Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus

• Decision Date: 26 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1721-HP.,78-1721-HP.
• Citation: 477 F. Supp. 40
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: GET OIL OUT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cecil D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants.

477 F. Supp. 40

GET OIL OUT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cecil D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants.

No. 78-1721-HP.

United States District Court, C. D. California.

July 26, 1979.

Bruce J. Terris, Edward H. Comer, Washington, D.C., Geoffrey Cowan, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.

James W. Moorman, William M. Cohen, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U.S. Atty., Stephen E. O'Neil, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

Charles S. Findlay, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Washington, D.C., McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea, Philip K. Verleger, Betty-Jane Kirwan, Los Angeles. Cal., for defendants in intervention: Atlantic Richfield Co., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Exxon Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Sun Oil Co., Texaco, Inc., Union Oil Co. of Cal.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PREGERSON, District Judge.

Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), requires a federal agency to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for any major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." In 1977 the Department of the Interior (DOI) approved development plans for Platforms Henry and Grace, two oil and gas drilling and production platforms proposed for installation in the Santa Barbara Channel. Because DOI concluded, on the basis of two Environmental Assessments, that the platforms would have no significant effect on the quality of the human environment, it did not prepare a site-specific EIS for each platform.

Plaintiffs by this action seek to compel DOI to prepare site-specific EIS's for Platforms Henry and Grace; they maintain that DOI erred in concluding that these platforms will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and that NEPA therefore requires that such EIS's be prepared.

Defendants contend that DOI was correct in its determination that site-specific EIS's are not required for Platforms Henry and Grace. They maintain that the determination of no significant impact should be sustained, because DOI in reaching its conclusions acted neither arbitrarily and capriciously nor unreasonably. Defendants also point to the comprehensive environmental studies previously prepared by DOI on the subject of oil and gas development in the Santa Barbara Channel, and argue that even if the court should find that the impacts of these platforms are sufficiently significant to require the preparation of EIS's, those already prepared satisfy this need.

On June 25, 1979, this matter was again before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Argument on these cross-motions was heard once before, on December 15, 1978; however, the court in its decision filed January 11, 1979 (468 F.Supp. 82) declined to reach the merits of the action since the Environmental Assessments prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey, an agency within the DOI, were procedurally deficient. This deficiency stemmed from the failure of the agency to state specifically the underlying reasons for its conclusions that the development proposals for Platforms Henry and Grace were not "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning of NEPA. That conclusion, if sustained, would eliminate the need for the agency to prepare an EIS for each platform. (40 C.F.R. § 1500.6.)

The court in its decision filed January 11, 1979 remanded this matter to DOI for a statement of reasons explaining its conclusion that no significant adverse environmental consequences would result from the presence of the two platforms in the Santa Barbara Channel. In its earlier decision, the court established certain procedures and time periods which DOI was to follow, and required the agency, if it again made findings of no significant impact, to notify the public in Santa Barbara and Ventura Counties of that determination and to give the public an opportunity to comment on the findings by submitting relevant information. The court's decision also enjoined further installation work on Platforms Henry and Grace until the procedures and time periods described therein were completed. That decision was complied with fully.

On remand, the agency, after articulating its reasons, reaffirmed its earlier determination of no significant impact. The overriding question this court must decide is whether DOI acted unreasonably or arbitrarily and capriciously in making findings of no significant impact, given the administrative record before it at the time of decision. There is no factual dispute as to the extent of the administrative record considered by DOI. The parties are again before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Having considered the pleadings, the memoranda of law, the administrative record, and the oral argument of counsel heard on December 15, 1978 and on June 25, 1979, and having studied the statements of reasons prepared by the DOI pursuant to the court's earlier decision, the court now concludes that the DOI acted neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that Platforms Henry and Grace will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment. The court therefore rules that no further environmental impact statements need be prepared in connection with the proposed developments, and that the order enjoining further work on these platforms is vacated.

Before considering the pending cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must address a jurisdictional question first raised by the parties at oral argument on June 25, 1979. Section 23(c) of the 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, (OSCLA), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(c)(2), provides that

Any action of the Secretary to approve, require modification of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any development and production plan under this Act shall be subject to a judicial review only in a United States court of appeals for a circuit in which an affected State is located.

Intervening defendants contend that this provision, which became effective on March 18, 1979, divests the district court of jurisdiction in this case. They assert that the subject of this lawsuit involves a decision by the Secretary of the Interior to approve development plans for two oil and gas drilling and production platforms, and that such approval falls within § 23(c), placing judicial review of such actions exclusively in the court of appeals.

This action was filed prior to the effective date of § 23(c). A question therefore arises whether Congress intended these amendments to apply to cases pending in district courts at the time the 1978 amendments became effective. It is a fundamental and well-settled principle of construction that statutes are not to be applied retroactively "unless the words used are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied." United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States ex. rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314, 28 S.Ct. 537, 539, 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908). Here no such directive can be found, either in the legislative history of the amendments or in the amendments themselves. Nor does Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 72 S.Ct. 581, 96 L.Ed. 786 (1952), which intervening defendants cite in their brief (filed July 2, 1979), support a denial of jurisdiction in this case. Bruner held that the jurisdiction of a district court to hear certain cases brought under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346) was eliminated when Congress amended the statute to withdraw specifically the district court's jurisdiction over such cases. In the instant case, however, there has been no repeal of the statute upon which this court's jurisdiction is based. This court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives the district court jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions, and that statute remains in full force. The fact that Congress has reposed all future actions involving Secretarial approval or disapproval of development plans in the court of appeals does not, therefore, affect cases currently pending in the district courts, since Congress has not indicated any intention that pending cases be affected.

A more fundamental reason exists for retaining jurisdiction in this court. Section 23(c) applies only to actions to "approve, require modification of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any development and production plan under this Act," (emphasis added). Plaintiffs, however, do not challenge any such action; they seek only to require the Secretary of the Interior to prepare EIS's concerning Platforms Henry and Grace in accordance with NEPA provisions mandating EIS's whenever federal action will significantly affect the human environment. In short, this lawsuit is not brought under OCSLA, to which 23(c) explicitly refers when it grants the court of appeals jurisdiction to review Secretarial approval of development plans "under this Act." Rather, this lawsuit, which concerns only the Secretary's decision that no EIS need be prepared, is brought under § 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. § 4332). This interpretation of § 23(c) is supported by subsection (a)(6) of § 23, which provides that

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person or class of persons may have under any other Act or common law to seek appropriate relief.

The OCSLA amendments of 1978 do not restrict a plaintiff's right to bring suit to force compliance with NEPA, and this action was brought for precisely that purpose. Therefore, § 23(c) does not apply here. This court has jurisdiction to decide the question before it.

In deciding the issues presented by the cross-motions for summary judgment, a court's role under NEPA is defined in Kleppe v....