Georgia Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Sewell

• Decision Date: 05 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 41708,41708,3
• Citation: 113 Ga.App. 443,148 S.E.2d 447
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: GEORGIA LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY v. Alvin R. SEWELL, by Next Friend

Page 447

148 S.E.2d 447

113 Ga.App. 443

GEORGIA LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY v. Alvin R. SEWELL, by Next Friend.

No. 41708.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

April 5, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an action upon an accident insurance policy to recover benefits provided for 'loss of entire sight' of an eye, it was correct and applicable for the court to instruct the jury that if plaintiff had lost the entire sight of the eye 'for all practical purposes,' this would amount to loss of the entire sight of the eye as covered by the policy.

2. The verdict for the insured was authorized by the evidence.

Alvin Ray Sewell brought this action upon an accident insurance policy against Georgia Life & Health Insurance Company to recover benefits for loss of plaintiff's eyesight. The policy provided: 'If the insured shall sustain any one of the following specific losses within one hundred (100) days from the date of accident, the Company will pay for loss of: * * * Either Eye * * * $1,000.00 * * * Loss of sight of eye or eyes shall mean the irrecoverable loss of the entire sight thereof.' Defendant took this appeal from the judgment entered upon the jury's verdict for plaintiff.

A. S. Skelton, Hartwell, Erwin, Birchmore & Epting, Eugene A. Epting, Athens, for appellant.

Joseph S. Skelton, Hartwell, McClure, Ramsay & Struble, Robert B. Struble, Toccoa, for appellee.

Heard & Leverett, E. Freeman Leverett, Elberton, for party at interest, not party to rocore.

BELL, Presiding Judge.

1. Defendant enumerates error upon the following portion of the court's charge to the jury: 'If you should find from all the evidence that for all practical purposes, the plaintiff, Alvin Ray Sewell, has lost the entire sight in his left eye, then this shall amount to the loss of the entire sight of one eye as set forth in the policy.' The question presented is of first impression in Georgia although decisions on the point are available from other jurisdictions.

To recover under a policy provision of the kind in question, loss of sight in the literal sense of absolute blindness is not necessary. Jensvold v. Provident Life etc. Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 122, 253 N.W. 535, 537; Locomotive Engineers' etc. Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 157 Miss. 97, 127 So. 699, 702.

In Locomotive Engineers etc. Ins. Ass'n v. Vandergriff, 192 Ark. 244, 91 S.W.2d 271, 273, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated: 'It is manifest, when we abandon sophistry and indulge in plain thinking, that where one has no practical use of his eyes he is blind, and the ordinary person having a policy such as the one in the instant case would think that he was insured against blindness-so he is. 'The ability to perceive light and objects but no ability to distinguish and recognize objects is not sight, but blindness.' This, all men know. It would be unfair to the association to impute to it the intention * * * to base its liability upon the frivolous distinction between the power to perceive objects in any character of light without the ability to distinguish one object from another, and that totality of blindness which would make complete darkness.' See also: Murray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 243 F. 285 (D.C.Mont.); Zurich etc. Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 192 Ark. 898, 95 S.W.2d 896, 897; Tracey v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 119 Me. 131, 109 A. 490, 494, 9 A.L.R. 521.

The words 'loss of entire sight' in policies similar to the one here have been interpreted, with few exceptions, to mean loss of practical use of sight rather than literal blindness. In addition to the foregoing cases, see: Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Terrell, 29 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.); Clark v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 43 Cal.App.2d 563, 111 P.2d 353, 355, 112 P.2d 298; Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Ward, 99 Ind.App. 97, 187 N.E. 55, 57; Continental Casualty Co. v. Linn, 226 Ky. 328, 10 S.W.2d 1079, 1083; Mulcahey v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 229 Mo.App. 610, 79 S.W.2d 759, 765; Brinson v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 85, 150 S.E.2d 246; International Travelers' Ass'n v. Rogers, (Tex.Civ.App.) 163 S.W. 421, 423; Anno. 87 A.L.R.2d 481, §§ 3, 9. Contra, Gilliland v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 216 Ala. 13, 112 So. 255; Bolich v. Provident Life etc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 43, 169 S.E. 826, 828.

Construing 'loss of entire sight,' as we do, to mean the entire loss of practical use of sight, it follows that the instruction complained of was a correct and applicable principle of law. Similar instructions were approved in Murray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra; Continental Casualty Co. v. Linn, supra; and International Travelers' Ass'n v. Rogers, supra.

2. The only question for consideration on the general grounds is whether the evidence authorized a finding that plaintiff's injury resulted in 'loss of the entire sight' of plaintiff's left eye within the meaning of those terms discussed in division 1.

The evidence showed that plaintiff had completely lost the central vision of his left eye, but that some peripheral vision remained. Plaintiff testified that with his left eye he could distinguish between dark and light, but could not see the blackboard even when sitting on the front row at school, could not read 'the regular print' of any...