Geyler v. Dailey

• Decision Date: 24 April 1950
• Docket Number: No. 5159,5159
• Citation: 217 P.2d 583,70 Ariz. 135
• Parties: GEYLER v. DAILEY et ux.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 583

217 P.2d 583

70 Ariz. 135

GEYLER v. DAILEY et ux.

No. 5159.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

April 24, 1950.

Harold R. Scoville, of Phoenix, Charles A. Stanecker, of Phoenix, attorneys for appellant.

Fred V. Moore, of Phoenix, attorney for appellees.

PHELPS, Justice.

Appellant was plaintiff and appellees defendants in the trial court and they will be thus designated in this opinion. The facts in the case are that at all times here involved plaintiff was a duly licensed real estate broker engaged in the business of selling real estate in Arizona.

On August 28, 1947 defendants Dailey entered into a contract in writing with plaintiff giving to plaintiff the exclusive right until January 1, 1948, to sell an 80-acre ranch belonging to defendants for the sum of $32,000 payable in the manner provided in said contract and agreeing therein to pay a 5% commission to plaintiff in the event of sale.

Thereafter on October 10, 1947 plaintiff procured a purchaser for the ranch at the price named and payable in the manner provided for in the contract. The proposed purchaser was ready, able and willing to perform each and all of the terms of purchase provided for in the contract and at the time tendered his check in the sum of $3200 as earnest money. Defendants refused to sell the ranch to the purchaser and claimed as an excuse therefor that they had on the previous day, to wit, on October 9th revoked plaintiff's authority to sell the ranch.

Plaintiff brought an action in the superior court of Maricopa County to recover the sum of $1600 as and for his commission as provided for in the contract. The cause was tried to a jury and a verdict and judgment was rendered in favor of defendants. From the judgment and order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial this appeal is prosecuted.

Plaintiff assigns the following errors:

1. The court erred in failing and refusing to direct a verdict for plaintiff at the conclusion of the case for the reason that the evidence established a full performance by plaintiff of his part of the agency contract.

2. The court erred in refusing to remove from the consideration of the jury any question except the question of damages to plaintiff for defendants' breach of their contract with plaintiff.

3. The court erred in giving defendants' instruction No. 2 as follows:

'If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendants revoked the agreement which they had with plaintiff regarding the sale of their property prior to the time the defendants had procured a purchaser, ready, able and willing to purchase defendants' property upon the terms and conditions of said agreement, then I instruct you your verdict should be for the defendants and against the plaintiff.'

4-5. The court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict of the jury for defendants and against plaintiff (a) for the reason that the verdict was and is contrary to law; (b) for the reason that the verdict is contrary to the evidence.

6. The court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial (a) for the reason that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted at the close of the case; (b) for the reason that he refused to withdraw from the jury all questions of fact except as to damages for defendants' breach of contract with plaintiff.

There is no dispute in the evidence that plaintiff procured a purchaser for defendants' property who was ready, able and willing to take and pay for the property in question on the terms and conditions fixed by defendants in their contract with plaintiff. Under such circumstances we have consistently held that the broker is entitled to his commission. We said in Lockett v. Drake, 43 Ariz. 357, 31 P.2d 499, 500, that: '* * * It is the almost universally accepted rule of law that, in the absence of a specific contract to the contrary, when a real estate broker has brought together the parties to a sale or exchange of real estate, and they have agreed fully on the terms and entered into a binding contract for such sale or exchange, his duties are at an end and his commission is fully earned, and it is immaterial that the parties to the contract rescind mutually or that one or the other thereof defaults and the sale or exchange is not fully effected. (Citing cases.) * * *.' See also Eason v. Heigton, 49 Ariz. 237, 65 P.2d 1373; Sligh v. Watson, 69 Ariz. 373, 214 P.2d 123.

Defendants agree with the above principle of law but assert that defendants had a right to terminate plaintiff's agency contract and did terminate the same before he produced a purchaser for defendants' property, therefore defendants are not liable to plaintiff for any commission whatsoever, citing the case of Blaisdell v. Steinfeld, 15 Ariz. 155, 137 P. 555, 566, in support of their position.

The court said in that case: '* * * an authority to sell land, when not coupled with an interest, may be revoked at the will of the principal. * * *.'

This is undoubtedly a correct statement of the law. The authorities are in conflict on the question of liability of a principal for the revocation of the authority of an agent where the agency is to exist for a definite period of time as in the instant case. The better rule seems to be, however, if the revocation of authority to sell results in a breach of the contract of agency the principal will be required to respond in any damages which may proximately result from such breach. Ex parte Allison, 211 Ala. 616, 101 So. 624; Dancey v. Baker, 206 Ala. 236, 89 So. 590; Morning Star Mining Co. v. Bennett, 164 Ark. 244, 261 S.W. 639; Park v. Swartz, 110 Tex. 564, 222 S.W. 156; Emerson v. Pacific Coast & Norway Packing Co., 96 Minn. 1, 104 N.W. 573, 1 L.R.A., N.S., 445, 113 Am.St.Rep. 603, 6 Ann.Cas. 973; Merkeley v Fisk, 179 Cal. 748, 178 P. 945; Rowan & Co. v. Hull, 55 W.Va. 335, 47 S.E. 92.

In Blaisdell v. Steinfeld, supra, the court held that the agency contract was usurious, illegal and void. The revocation of the agency in that case therefore did not constitute a breach of a contract. The question of the rights of an agent whose principal has breached a valid contract by revoking the agency was not before the court. The...