German Sav. Bank v. Walker

• Citation: 181 N.W. 443,190 Iowa 1096
• Decision Date: 15 February 1921
• Docket Number: 33450.
• Parties: GERMAN SAVINGS BANK, Appellee, v. O. H. WALKER, Trustee, et al., Appellants
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

181 N.W. 443

190 Iowa 1096

GERMAN SAVINGS BANK, Appellee, v. O. H. WALKER, Trustee, et al., Appellants

No. 33450.

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 15, 1921

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HUBERT UTTERBACK, Judge.

ACTION by plaintiff, judgment creditor of the Granite Brick Company former owner of the land in controversy, to set aside a tax deed and redeem from tax sale. From a decree permitting redemption, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

J. L Witwer, for appellants.

Parrish & Cohen, for appellee.

ARTHUR J. EVANS, C. J., STEVENS and FAVILLE, JJ., concur.

OPINION

ARTHUR, J.

On December 1, 1915, and subsequently, the Granite Brick Company was the owner of the land in controversy, the west five acres of Lot 6, of Dawson estate land, in Section 15, Township 78, Range 43, Polk County, Iowa. On December 1, 1913, plaintiff obtained three several judgments, aggregating $ 37,131.15, which judgments became liens on the above-described property. The first of the judgments was partially satisfied by sale under special execution of Lot 7 and a portion of Lot 8 of the Dawson estate land under which a sheriff's deed was issued to plaintiff on January 15, 1915. The balance of the judgments remained unsatisfied, and the property of plaintiff,--valid and subsisting judgments against the Granite Brick Company.

On December 2, 1912, the property in controversy was sold by the treasurer for the taxes of 1911 to one F. H. Noble, and the certificate of purchase was transferred to O. H. Walker, trustee, one of the defendants. All subsequent taxes were paid by the holder of the certificate of purchase. On December 31, 1915, the German Savings Bank made a lease to A. J. Northway of "a tract of land near Hastie, Iowa, known as the Granite Brick Company property, 120 or 150 acres, more or less," which included the property in controversy, while it does not describe it.

Notice for tax deed was duly served on the Granite Brick Company, to whom the property was taxed. On January 20, 1918, notice was delivered to W. L. Baugh for service, and on the same day, he went out upon the land to serve the notice on anyone whom he might find in possession, and returned that he found the land vacant and unoccupied. Return of service was filed with the treasurer on February 11, 1918.

On February 11, 1918, the German Savings Bank, plaintiff, sold the land to George and Mary Pierick, describing the land the same as above described in the lease to Northway. On June 21, 1918, the treasurer issued a tax deed to O. H. Walker, trustee, one of the defendants. On September 12, 1918, Walker, trustee, conveyed the land to Edward Lawson, one of the defendants, by a special warranty deed. On October 25, 1918, plaintiff began this suit to redeem.

That legal notice for tax deed was served on the Granite Brick Company, in whose name the property was taxed, is conceded. Plaintiff's claim, on which it bases its right to redeem, is that A. J. Northway was in possession of the property, and that he was not served with notice for tax deed.

W. L. Baugh, to whom was delivered the notice for service on anyone in possession of the premises, returned that he found the premises vacant and unoccupied. Baugh was called as a witness, and testified that he went out onto and viewed the premises on January 20, 1917; that there was a partition fence on the east side of the five-acre tract, and one on the north, but no fence on the south or west, except a fence running down on the west side; that he walked around the five-acre tract, and went through the house; that no one was occupying the house; that no brush or timber had been cut on the premises; that he made inquiries in the neighborhood as to whether the premises had been occupied, and could not find out that there was anybody in possession, or had been occupying the premises for three or four years.

Northway, called as a witness, testified that he knew where Lot 6 was located; that he took possession of part of Lot 6, and cleared the brush from the west five acres; that he put a temporary fence around the five-acre tract, in the spring of 1915 or 1916; that, when he leased it, there was no fence; that he kept possession of the west five acres of Lot 6 until the time that Pierick bought it, in February, 1918; that he cleared the timber off of it during that time and pastured it, two cows part of the time, and part of the time three, and two horses; that, when he went upon the premises, he took what the Granite Brick Company claimed was its land; that the lease described the land as the Granite Brick Company land; that he had the west five acres of Lot 6 leased for three years; and that, in addition to putting a fence around it, he cleared it off, and exercised control over it.

Other witnesses testified to Northway's occupancy and to his building a fence around the premises, and of his clearing it off and using it. None of the land was cultivated.

From the evidence we must find that Northway was in such occupancy and control and possession of the premises on January 20, 1918, as to require notice upon him, under the statute.

Under this finding,--that Northway was in possession,--and it being conceded that no notice was served on him, the plaintiff had the right of redemption granted him by the decree of the court below, unless the contention of the defendant is sound and must prevail,--that Edward Lawson, a good-faith purchaser for value, without notice of irregularity or other matters not disclosed by the record, is protected; and that the deed held by Lawson is invulnerable, even though want of notice on Northway would void the title if the title were still in O. H. Walker, trustee, the original holder of the tax deed.

Appellant Lawson's claim is that the title under the tax deed is not absolutely void because of want of service of notice for the tax deed on Northway, but voidable only.

It is not claimed that any fraud was committed, and there was no bad faith on the part of Lawson or of Walker, trustee. It clearly appears from the evidence that Edward Lawson was a good-faith purchaser for value. He received from Walker, trustee, an abstract of title, showing no flaw in the title. The Northway lease was not of record.

Now, does the status of Edward Lawson, a good-faith purchaser for value, and without notice of infirmities in the title, under undisputed facts, entitle him to prevail against the plaintiff's claimed right of redemption because notice was not served on Northway?

Appellee argues, and cites authorities to sustain his argument, to the effect that the failure to serve notice for tax...