Geygan v. Geygan

• Decision Date: 03 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11AP–626.,11AP–626.
• Citation: 973 N.E.2d 276,2012 -Ohio- 1965
• Parties: Vickie GEYGAN, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. Mark GEYGAN, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

973 N.E.2d 276

2012 -Ohio- 1965

Vickie GEYGAN, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee,

v.Mark GEYGAN, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

No. 11AP–626.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Tenth District, Franklin County.

May 3, 2012.

Eugene F. Battisti, Jr., Columbus, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Jason M. Donnell, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Ohio Legal Rights Service and Kevin J. Truitt, Columbus, for John Geygan as amicus curiae.

DORRIAN, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, Vickie Geygan (“Vickie”), appeals from judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations (“domestic relations court”), granting her petition for divorce from defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, Mark Geygan (“Mark”), and issuing custody, child support, and visitation orders. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Vickie and Mark were married on February 12, 1971. Vickie filed a complaint for divorce on May 18, 2009. Vickie and Mark have two children, both of whom were over the age of 18 at the time the divorce complaint was filed. One of the children, John Geygan (“John”), born May 30, 1973, has had physical and developmental disabilities since birth. Along with other relief, in her complaint for divorce, Vickie sought legal custody and child support for John.

{¶ 3} On August 31, 2009, a magistrate of the domestic relations court issued a temporary order declining to enter custody, visitation, or child support orders. The magistrate concluded that the domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders relating to John because he was over the age of 18. Vickie then moved to set aside the magistrate's temporary order with respect to custody and child support. On December 18, 2009, the trial court granted Vickie's motion to set aside portions of the magistrate's order. The court concluded that it possessed jurisdiction to enter custody, visitation, and support orders related to John. The court issued a temporary order providing that Vickie would be John's legal custodian, that Mark would have minimum visitation time with John of ten hours per week, and that Mark would pay child support of $796.79 per month. On June 22, 2011, the trial court entered a final judgment entry granting the parties a divorce and dividing the marital property. The final judgment order incorporated by reference the custody, visitation, and child support provisions of the December 2009 temporary order, with amendments to the support order. The court also ordered an in camera interview with John. After conducting the interview, on August 31, 2011, the trial court issued an order clarifying the visitation schedule (“visitation order”), providing that Mark would have visitation with John three weekend days per month for four hours and one additional weekend day per month for eight hours.

{¶ 4} Vickie appealed from the trial court's orders, assigning three errors for this court's review:

I. The Trial Court erred when it used evidence from an in camera interview with the adult disabled child of the parties to award visitation to the Appellee.

II. The Trial Court erred when it awarded visitation to Appellee when such visitation is against the interests of the Child.

III. The Trial Court erred when it ruled Appellant's contempt motion and other motions filed before trial were moot.

{¶ 5} Mark filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's orders, also assigning three errors for this court's review:

I. The trial court erred granting jurisdiction to hear custody and child support where the person in question was over the age of majority upon commencement of the proceeding

II. The trial court erred by failing to do a Castle assessment to determine if child support should apply as codified under R.C. 3119.86

III. The trial court erred establishing defendant's income at $137,000

{¶ 6} In addition to the briefs filed by Vickie and Mark, John has filed an amicus curiae brief in which he objects to the domestic relations court's exercise of jurisdiction in entering visitation and custody orders.

II. Jurisdiction Issues

{¶ 7} We begin by addressing Mark's first assignment of error, which raises the question of whether the domestic relations court had jurisdiction to enter custody and child support orders relating to John. Jurisdiction is a threshold matter; therefore, we address it first. See In re M.E.V., 10th Dist. No. 08AP–1097, 2009-Ohio-2408, 2009 WL 1449021, ¶ 5 (referring to jurisdiction as a threshold matter).

{¶ 8} Domestic relations courts have “jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters.” R.C. 3105.011. R.C. 3109.04(A) provides that, in a divorce proceeding, the domestic relations court “shall allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.” See alsoR.C. 3105.21(A) (“Upon satisfactory proof of the causes in the complaint for divorce * * * the court of common pleas shall make an order for the disposition, care, and maintenance of the children of the marriage, as is in their best interests, and in accordance with section 3109.04 of the Revised Code.”). Under R.C. 3109.05(A)(1), “the court may order either or both parents to support or help support their children.”

III. Jurisdiction to Order Child Support

{¶ 9} With respect to the domestic relations court's jurisdiction to order child support in this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he common-law duty imposed on parents to support their minor children may be found by a court of domestic relations having jurisdiction of the matter, to continue beyond the age of majority if the children are unable to support themselves because of mental or physical disabilities which existed before attaining the age of majority.” Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279, 473 N.E.2d 803 (1984), paragraph one of the syllabus. The child in Castle was 13 at the time of her parents' divorce in 1977, and her father was ordered to pay child support. After the child turned 18, the father discontinued child support payments and filed a motion with the court to terminate the child support obligation. Id. at 280, 473 N.E.2d 803. The trial court found that the child had the mental age of a five-year-old and would never be able to support herself; however, the court granted the father's motion based on the fact that the child received Social Security income and was over the age of 18. Id. The court of appeals reversed the trial court ruling, based on its finding of a common-law duty for continued support of developmentally disabled children beyond the age of majority. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, concluding that “a domestic relations court has jurisdiction to order a noncustodial parent to continue to provide support after the age of majority if the child is physically or mentally disabled to the extent of being incapable of maintaining himself or herself.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 283, 473 N.E.2d 803.¹

{¶ 10} In 2000, the General Assembly adopted R.C. 3119.86, which provides in relevant part that “[n]otwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code * * * [t]he duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court child support order shall continue beyond the child's eighteenth birthday” only in certain circumstances, including where “[t]he child is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable of supporting or maintaining himself or herself.” R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a). R.C. 3109.01 defines what is commonly referred to as the “age of majority,” and states that “[a]ll persons of the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal disability, * * * are of full age for all purposes.” R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a) has been deemed to effectively codify the Castle decision. Yost v. Yost, 4th Dist. No. 02CA2852, 2003-Ohio-3754, 2003 WL 21652172, ¶ 10.

{¶ 11} However, the precedent in Castle and statutory language in R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a) do not directly apply in this case because John was over the age of 18 at the time of the divorce. This is not a case where the domestic relations court is exercising continuing jurisdiction to modify or enforce custody or child support orders entered before John turned 18. Instead, the court exercised jurisdiction over an individual who was 38 years old at the time the final divorce decree was issued.

{¶ 12} This court has previously stated that “a domestic relations court has no authority to order child support for an adult child over whom it has no jurisdiction.” O'Connor v. O'Connor, 71 Ohio App.3d 541, 544, 594 N.E.2d 1081 (10th Dist.1991). In O'Connor, the parties had multiple children, including a daughter who was 25 years old at the time of the divorce, and who was “incompetent and unable to provide for her own support and maintenance.” Id. at 542, 594 N.E.2d 1081. Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement on the terms of their divorce, and the agreement was journalized as the decree of the domestic relations court. Id. The agreement provided that the father would be responsible for his daughter's support over and above her income and other assets. Id. When the mother sought an order finding the father in contempt for failing to pay support and an order setting a specific amount of support, the trial court ordered the father to pay $940 per month in support. Id. at 543, 594 N.E.2d 1081. On appeal, we noted that “the domestic relations court never had jurisdiction” over the adult child with disabilities. Id. at 544, 594 N.E.2d 1081. However, we held that the domestic relations court could incorporate the parties' agreement into a decree and enforce it in a subsequent proceeding. Id. Because the parties' agreement provided for the father to pay child support, we affirmed the lower court's child support order. Id.

{¶ 13} In the present case, the magistrate relied on O'Connor in concluding that the domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction to enter custody and child support...