Georgia Dept. of Transp. v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 03 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S96A1745,S96A1745 |
| Citation | 267 Ga. 733,482 S.E.2d 260 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 705 GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. EDWARDS et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Deputy Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for plaintiff.
Charles N. Pursley, Jr., Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Altanta, for defendants.
The Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Rodney Edwards in this inverse condemnation action. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In 1987, Edwards purchased property in the southwest quadrant of the intersection of State Route 136 and East Armuchee Road in Walker County, where he operated a grocery and general merchandise store and gasoline business. At the time, State Route 136, which bordered the northern edge of Edwards' property, consisted of two lanes. The edge of the roadway was approximately 30 feet from the gasoline pumps on the north side of the store. The area between the store and State Route 136 was used by Edwards for parking and for servicing vehicles at the pumps. This dispute concerns the paving and striping of a turn lane in that area by DOT.
In March of 1990, Edwards observed surveying activity on the road adjacent to his store, and he asked DOT's agents about its intentions. He also advised DOT that, in his opinion, his property extended up to the paved portion of State Route 136, and that DOT owned no right-of-way beyond the roadway. Despite repeated inquiries, Edwards was unable to learn anything further from DOT.
In October 1990, DOT moved paving equipment into the area and Edwards again complained. He was assured by DOT district engineer Felton D. Rutledge that nothing would be done that day, and that DOT would send a representative on the following day to discuss the problem. Despite Rutledge's assurances, DOT's crew returned to Edwards' property that afternoon in the company of a State Patrol officer who threatened to arrest Edwards if he interfered with the paving. DOT paved and striped the turn lane that day.
Edwards' subsequent complaints to Rutledge and demands that the turn lane be removed were met with threats. Finally a meeting was held in December between Edwards and his attorney, and Rutledge and a representative from the Attorney General's office acting on DOT's behalf. When both Edwards and DOT claimed ownership of the property, DOT's attorney proposed that an independent survey be conducted. Edwards agreed and Richard D. Canaday, a registered land surveyor acceptable to both parties, was selected to determine the north boundary line of the Edwards property. After extensive investigation, Canaday concluded that the turn lane was constructed on property owned by Edwards.
Edwards demanded that DOT remove the turn lane and restore the property to its original condition, and that he be compensated for the taking and for consequential damages. When his demands were refused, Edwards filed suit against DOT and its district engineer, Rutledge, on a theory of inverse condemnation. He sought damages for the taking including consequential damages to his property and business through the date of trial; damages for trespass and nuisance; an injunction requiring the removal of the public road; and attorney fees and expenses of litigation. In its answer, DOT claimed ownership of the property pursuant to two right-of-way deeds acquired in 1931 and 1932, respectively; and by adverse possession under color of title by virtue of having maintained a turn lane in the same area in the late 1970's or early 1980's, for a period in excess of seven years. Asserting a continuing trespass and nuisance, DOT counterclaimed for damages and for injunctive relief to prohibit further trespass.
By special verdict, the jury determined that Edwards owned the property on which the turn lane was paved, and it relied on the Canaday survey to identify the boundary line between the south right-of-way of State Route 136 and Edwards' property. It awarded Edwards $200,000 as compensation for inverse condemnation, an injunction requiring DOT to remove the turn lane from the property, attorney fees and expenses of litigation. It rejected Edwards' claims for damages for nuisance, trespass and for punitive damages, and found no liability on the part of Rutledge.
1. DOT asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict on several grounds. In reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this court must determine whether there is any evidence to support the jury's verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50(a); Howard v. Rivers, 266 Ga. 185(1), 465 S.E.2d 666 (1996).
Canaday testified at trial that he was employed to do an independent boundary survey, particularly to determine where Edwards' northern property line joins State Route 136. He received information from both parties, and conducted more than one thousand hours of research and field work. Canaday examined Edwards' chain of title beginning in 1870, through the present. He examined two right-of-way deeds through which DOT claimed the property, which were given to DOT's predecessor, the State Highway Department, in 1931 and 1932. The right-of-way deeds purported to convey a 100-foot strip, 50 feet on either side of a proposed center line of State Route 136. However, Canaday determined that while the grantors of the 1931 and 1932 deeds owned property north of the center line of the road as shown on those deeds, they had no ownership in the property south of the center line. He concluded that neither grantor had any ownership in the property claimed by Edwards, and thus had no right-of-way to convey to the State. He was unable to confirm any other deed that granted a right-of-way at the location asserted by DOT. Canaday's conclusion, that the turn lane is on Edwards' property, is reflected on his plat of survey, which was admitted into evidence without objection. DOT offered no survey of its own to refute the Canaday survey. 1
To establish title in Edwards, Canaday relied on the deed Edwards received in 1987 upon purchasing the property, as well as on a 1924 deed in Edwards' chain of title, which originally separated the store property as a separate tract. These deeds described the northern boundary line of Edwards' property as running along Lafayette-Villanow Road (the predecessor to State Route 136). Relying on Walker v. Hill, 253 Ga. 126, 317 S.E.2d 825 (1984), DOT asserts that the description of the boundary as running along a road for a specific distance was unambiguous as a matter of law and could not be modified by extrinsic evidence, including the mutual Canaday survey. In Walker there was undisputed evidence that the State's fee interest extended 50 feet east of the centerline of the road. The question was whether the property line in question ran from the edge or from the centerline of that roadway. Since the deed in Walker unambiguously described the property line as running from the margin of the road, we held that a mutual survey was not competent evidence to vary the terms of that deed.
In contrast to Walker, there was clear evidence that DOT's interest in the land did not extend 50 feet from the centerline. The Canaday survey was not offered to vary the terms of an unambiguous deed, as in Walker, but rather to establish the location of Edwards' north property line and the existing right-of-way line of State Route 136.
Since there was competent evidence that a taking had occurred, the motion for directed verdict was properly overruled on this ground.
Edwards offered testimony of a licensed real estate and business appraiser. He was asked to value Edwards property just prior to the time the turn lane was paved. Using the income method, he took into consideration the monthly and annual income of the business since Edwards purchased it in 1987, income tax returns, and gross sales. He computed the entire business income from 1987 until October 1990 and recognized an upward trend. He calculated what a well informed purchaser would pay and a seller would take for the property in 1990, and estimated the fair market value of the property prior to the paving on October 25, 1990, to be $207,225. The appraiser recognized that construction of the turn lane impaired access to the property and to the gasoline pumps, and drastically reduced parking. Since two-thirds of the gross income of the business came from the sale of gasoline, the loss of access to the pumps had a considerable effect on the value of the property. The appraiser valued the total damage from the time of the taking until the time of trial attributable to the placement of the turn lane at $126,652 (i.e., value of the temporary taking of the land and the damage to...
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