German Nat. Bank of denver v. National State Bank of Boulder

• Decision Date: 14 January 1895
• Citation: 39 P. 71,5 Colo.App. 427
• Parties: GERMAN NAT. BANK OF DENVER v. NATIONAL STATE BANK OF BOULDER.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

39 P. 71

5 Colo.App. 427

GERMAN NAT. BANK OF DENVER v. NATIONAL STATE BANK OF BOULDER.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

January 14, 1895

Appeal from district court, Boulder county.

Action by the National State Bank of Boulder against W.G. Motley followed by attachment (German National Bank of Denver garnishee). From a judgment for plaintiff, the garnishee appeals. Reversed.

Hartzell & Patterson, for appellant.

R.H Whiteley, for appellee.

REED J.

This case was before this court on a previous occasion. See 3 Colo.App. 17, 31 P. 122. In 1890, W.G. Motley was indebted to appellee on a promissory note, which became due in December of that year. In January, 1891, the bank brought suit upon the note, and sued out an attachment against W.J. Motley. Appellant was served with process of garnishment, with notice to answer indebtedness to W.J. Motley. The cashier of the bank answered, denying any indebtedness to W.J. Motley. The answer was traversed by appellee. A trial was had, resulting in a judgment against appellant. An appeal was prosecuted to this court, the judgment reversed, and cause sent back for retrial. The trial occurred April, 1893, again resulting in a verdict and judgment against appellant for the sum of $798.21 and costs, from which this appeal is prosecuted. By reference to the former opinion, it will be seen that this court held that the full name or proper initial letters were necessary in a proceeding of that kind, and that a writ of attachment and notice of garnishment against "W.J. Motley" would not reach moneys due "W.G. Motley." At the time of the service of notice upon appellant, it had funds of W.G. Motley in its possession, which it subsequently paid out in full upon checks. We are perfectly satisfied with the former opinion on the case then made, and affirm it. In the intricate and complicated business of banking, absolute exactness and particularity in regard to names is absolutely indispensable, not only for the security of the bank, but of those doing business with it. In many instances there are many of the same surnames, and frequently with the same first initial letter; and, where the full name is not used, it frequently occurs that the second or intermediate initial is all that distinguishes one name from another; and a bank disregarding the middle initial as a part of the name would be very likely to find itself in trouble by allowing one man to draw upon the account of another. If such trouble occurred, no bank could shield itself from responsibility by ignoring the only distinctive difference between the names of two persons. When banks are necessarily held to such strict accountability, it is not asking too much that in proceedings against them the individual sought to be reached should be so designated as to leave no doubt in regard to the identity. Banks cannot presume that John A. Smith and John W. Smith are the same person. Creditors are supposed to know the names of their debtors, especially when, as in this case, the indebtedness is evidenced by a promissory note, and in bringing suit should be held to bring the suit against the proper person, or suffer the penalty of their own negligence. Where a person opens a bank account under a fictitious name, and the process is sued out in the real name, the identity should be established to the officers of the bank when it is sought to reach the fund. There is no doubt but that, if actual knowledge of the identity was brought home to the knowledge of bank officials, the bank would be held chargeable. In the former opinion of this court the learned judge who wrote it carefully guarded against any misconception, and said: "There was no showing in the present case that the bank had any knowledge whatever that their depositor was the one sought to be reached by the process at the time they paid out...