Geron v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2017-CA-000540-MR,2017-CA-000540-MR |
| Parties | SHAINA M. GERON APPELLANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION d/b/a JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ANGELA HOSCH, PRINCIPAL; DR. DONNA M. HARGENS, SUPERINTENDENT; AND STATE EVALUATION APPEALS PANEL, KENTUCKY BOARD OF EDUCATION, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT CABINET APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
Geron was a non-tenured teacher with a limited contract of employment for JCPS. The contract specifically stated it was for the 2013-2014 school year and reserved the right of the Superintendent of JCPS "to transfer, suspend, non-renew, or terminate" the employment. Geron worked at Portland Elementary School during the 2013-14 school year, the first year of her teacher internship. She was directly supervised by Principal Angela Hosch.
On multiple occasions during the year, Geron was informed and counseled regarding perceived deficiencies in her classroom management, teaching performance and student behavior supervision. Additionally, several times Geron failed to turn in completed work for her Kentucky Teacher Internship Program ("KTIP")1 or was tardy in submitting the work. At her mid-year summative evaluation, Geron's performance on all benchmarks was classified as "inconsistently meets" which means an "employee's performance is less than the performance criteria expected and needs improvement." The deficiencies weredescribed in detail in a summative evaluation report. Unfortunately, Geron's performance did not improve, despite continued counseling and advice from school administrators.
Near the end of the school year, Geron received another summative evaluation which reflected the decline in her performance. The rating on all benchmarks was classified as "does not meet" which means her Again, detailed information was provided in the summative evaluation report outlining Geron's failure to improve from her mid-year evaluation. Hosch recommended Superintendent Dr. Donna M. Hargens not renew Geron's limited employment contract for the following year. Geron did not file a grievance or otherwise challenge the recommendation.
Superintendent Hargens informed Geron by letter of the nonrenewal of her limited teaching contract for the 2014-15 school year. Because Geron had not successfully completed her KTIP, she lost her teaching certification. Due to this loss of certification, Superintendent Hargens issued another letter informing Geron she would be ineligible to hold a teaching position after June 30, 2014.
Geron subsequently requested a written explanation from Superintendent Hargens for the nonrenewal of her limited teaching contract. A detailed response was issued explaining the nonrenewal with multiple supporting documents attached thereto. Fifteen months after her nonrenewal, Geron—throughcounsel—sought to appeal her evaluations and nonrenewal, specifically requesting a LEAP hearing. Because JCPS believed the time for seeking such a hearing was fourteen days after receiving notice, the request was denied as untimely.
Geron filed a "Verified Petition" in Franklin Circuit Court against Hosch, Superintendent Hargens and JCPS (collectively "JCPS appellees") seeking reinstatement to her teaching position, damages and injunctive relief based on claims of breach of contract, violation of statutory and regulatory procedures precipitating her nonrenewal, age discrimination, and religious discrimination. Approximately one month later, Geron requested and was granted a SEAP hearing. Geron and representatives from JCPS, all represented by counsel, attended the SEAP hearing. The SEAP determined the appeal was not ripe for review because the LEAP had denied an initial hearing. On December 17, 2015, the matter was remanded to the LEAP to convene a hearing.
On December 28, 2015, the JCPS appellees moved to dismiss Geron's complaint or, alternatively, to transfer the action to Jefferson Circuit Court. Geron responded and challenged what she believed was the improper inclusion of numerous documents to the motion to dismiss.
On April 15, 2016, the Franklin Circuit Court dismissed Geron's breach of contract claim upon concluding the statute of limitations period had run before the action was filed. The remainder of the claims were transferred to Jefferson Circuit Court for disposition. After Geron moved to alter, amend or vacate the April 16 order, the Franklin Circuit Court ordered the record returnedfrom Jefferson Circuit Court. Although technically granting Geron's motion, by order entered on August 21, 2016, the Franklin Circuit Court reaffirmed its prior dismissal of her breach of contract claim and transfer of the action to Jefferson Circuit Court.
While the Franklin Circuit Court action was progressing, a LEAP hearing was convened at which all parties were represented by counsel and were permitted the opportunity to present evidence supportive of their respective positions. The LEAP upheld the evaluations and nonrenewal of Geron's limited teaching contract. Geron timely appealed the decision to the SEAP which conducted a hearing on October 4, 2016. Again, all parties were present and represented by counsel; the entire LEAP record was presented to the SEAP and all parties filed prehearing written briefs. In its final order dated October 25, 2016, the SEAP noted its jurisdiction was limited to review of procedural matters already addressed by local panels and it did not have authority to review or amend a superintendent's decision not to renew a limited teaching contract. After considering the arguments and exhibits presented, the SEAP concluded Geron had failed to show a material procedural violation sufficient to overturn the decision of the LEAP.
On November 23, 2016, Geron filed a "Verified Petition" in Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the decision of the SEAP.2 The new petition raisedsimilar claims and allegations to those brought in the earlier action. Geron's subsequent motion to consolidate the two actions was granted. On January 1, 2017, the JCPS appellees moved to dismiss the junior action. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion and Geron timely moved to reconsider. In denying reconsideration, the Jefferson Circuit Court clarified the dismissal was applicable to both of the consolidated actions. This appeal followed.
Geron raises multiple allegations of error in seeking reversal. First, she contends attaching multiple documents to the first motion to dismiss filed by the JCPS appellees in Franklin Circuit Court was improper, those documents should be disregarded, and consideration of the exhibits by the court constituted reversible error. Second, Geron alleges the SEAP decision to uphold nonrenewal of her limited teaching contract was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, subject to judicial review. She believes the dismissal of her petitions deprived her of such review. Next, she contends JCPS materially breached its contractual promises, thereby rendering the Franklin Circuit Court's dismissal of her breach of contract claim erroneous. Finally, Geron contends she presented a prima facie showing of religious discrimination sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
In response, the JCPS appellees, KDE and KBE (collectively "school appellees") contend SEAP decisions are not subject to judicial review, thereby rendering the circuit court's dismissal appropriate. Alternatively, the JCPS appellees argue the documents attached to the motion to dismiss were referred to and relied on by Geron in her Verified Petition and thus were properly tendered toand considered by the court; Geron was not denied due process and no arbitrary action occurred at the administrative level;3 no breach of contract occurred when Geron's limited teaching contract was not renewed following its expiration; and Geron did not establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination. Discerning no error in the proceedings below, we affirm.
First, Geron presents what she believes is a "threshold matter," arguing the inclusion of "twenty-six (26) exhibits, spanning one hundred and twenty-seven (127) pages" by the JCPS appellees in their first motion to dismiss was improper. She contends these documents should be disregarded and the trial court's failure to do so constituted reversible error. Geron alleges consideration of the exhibits converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, a motion which would be clearly premature as no discovery had been completed, thereby mandating reversal. Geron's assertions fall wide of the mark.
In her petition, Geron referenced and relied on the contents of the exact documents the JCPS appellees attached to their motion to dismiss. They were clearly essential to her case as she made multiple allegations regarding the content and meaning of these documents. To cry foul when these matters are presented to the court for its consideration is disingenuous at best. Generally, when a court considers matters outside the pleadings, a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment. CR4 12.02. However, when thedocuments or exhibits are central to the issues raised in a plaintiff's complaint and referenced...
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