Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Wright
| Decision Date | 24 May 1906 |
| Parties | GEORGIA R. & BANKING CO. v. WRIGHT, Comptroller General, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The present Constitution imperatively requires that all property of every nature whatsoever within the territorial limits of the state shall be taxed, except such as the Constitution expressly authorizes the General Assembly to exempt from taxation.
The Constitution does not require any property to be taxed more than once.
A tax law will not be so construed as to require the same property to be taxed a second time, unless such a construction is required by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
When a tax is imposed upon that which has inherent value in the hands of one person, and is also imposed upon that which is a mere symbol thereof in the hands of another person, deriving its value solely from that which it represents, the same property is twice taxed.
When a tax is levied against a corporation upon all its property and a tax is also levied upon the value of the shares in the hands of the stockholders, that which makes up the value of the property of the corporation and the value of the shares of the stockholders is one and the same thing, and under such a system of taxation the same property is twice taxed.
By the act of 1885 (Acts 1884-85, p. 30), shares of stock in corporations within the state were declared to be the subject of taxation.
By the act of 1886 (Acts 1886, p. 24) the act of 1885 above referred to was repealed, so far as it related to stock in corporations in this state which were required by law to make a return of property for taxation to the Comptroller General.
By the act of 1888 (Acts 1888, p. 29) the act of 1885, so far as it related to the taxation of shares of stock of corporations within this state, was repealed as to shares of stock in those corporations where the law required the president of the company to return the property of the corporation for taxation.
The provisions in the tax acts of 1886 and 1888 (Acts 1886, p 24; Acts 1888, p. 29) which in effect declare that shares of stock in domestic corporations need not be returned for the purpose of taxation have been carried forward in every tax act which has been passed up to the present time, and were not repealed by the adoption of the Code of 1895. There is no law now of force in this state, nor has there been since 1888, requiring shares of stock in corporations within the state to be returned for taxation when the president or other officer of the company is required by law to return the property of the corporation, either to the Comptroller General or the tax receiver of the county.
The General Assembly not being required by the Constitution to impose a tax on shares of stock in domestic corporations where the property of such corporations is taxed in the hands of the company, the failure of the General Assembly to impose such a tax, while imposing a tax upon shares in foreign corporations, is not, as to the owners of shares of the latter class, a violation of those provisions of the Constitution of Georgia which require that protection to property shall be impartial and complete, and that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the taxing authority, nor of that provision of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
"A tax in another state is no tax for the purposes of the state of Georgia."
That provision in the Constitution of the state which declares that protection to persons and property shall be impartial and complete is the equivalent of a declaration that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States places a limitation upon all the powers of a state, including, among others, that of taxation.
The limitations in the fourteenth amendment are upon the state and those who act in its name and under its authority, and have no reference to actions by individuals.
The courts of this state will take judicial notice that the mass of property in this state is made up of lands and the different forms of personalty, but such notice cannot be taken as to the quantity of personalty.
When in a given case, it appears that only two persons are proceeded against by the tax officers of the state for taxes on a particular character of personalty, the courts cannot take judicial notice that there are other persons in the state who are also owners of property of that character, and who have not been required to pay taxes thereon.
Custom among taxpayers to return their property for taxation at sums less than that required by law will not, as to a taxpayer called upon to pay the full amount of his tax, amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, when the custom was adopted without the authority or consent of the tax officers of the state, and over the protest of such officers.
The administration of valid tax laws of a state will not be declared to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, unless it appears that the officers charged by the law of the state with the collection of taxes knowingly willfully, and intentionally so administered the law as to place upon one person or class a burden from which another person or class similarly situated is relieved.
The trial judge, to whom the case was submitted on both the law and the facts, having found that the evidence did not disclose any discrimination in the assessment and levy of the taxes on the stock in controversy, as compared with other property in the state, and that the value placed on the stock by the Comptroller General is not excessive, and having also found generally in favor of the defendant on all of the issues of fact in the case, and there being evidence to authorize each finding, and the trial judge having, upon motion for a new trial, declined to disturb the findings made by him at the final hearing, the judgment will not be reversed on the ground that the findings were contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support them.
The different acts of the General Assembly relating to the method of collecting the taxes upon the property of railroad companies for state, county, and municipal purposes are to be construed together, and when so construed they are exhaustive as to the method to be adopted in the collection of taxes of every character imposed by law upon all the property of railroads. When so interpreted, there is nothing in such acts to violate that provision of the Constitution of the state which declares that all taxes "shall be levied and collected under general laws."
Tax executions, whenever lawfully issued, bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum upon the amount of taxes embraced therein "from the time fixed by law for issuing the same." A tax execution may be lawfully issued whenever the time fixed by law for the payment of the tax has expired; and whenever issued, it bears interest from the first day that it could have been issued.
When a taxpayer causes an injunction to be issued, restraining the collection of taxes against him, interest upon the tax execution is not suspended while the injunction is operative, if the taxpayer is by the final decree declared liable for the taxes.
When a taxpayer is enjoined from returning given property for taxation and from paying taxes on the same, and the tax officer is also enjoined from levying and collecting any taxes upon such property, at the instance of a third party, the taxpayer is not relieved from the payment of interest on the tax execution subsequently issued, when it appears that the taxpayer was a mere complacent defendant, interposing no obstacle to the injunction, in no way seeking to obtain permission of the court to pay any amount as admitted to be due as taxes, and, so far as the record discloses, acquiescing in the contention of the plaintiff that no tax is due thereon.
When a taxpayer is enjoined from making a return of his property or a portion thereof for taxation, and the injunction is subsequently dissolved, he should be allowed the same time for making a return after the dissolution of the injunction as he would have been allowed under the law if no injunction had been granted, and the tax officer should not proceed against such a taxpayer as a defaulter until such time has elapsed.
When the injunction issued by the United States Circuit Court restraining the plaintiff from returning for taxation the stock involved in the present case was issued, the plaintiff, under the law, had 12 days remaining of the time in which to make a return for taxation for that year. The Comptroller General not having made an assessment of the property until after the expiration of that time, the assessment was valid, and it was not error to refuse to enjoin the execution issued on such assessment.
The injunction referred to in the preceding note having been operative from April 19, 1902, to January 10, 1905, the plaintiff should have been allowed such time for making returns, after the dissolution of the injunction, as the law allowed it during the years 1903 and 1904; that is, from January 1st to May 1st, four months. The assessments for these years having been made within less than this time, they were unauthorized and illegal, and the execution for these years should have been enjoined from proceeding.
The four months which the taxpayer should have been allowed, to make a return of the stock for taxation for the years 1903 and ...
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