraced that same concept in differing words. The preamble of the very first Charter, the Constitution of 1777, contains this language: "We, therefore, the representatives of the people, from whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended, by virtue of the power delegated to us, do ordain and declare, ...." The Constitution of 1861, at Art. I, Par. 16, holds: "A faithful execution of the laws is essential to good order; and good order in society is essential to liberty."
The object of our government and the function of public officers are set out with consistency from the earliest days of our history. It is important, therefore, in delineating the import of the word "trustees", to examine the manner in which that term was used contemporaneously with its first appearance in the Constitution of 1877.
The Code of Georgia of 1863, § 2309, read as follows: That section differs but slightly from our present law, Code Ann. § 108-429, as follows:
The case of Caruthers v. Corbin, 38 Ga. 75 (1868), dealt with the responsibility of a fiduciary who, under the disjointed economy of the times, settled an obligation of an estate with Confederate Treasury Notes, profiting by supplying his own Confederate currency, which was worth but five cents on the dollar. Our court condemned that transaction, and laid down this plain and simple proscription--"He can not use his trust to promote his own personal interest." Id. at p. 91. In City of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878), this Court dealt with a mayor who had contracted with his city to do certain things. Condemning alike that transaction, we held: Id. at pp. 225, 226, 228.
Perhaps the earliest treatment of this subject is Harrison v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 164 (1850), relating to the propriety of a sheriff purchasing on his own account property sold at public outcry. Justice Nisbet wrote: Id. at pp. 166, 167.
A member of the General Assembly is, of course, a "public officer" within the meaning of the Constitution. "Certainly, where an individual has been appointed or elected, in a manner prescribed by law, has a designation or title given him by law, and exercises functions concerning the public, assigned to him by law, he must be regarded as a public officer." Bradford v. Justices of Inferior Court, 33 Ga. 332(2) (1862). See also Polk v. James, 68 Ga. 128, 131 (1881):
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We have set out these venerable authorities as illuminative of the state of our law at the time of the initial adoption of the Constitutional provision here in...
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