Gerald Park Imp. Ass'n v. Bini
| Decision Date | 14 August 1951 |
| Citation | 83 A.2d 195,138 Conn. 232 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | GERALD PARK IMPROVEMENT ASS'N, Inc. v. BINI. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Jay E. Rubinow, Manchester, Leon Podrove, Manchester (John D. LaBelle, Manchester, on the brief), for the appellant plaintiff.
Irwin I. Krug, Willimantic, for the appellee defendant.
Before, BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.
O'SULLIVAN, Justice.
This appeal is concerned only with that phase of the judgment, rendered on the counterclaim, which enjoined the plaintiff 'against maintaining any closed gates' across three private roadways.
The finding cannot be corrected. It incorporates the following facts: Prior to 1925, James H. Fitzgerald decided to develop a tract of land on the south shore of Lake Wamgumbaug in the town of Coventry. In that year he filed with the town clerk a map of the contemplated development which he called Gerald Park. The map delineated several hundred lots and various proposed roadways. Three of these private ways, Fitzgerald Boulevard, Washburn Avenue and Ross Avenue, led south from the lake shore to a public highway known as South Street. The defendant and his wife acquired two of the lots during 1946. Their deeds, in describing the land conveyed, expressly referred to the map which Fitzgerald had filed with the town clerk. The defendant subsequently built a house for himself on one of the lots. The three mentioned roadways are beneficial to him in connection with his ownership and use of the lots.
The plaintiff is a nonprofit incorporated association. Its membership is composed of approximately 50 per cent of the property owners in the development. In 1946, Fitzgerald conveyed to the plaintiff the fee in all of the roadways, subjecting it to a right of way in every property owner in Gerald Park. The defendant does not belong to the association.
For some time prior to 1950, persons not living within the development frequently entered it from South Street by means of the three roadways. The attraction for them was the lake, which was legally available for bathing solely to the property owners in the development. On occasions the trespassers created disturbances, and by their presence and conduct they deprived the residents of the quiet enjoyment of their homes and violated the plaintiff's rights as the owner of the private ways. The annoyance was particularly offensive on Saturdays and Sundays between noon and 7 p. m. The plaintiff tried to cope with the problem by various methods such as the posting of signs and the stationing of officers at the South Street entrances, but the results were not effective.
On July 15, 1950, the plaintiff erected gates at the three entrances. On that occasion, the defendant was denied admission. For the remainder of the summer the gates were kept closed on Saturdays and Sundays from noon until 7 p. m. An employee of the plaintiff was stationed at each entrance during those periods. The gate was opened for a person to pass through only after he had stopped and identified himself as privileged to enter. This procedure was followed with respect to everyone, whether or not he was a member of the association. It proved to be of some help in keeping trespassers out of the development. The plaintiff intends to continue this policy from June through September of each year but only on the days and during the hours previously mentioned. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the court concluded that, in the absence of consent by the defendant, the maintenance of the gates was in derogation of his property rights and constituted an unreasonable interference with his right of way. Judgment was rendered for the defendant on the counterclaim. The plaintiff was enjoined from maintaining any closed gates across the roadways in question.
The case is governed by an approved principle of law. '[W]here an owner of land causes a map to be made of it upon which are delineated separate lots and streets and highways by which access may be had to them, and then sells the lots, referring in his conveyances to the map, the lot owners acquire the right to have the streets and highways thereafter kept open for use in connection with their lands.' Whitton v. Clark, 112 Conn. 28, 32, 151 A. 305, 307. The sole limitation upon that right is that the street or highway must be of benefit to the lot owner. Id., 112 Conn. 33, 151 A. 305; Lake Garda Co. v. D'Arche, 135 Conn. 449, 453, 66 A.2d 120. This...
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Castonguay v. Plourde
...if incompatible with the equities of the case, does not necessarily entitle one to equitable redress.' " Gerald Park Improvement Assn. v. Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 236, 83 A.2d 195 (1951). In this case, however, it is apparent that the trial court carefully considered, weighed and balanced the o......
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