Gerow v. Covill, 1CA-CV

Decision Date09 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. 1CA-CV,1CA-CV
Citation960 P.2d 55,192 Ariz. 9
Parties, 268 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 38 In re the Marriage of: Ann L. GEROW, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bruce E. COVILL, Respondent-Appellant. 97-0187.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals
OPINION

LANKFORD, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Bruce E. Covill ("Husband") appeals from that part of a domestic relations judgment pertaining to Cyber Publishing, Inc. ("Cyber"). The trial court found that Husband had fraudulently conveyed his consulting business. The court accordingly awarded Ann L. Gerow ("Wife") a fifty percent ownership of that business, Cyber.

¶2 The facts are as follows. Husband and Wife married in 1974. Twenty years later, in May 1994, Wife filed a petition for dissolution.

¶3 At the time of filing, Husband was self-employed as an independent consultant working with information systems and information delivery, with a focus on electronic media. He worked primarily with the travel industry. By August 1994, Husband was involved in a new business entity, Cyber.

¶4 Cyber began as the result of conversations among Husband and his brother and sister-in-law, Jeff and Ann Covill. Cyber was to produce electronic brochures for businesses interested in having a presence on the Internet. Husband was named the president and a director of the company and was responsible for the day-to-day management of company affairs. Incorporation occurred in August 1994, with Ann Covill listed as the sole shareholder. She had contributed $2500 for start-up costs. No shareholder, officer, director or employee of Cyber has ever contributed any further capital.

¶5 Shortly after incorporation, Wife learned of Cyber when she found the incorporation papers in Husband's office in their shared home. Husband disclosed information about Cyber to Wife in a letter sent a few weeks later.

¶6 Two of the four clients 1 Husband had worked with in his independent consulting business in recent years became Cyber's major clients. Cyber provided Internet services for both companies, The Hotel Industry Switch Company ("THISCO") and Best Western International.

¶7 Though he had maintained his sole proprietorship through the first few months of Cyber's existence, Husband had ceased his business completely and worked solely for Cyber by February 1995. His salary was increased from $2500 per month to $10,000 per month and he received a $30,000 bonus in 1994. Husband received no designated payment for any intangible assets he brought to Cyber from his sole proprietorship, such as goodwill or a client list.

¶8 In the joint pretrial statement, Wife raised the issue of the true ownership of Cyber. She claimed that instead of merely being an employee of the company, Husband actually was an owner. She sought equitable distribution of Cyber as a community asset. The joint pretrial statement was filed June 7, 1995. Though the trial had originally been set to begin in July 1995, it was continued and began September 21, 1995, and concluded on January 17, 1996, after a total of nine trial days.

¶9 The parties submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Husband objected to Wife's proposed findings and conclusions. The court adopted substantially all of Wife's proposals, but later acknowledged that it had not considered the objections. Implicit in Rule 3.7(c), Rules of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, is that the court will consider the objections before entertaining findings and conclusions. However, the objections here generally related to the sufficiency of the evidence. Such concerns may be and indeed were in this case addressed in a motion for new trial. Sufficiency of the evidence objections can be made even when not raised as objections to proposed findings and conclusions. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Therefore, though it may have been error to fail to consider the objections, the error is harmless because any substantive errors in the findings and conclusions were raised by motion for new trial and have been preserved for appeal.

¶10 The court made extensive findings of fact. It stated that it disbelieved Husband's statement that he was financially unable to start Cyber himself in light of his historical six-figure income and the expenditure of "tens of thousands of dollars" in gifts and loans to a female friend. The court saw the incorporation of Cyber as an attempt to "remove the business and its asset from the marital community." The court also found that all of Cyber's revenue-producing clients were either prior clients of Husband's or derived from his prior business contacts, which had developed during the marriage. The court noted that Cyber had been "remarkably successful and highly lucrative for a start-up business." The court also found that Husband had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Wife by "permitting his sole proprietorship to be incorporated and wholly owned by his sister-in-law."

¶11 As a result of these findings, the court ordered in its judgment and decree that:

[A]s between petitioner and respondent, petitioner is and shall be the owner of one-half of the capital stock in Cyber Publishing, Inc. Upon resolution, whether by consent or by adjudication, as against Ann Covill that the stock ostensibly in her name is in fact owned by husband or the marital community of husband and wife, the ownership of the stock on the books and records of Cyber Publishing, Inc. shall also be changed to reflect wife's one-half ownership interest as provided hereon.

The court denied Husband's motion for new trial.

¶12 Husband advances eight contentions on appeal. They are as follows:

1. Because the court awarded Wife one-half of Cyber stock, but ordered a stock ownership record change reflecting that award only after the issue of Husband's ownership was decided as against Ann Covill, the judgment is conditional and therefore void.

2. Wife failed to join indispensable parties--Ann Covill and Cyber--in the divorce proceedings.

3. The evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Husband transferred community property to Cyber.

4. The decree violates Husband's constitutional right against indentured servitude.

5. No fraudulent conveyance was shown because the necessary elements were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.

6. The court erred in finding that Husband owed Wife a fiduciary duty and that Husband breached that duty.

7. Wife did not properly and timely disclose and raise the issues concerning the formation of Cyber.

8. Pursuant to Arizona Civil Appellate Procedure Rule 21(c), Husband is entitled to attorneys' fees.

¶13 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(B), and 12-2101(F)(1). On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and affirm if any evidence supports the judgment. Paul Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Constr., Inc., 129 Ariz. 204, 205, 630 P.2d 27, 28 (1981). We are not bound, however, by the trial court's decisions on questions of law. Premier Fin. Servs. v. Citibank (Arizona), 185 Ariz. 80, 87, 912 P.2d 1309, 1316 (App.1995).

¶14 The first issue is Husband's allegation that the judgment is void because it is conditional. The trial court stated that "as between petitioner and respondent, petitioner is and shall be the owner of one-half of the capital stock in Cyber Publishing, Inc." (Emphasis added). The court then stated that change would be later reflected on Cyber's books only after the ownership of the stock was decided. Husband asserts that the unsettled ownership issues against Ann Covill, the record owner of Cyber's stock, make the judgment between Husband and Wife conditional and therefore, void.

¶15 While conditional judgments are generally void, there are exceptions to this rule. Peterson v. Overson, 52 Ariz. 203, 205, 79 P.2d 958, 959 (1938). One exception is an alternative or conditional judgment that "is of such a nature that it may be determined therefrom definitely what rights and obligations pertain to the respective parties." Id. at 206, 79 P.2d at 959. Here, the rights and obligations of Husband and Wife may be determined with such certainty. As between them, Wife has a right to one-half of the value of that portion of Cyber determined to be Husband's. 2 Husband has the obligation to release that amount to Wife. The domestic relations court made the assumption that his actual ownership was one hundred percent, but recognized that his ownership as against Ann Covill would be determined separately. 3 The contingency, the Husband's ownership, does not change the rights and obligations between the spouses.

¶16 Equitable judgments constitute another exception. Wright v. Mayberry, 158 Ariz. 387, 389, 762 P.2d 1341, 1343 (App.1988) (recognizing equitable exceptions to the rule); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 83 (1997). A domestic relations court sits in equity. Guzman v. Guzman, 175 Ariz. 183, 188, 854 P.2d 1169, 1174 (App.1993). "When a court of equity renders a conditional decree ... [i]t is simply adjusting the equities between the parties and granting to one or the other certain relief to which the litigants may be entitled...." Mason v. Ellison, 63 Ariz. 196, 203, 160 P.2d 326, 329 (1945); see also In re Marriage of Zeliadt, 390 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa 1986) ("The court sitting in equity has the power and flexibility to impose equitable terms upon parties as conditions of granting equitable relief."). Here, the domestic relations court merely used its power as an equity court to "adapt[ ] its relief and mold[ ] its decree[ ] to satisfy the requirements of the case and to conserve...

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