GERMANTOWN CENT. v. Clark
| Decision Date | 05 June 2003 |
| Citation | 791 N.E.2d 398,100 N.Y.2d 202,761 N.Y.S.2d 141 |
| Parties | GERMANTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. CLARK, CLARK, MILLIS & GILSON, AIA, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Günter Dully, Albany, for appellant.
Harter, Secrest & Emery LLP, Rochester (James C. Moore and Peter G. Hentschke of counsel), for Clark, Clark, Millis & Gilson, AIA, and others, respondents.
Sternberg & Gorman LLP, Hoosick Falls (Edward J. Gorman of counsel), for Kevan R. Jones, respondent. Jay Worona, Latham, and Kimberly A. Fanniff for New York State School Boards Association, Inc., amicus curiae.
A school district commenced this professional malpractice action upon discovering asbestos in one of its buildings more than a decade after completion and certification of an asbestos abatement project. The question presented is whether the claim accrued at the time of the alleged malpractice or upon discovery that asbestos remained in the building. Because the nature of plaintiff's property damage claim does not fall within the purview of CPLR 214-c, the toxic tort remedial statute of limitations, we conclude that CPLR 214 (6) is the appropriate statute of limitations and the action was properly dismissed as untimely.
Plaintiff Germantown Central School District contracted with defendant Clark, Clark, Millis & Gilson, AIA (Clark) in April 1985 for the provision of architectural services in connection with an asbestos abatement project for the District. Clark retained defendant Robson & Woese, Inc. (Robson) as the engineering subcontractor for the project. In December 1986, Clark and Robson certified to plaintiff that no asbestos remained in the areas designated for removal. All work on the project was completed in 1987.
In the course of a renovation project 13 years later, plaintiff learned that asbestos was present in certain areas of the building that had been certified as asbestos-free by Clark and Robson. As a result of this revelation, in October 2000, plaintiff initiated a malpractice action against Clark, its individual partners and Robson to recover its abatement and related costs for removal of the asbestos. After answering, defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was precluded by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions set forth in CPLR 214 (6).1 Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for leave to serve an amended complaint. Supreme Court denied defendants' motion and granted plaintiff's cross motion, concluding that the action was timely commenced within three years after plaintiff's discovery of asbestos in the building. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissing the complaint. As relevant to this appeal, the Court held that CPLR 214-c, the three-year discovery-based statute of limitations for toxic torts, was inapplicable to plaintiff's claimed property damage and that the malpractice action was untimely.
CPLR 214-c (2) provides, in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an action to recover damages for * * * injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance * * * upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier."
On appeal, plaintiff contends that this section should be available to save its claims because it was not aware of the continued presence of asbestos prior to January 2000.2 Urging that the need to perform additional remediation constitutes a latent injury distinct from the original installation of the asbestos, plaintiff requests reinstatement of its complaint. Defendants counter that section 214-c is not applicable in the absence of some allegation that plaintiff suffered a slowly-developing injury resulting from the latent effects of exposure to a toxic substance.
The legislative history and objectives of section 214-c have been well articulated by this Court (see e.g. MRI Broadway Rental v United States Min. Prods. Co., 92 NY2d 421 [1998]; Jensen v General Elec. Co., 82 NY2d 77 [1993]). As part of its 1986 tort reform package, the Legislature added a new section to CPLR article 2 (L 1986, ch 682) creating a date of discovery statute of limitations for toxic torts. The amendment was intended to remedy the inequities that arose from application of the common-law exposure rule to toxic tort cases. In his Approval Memorandum, Governor Mario Cuomo observed that the existing three-year statute of limitations measured from the date of exposure "fail[ed] to recognize that the adverse effects of many of these toxic substances do not manifest themselves until many years after the exposure takes place," and consequently, many claims were barred even before potential plaintiffs were aware of their injuries (Governor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1986, ch 682; see Matter of Steinhardt v Johns-Manville Corp., 54 NY2d 1008 [1981],
mot to amend remittitur granted 55 NY2d 825 [1981], cert denied 456 US 967 [1982]). The adoption of the date of discovery rule therefore results in the tolling of the statute of limitations until a party harmed by a toxic substance discovers or should have discovered the injury.
We have cautioned that even remedial statutes, like the one at issue here, "must be given a meaning consistent with the words chosen by the Legislature" (Enright v Eli Lilly & Co., 77 NY2d 377, 385 n 1 [1991], rearg denied 77 NY2d 990 [1991], cert denied 502 US 868 [1991]; see Jensen v General Elec. Co., 82 NY2d at 83
). As aptly...
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