Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus
| Decision Date | 11 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1721-HP.,78-1721-HP. |
| Citation | 468 F. Supp. 82 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | GET OIL OUT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cecil D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants. |
Bruce J. Terris, Edward Comer, Washington, D. C., Geoffrey Cowan, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
James W. Moorman, William M. Cohen, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Stephen E. O'Neil, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
Charles S. Findlay, U. S. Dept. of the Interior, Washington, D. C., McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea, Philip K. Verleger, Betty-Jane Kirwan, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants in intervention Atlantic Richfield Co., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Exxon Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Sun Oil Co., Texaco, Inc. and Union Oil Co. of Calif.
This case concerns three oil drilling and production platforms proposed for the Santa Barbara Channel. Plaintiffs are non-profit California environmental corporations and Yvon and Melinda Chouinard, owners of a beach front home in Ventura, California. Defendants include the Secretary of the Interior and officials of the United States Geological Survey, an agency within the Department of the Interior. Intervening defendants are seven major oil companies holding oil and gas development leases in the channel. Those leases were awarded by the Department of the Interior pursuant to a public sale conducted in 1968.
In 1977, the Department of the Interior, through the United States Geological Survey, approved development plans submitted by Chevron, Sun Oil, and Mobil Oil for three oil drilling and production platforms — Platform Grace, Platform Henry, and Mobil Platform — for the Santa Barbara Channel. The implementation of each development plan is subject to close monitoring and supervision by the Geological Survey through its inspection and certification procedures. Before approving each development plan, the Geological Survey prepared an environmental assessment (EA) pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1977). Each EA referred to comprehensive environmental impact statements prepared earlier in connection with ongoing oil and gas development in the channel.1 After preparing each EA, officials in the agency concluded that each development proposal is not a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Therefore, the agency concluded that it was not required to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for each platform pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
Plaintiffs contend that the Geological Survey erred in its threshold determination that each proposal is not a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" and that NEPA requires an EIS for each platform. Plaintiffs further contend that the earlier EIS's are inadequate because they are not site-specific, i. e., they do not analyze the potential environmental impacts of each proposed platform.
Federal defendants and the seven intervening defendant oil companies contend that no site-specific statements are required in light of the Geological Survey's EA's and three comprehensive EIS's prepared earlier on oil and gas development in the channel. Furthermore, federal defendants argue that action by this court is premature with respect to the Mobil Platform because the Department of the Interior has revoked its approval of the development plan.
The complaint seeks to halt all further activities in connection with the platforms until a site-specific EIS, meeting the requirements of NEPA, is prepared for each proposal.
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and federal defendants' motion for summary judgment. Having considered the pleadings, the memoranda of law, the administrative record, and the oral argument of counsel heard on December 15, 1978, the court concludes that federal defendants' motion as it relates to the Mobil Platform should be granted, and that installation work on Platforms Grace and Henry should be enjoined until the Department of the Interior prepares and files with the court environmental assessments conforming to the court's rulings as set forth below.
Before considering the standard of review and the procedural issues implicated in the determination of these motions, a brief history and description of the three platforms is helpful.
Chevron's plan of development locates Platform Grace in 318 feet of water 12 miles southwest of Ventura. The platform, if installed, will serve the Santa Clara Unit, a cluster of eight oil and gas leases spanning 46,080 surface acres. Chevron, as co-lessee of seven of the eight leases, is the designated operator of Platform Grace. On January 7, 1977, Chevron submitted a development plan for Platform Grace. On July 14, 1977, the Geological Survey approved the development plan subject to its certification of all construction phases, all proposed operating procedures, and all proposed facilities.
Sun Oil's plan of development locates Platform Henry in 175 feet of water 4 miles from the nearest shoreline over two separate oil and gas fields. Sun Oil is the designated operator of Platform Henry. On June 14, 1977, Sun submitted a development plan for Platform Henry, approved by the Geological Survey on November 11, 1977. Final approval is subject to the agency's certification of all construction phases, all proposed operating procedures, and all proposed platform facilities.
Mobil Oil's plan of development locates the Mobil Platform in 95 feet of water 4 miles southwest of Port Hueneme and 11 miles south of Ventura over the Hueneme Offshore Oil Field. The field comprises two leases acquired by Mobil and Union Oil. On June 25, 1976, Mobil, as operator of the two leases, submitted a development plan, approved by the Geological Survey on April 11, 1977. This approval was also conditional: all construction phases, all proposed operating procedures, and all proposed facilities must receive the agency's certification. After the plan was conditionally approved, Union Oil replaced Mobil as operator of the Mobil Platform. In September 1978, the Department of the Interior apparently revoked the approval of the original development plan and now requires Union to submit a new plan in accordance with new regulations issued January 27, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 3880 ( 30 C.F.R. § 250.34(1977)), or as revised pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.L.No.95-372, 93 Stat. 659. Thus, there appears to be no agency action before this court for review with respect to the Mobil Platform.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., provides that federal agencies must prepare an environmental impact statement for every "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). It appears from the language of the statute that two factors must be present to trigger the EIS requirement — a major federal action and an ensuing significant effect on the environment. The Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected that line of analysis in City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975), quoting Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974):
By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be possible to speak of a "minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," and to hold NEPA inapplicable to such an action. Yet if the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA that it should be the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by NEPA . . ..
Thus, in City of Davis, the Ninth Circuit confined its review to the agency's decision that the project would have no significant adverse environmental consequences. Id. This court's initial task, then, is to review the Department of the Interior's threshold determination that the three platform proposals will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment.
In reviewing that agency's determination, the standard of review in the Ninth Circuit apparently is "whether the . . . agency has `reasonably concluded' that the project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences." City of Davis v. Coleman, supra, 521 F.2d at 673. The court is not required to "determine whether a challenged project will in fact have significant effects." Id.
There is some uncertainty, however, whether the Supreme Court has adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), when an agency's determination of no significant impact forecloses the preparation of an EIS. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2731, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976), where the proper standard of review was not at issue, Justice Powell remarked: "Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agencies have exercised their discretion appropriately."
Whether Kleppe, where at least one EIS was prepared, implicitly overrules the standard established in City of Davis, where no EIS was prepared, is a question this court need not decide now. The present state of the administrative record requires that this matter be remanded to the Department of the Interior to correct procedural defects in the administrative process. Therefore, the court need not, at this time, review the agency's substantive determination of no adverse significant environmental...
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Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus
...judgment. Argument on these cross-motions was heard once before, on December 15, 1978; however, the court in its decision filed January 11, 1979 (468 F.Supp. 82) declined to reach the merits of the action since the Environmental Assessments prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey, an agency ......