Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia
| Decision Date | 15 March 1919 |
| Docket Number | 1174. |
| Citation | 98 S.E. 696,149 Ga. 1 |
| Parties | GEORGIA RY. & POWER CO. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF GEORGIA ET AL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the proviso contained in the fifth section of the act approved August 23, 1907, now embodied in Civil Code 1910, § 2662, the Railroad Commission of this state was without authority to exercise the powers conferred and extended by that act, so as to determine or fix fares upon lines of street railroads within the limits of any town or city between which and the street railroad company operating such lines there was a valid, subsisting contract at the time of the passage of the act.
(a) There was such a contract between the city of College Park and the Georgia Railway & Power Company, and between that company and the city of Decatur as to one line running from Decatur to Atlanta.
(b) But as between the cities of Atlanta and East Point and the Georgia Railway & Power Company there was no such contract.
(c) But there was a contract covering the subject of transfers, which provided that upon the payment of one full fare a transfer should be given; and the Railroad Commission was without jurisdiction to deal with the matter of transfers.
"A grant of power to a municipal corporation must be strictly construed; and such a corporation can exercise no powers except those which are expressly given, or are necessarily implied from express grants of other powers." Applying this principle to the facts contained in this record, the city of Atlanta was without authority to pass an ordinance fixing the rates of fare upon the lines of the street railroad company which it had constructed within the limits of the municipality, and any attempt by the municipality to pass such ordinances was nugatory.
In the absence of a valid, subsisting contract and ordinance upon the subject of fares, it was the duty of the Railroad Commission, upon application by the Georgia Railway & Power Company, a street railroad company, to fix and determine the rates of fare upon the lines of the street railroad in the city, in accordance with the law defining the powers and duties of the commission.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The regulation of passenger tariffs, and the fixing of fares on street and steam railways, is a matter falling within the police power.
Under Const. art. 4, § 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, § 6464), neither the Legislature nor any municipality can, by ordinance or contract, abridge the exercise of the state's police power, but a municipality may make a contract on such subject, where state has not exercised its police power with reference thereto.
Under Const. art. 3, § 7, par. 20 (Civ. Code 1910, § 6448) forbidding General Assembly to authorize construction of street passenger railway within city or town without consent of corporate authorities, such authorities may impose conditions upon which a street railway may construct its track in streets, and contract with corporation as to conditions on which it may construct railway within municipal limits.
Where the state has not exercised, and is not seeking to exercise its police power as to street railway fares, a municipality and a street railroad may enter into valid contracts on such subject.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Geo. L. Bell, Judge.
Mandamus by the Georgia Railway & Power Company against the Railroad Commission of Georgia and others for an increase in street railroad fares. Judgment for defendants, and petitioner brings error. Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
King & Spalding, C. T., L. C., & J. L. Hopkins, Brewster, Howell & Heyman, Colquitt & Conyers, and Rosser, Slaton, Phillips & Hopkins, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
James K. Hines, J. L. Mayson, R. R. Arnold, S.D. Hewlett, E. E. Pomeroy, C. E. Cotterill, A. C. Broom, and G. M. Watkins, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error, hereafter called the railway company, filed a petition to the Railroad Commission of Georgia, for an increase in street railway fares. In the application it was claimed that an increase of rates for street car and suburban fares was absolutely essential in order for the applicant, in view of the unusual war conditions which had prevailed for more than a year, to effectively discharge obligations of the company to the public. The facts upon which this claim of the necessity for a raise in the rates of street car fares was based were fully and elaborately set forth in the petition to the commission. Upon hearing the application the commission held that, by reason of certain contracts between the railway company and the cities of Atlanta, Decatur, East Point, and College Park, it had no jurisdiction to grant increased fares, and reached the conclusion that, having found the contracts referred to to be physically existent, their validity was not a question for the commission, but for the courts, to decide; that when dealing with the rates of a street railroad under the terms of the act of 1907, embraced in Civil Code, § 2662, they were brought face to face with a contract or an ordinance in existence at the time of the passage of that act, and still subsisting, that the commission could go no further in dealing with the rates until the obstacle should be removed by legal procedure before a court of competent jurisdiction, or until the General Assembly should further act. The commission, having concluded that there were contracts in existence which were an obstacle to their further proceeding, stated as their opinion that the applicant was entitled to an increase in street car fares, and that a six-cent fare would be reasonable and just "so long as existing abnormal war conditions prevailed," and recommended to the municipal authorities of Atlanta, Decatur, and College Park the justice of granting the increase "by amendment to existing contracts or ordinances." The railway company then brought to the superior court of Fulton county its petition against the commission, and prayed that the writ of mandamus issue, requiring the commission to take jurisdiction in the matter of fixing the rates, it being insisted that the commission had erred in declining to take jurisdiction in the matter, for the reason that there were no contracts, valid or otherwise, between the city of Atlanta and petitioner fixing the street railroad fares, or that there was in existence in 1907 an ordinance, valid or otherwise, passed by the city of Atlanta fixing street railroad fares, and that if there existed at said time any such contracts or ordinances the same were invalid because the city of Atlanta lacked the charter power to make such contracts or ordinances, and because, if the city of Atlanta had charter power to make such contracts and ordinances they would be void because violative of article 4, § 2, par. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia, conferring upon the General Assembly alone the power of regulating passenger tariffs, preventing unjust discrimination, and fixing reasonable and just rates. Applicant also insisted that the alleged contracts between applicant and the towns of Edgewood, East Point, Decatur, and College Park were invalid because these towns were without charter power to make such contracts, and that if they had such power the contracts would be void because in violation of that section of the Constitution referred to. The further contention was made that, even if there were valid contracts between the petitioner and one or more of the municipalities referred to, the existence of such valid contract would not prevent the commission from exercising its jurisdiction to fix street railroad fares in cases other than those covered by such valid contracts, and that if there were with the cities, whose streets were occupied by petitioner, valid existing contracts, the act of the commission in fixing and approving just and reasonable rates would not be an impairment of such contracts under the Constitution of this state.
1. We will first consider the question as to whether, if there were contracts in existence on the 23d day of August, 1907, between the municipalities named, or any of them, by the terms of which the street railroad fares were fixed as to that municipality, such a contract would prevent the fixing of the street railroad fares by the commission. The act to revise and enlarge the powers and duties of the Railroad Commission of Georgia, etc., approved August 23, 1907, contains the statutory provision now embraced in section 2662 of the Civil Code, and so far as relates to the questions under consideration in this case reads as follows:
"The powers and duties hereinbefore conferred by law upon the Railroad Commission are hereby extended and enlarged, so that its authority and control shall extend to street railroads and street railroad corporations, companies, or persons owning, leasing, or operating street railroads in this state: Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed to impair any valid, subsisting contract now in existence between any municipality and any such company; and provided that this section shall not operate as a repeal of any existing municipal ordinance."
Until the passage of the act of 1907 the commission was without authority to deal with the subject of fixing fares for street railways. Until the enactment of that statute they did not exercise, as to street railway companies, the power to make the rates of charges for transportation of passengers on the lines of street railways operated by street railway companies, like that of the applicant in this case. But the act of 1907 as indicated by its caption, extended and enlarged the powers...
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