Gers v. New Roads Sch.

• Decision Date: 07 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-cv-08003-ODW (Ex)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: HARRY GERS et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW ROADS SCHOOL et al., Defendants.

HARRY GERS et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW ROADS SCHOOL et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-08003-ODW (Ex)

United States District Court Central District of California

August 7, 2020

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS [22]

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant New Roads School's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Harry Gers, Jenn Gers, and Glenn Gers's First Amended Complaint ("Motion"). (Mot., ECF No. 22.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.¹

II. BACKGROUND

Harry² was a student at New Roads School ("New Roads" or the "School") between September 2012 and November 2016. (First Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 17, ECF No. 21.) Harry has a learning disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and autismspectrum disorder, and requires accommodations and related aids and services at school. (FAC ¶¶ 13-15.) In December 2013, Jenn and Glenn, Harry's parents, obtained a neuropsychological evaluation to determine the nature of Harry's conditions and their impact on school, and shared the evaluation with the School and its employees. (FAC ¶¶ 18-19.) In June 2015 and June 2016, Jenn informed the school that Harry had been missing a substantial number of school days due to anxiety, depression, and panic attacks and requested accommodations and support; the School approved some of the requested accommodations. (FAC ¶¶ 20-29.)

In June 2016, the Gerses signed a New Roads student enrollment contract ("Enrollment Contract") for the 2016-2017 school year, during which Harry would matriculate as a sixteen-year-old tenth grader. (FAC ¶¶ 10, 30, 37.) The Gerses prepaid tuition for the entire school year. (FAC ¶ 30.) Under the Enrollment Contract, enrollment fees are nonrefundable, and the parents are obligated to pay tuition "whether or not the student completes the school year, is withdrawn, absent, or dismissed, for all or any portion of the school year." (FAC ¶¶ 32-34.) The Enrollment Contract states that the School reserves the right to dismiss the student under certain circumstances, including when "the student has been unable to meet the academic, social[,] or behavioral standards of the school." (FAC ¶¶ 34-35.)

In August 2016, Glenn informed a School official of Harry's ongoing anxiety issues and treatment, and requested support from administrators and staff for Harry's disability-related needs. (FAC ¶ 38.) The School failed to provide the requested accommodations. (FAC ¶ 39.) Between September and November 2016, both Jenn and Glenn complained to administrators about the School's failure to accommodate Harry's disabilities and requested emergency meetings to discuss support and accommodations for Harry. (FAC ¶¶ 41-43.) The School was unresponsive. (FAC ¶ 43.) On October 21 and November 7, 2016, Harry's psychiatrist called the School's psychologist with proposed accommodations, including the temporary reduction of Harry's school days and course schedule. (FAC ¶¶ 44-45.)

On November 16, 2016, Jenn and Glenn met with School employees. (FAC ¶¶ 46-47.) The School and its employees refused to engage in the interactive process to discuss accommodations at this meeting; instead, the School's representatives informed Jenn and Glenn that Harry would be dismissed because he could not attend as a full-time student. (FAC ¶¶ 48-49.)

In December 2016, Jenn and Glenn requested that the School refund tuition because it had unjustly dismissed Harry due to his disabilities. (FAC ¶ 52.) The School did not respond to the request. (FAC ¶ 52.) As a result of his dismissal, Harry experienced emotional distress and the Gerses faced difficulties timely locating a comparable school, which delayed the completion of Harry's high-school education. (FAC ¶¶ 53-55.)

The Gerses initiated this action on September 16, 2019. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) In the operative FAC, Harry brings the first claim for disability discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12182, and fourth claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51(f). (FAC ¶¶ 56-71, 103-10.) Additionally, all three Gerses bring the second claim for violation of the antiretaliation provision of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; third claim for violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; fifth claim for breach of contract; and sixth claim for unfair trade practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (FAC ¶¶ 72-102, 111-25.) The School moves to dismiss, challenging the FAC on grounds including standing, statute of limitations, and failure to state a claim. (See Mot.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Article III case or controversy requirement limits a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which includes the requirement that plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. Chandler v. StateFarm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). When a motion to dismiss attacks subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), apply with equal force to Article III standing when it is being challenged on the face of the complaint. See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, in terms of Article III standing, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The determination of whether a complaint satisfies this plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all "factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

The School moves to dismiss the FAC on the following grounds: (1) the Unruh Act, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims are untimely; (2) Jenn and Glenn lack standing to bring their ADA retaliation and Rehabilitation Act claims; (3) the Gerses fail to state a contract claim; (4) the Gerses fail to state an unfair trade practices claim; and (5) the Gerses' claims for damages are deficient. (See Mot.)

A. Statute of Limitations

The events upon which the Unruh Act, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims are based took place more than two but less than three years before the Gerses initiated this action. (See FAC ¶¶ 40-52.) The School argues the claims are untimely because they are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but the Gerses contend three-year limitations periods apply to these claims. (Mot. 15-18; Opp'n 4-11, ECF No. 26.) The Court considers these arguments with respect to the Gerses' claims in turn.

1. The Unruh Act Claim May Be Timely.

Harry claims the School violated the Unruh Act, California Civil Code section 51(f), which makes unlawful a violation of a right protected by the ADA. (FAC ¶¶ 103-10.) Federal courts are divided on whether the applicable statute of limitations for Unruh Act claims is two or three years, and there is no California Supreme Court authority on point. See Kemp v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C-09-4687 PJH, 2010 WL 2889224, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (discussing lack of consensus).

Regardless, the Court need not resolve the question because California law tolls limitation periods for individuals under the age of majority. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a). Harry was sixteen years old at the time of the events giving rise to his claims. (FAC ¶ 10.) Construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable toHarry, if Harry was sixteen in December 2016, the date of the latest alleged act or omission by the School, (see FAC ¶¶ 10, 52), then he could not have reached the age of majority until at earliest December 2017—less than two years before this federal action began. Assuming without deciding that the appropriate limitation period is two years, Harry's claim may be timely if he can prove the limitation period was tolled until his eighteenth birthday.

Accordingly, the running of the statute of limitations is not "apparent from the face of the complaint." Seven Arts Filmed Entm't Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th...