Ghiazza v. Anchorage Marina, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-CV-2792 (KMK),19-CV-2792 (KMK)
• Parties: JEFFREY GHIAZZA, Plaintiff, v. ANCHORAGE MARINA, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

JEFFREY GHIAZZA, Plaintiff, v. ANCHORAGE MARINA, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 19-CV-2792 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

July 27, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Jeffrey Ghiazza

Pleasant Valley, NY

Pro se Plaintiff

Eric M. Kurtz, Esq.

Cook, Netter, Cloonan, Kurtz & Murphy, P.C.

Kingston, NY

Counsel for Anchorage Defendants

Russell A. Schindler, Esq.

Kingston, NY

Counsel for Defendant Lawrence W. Ghiazza, Jr.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Jeffrey Ghiazza ("Plaintiff") pursues several state law tort claims against Defendants Anchorage Marina, Inc. (the "Marina"), Anchorage Restaurant and Marina (the "Restaurant"), Julie Swarthout ("Swarthout") (collectively, the "Anchorage Defendants"), and Lawrence W. Ghiazza, Jr. ("Defendant Ghiazza"). (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 2).) Before the Court are the Anchorage Defendants' and Defendant Ghiazza's respective Motions To Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Not. of Ghiazza Mot. (Dkt. No. 25); Not. of Anchorage Mot. (Dkt. No. 29).) For the following reasons, the Motions are granted, and the case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following factual allegations, drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint, are taken as true for the purposes of deciding the instant Motions:

Plaintiff and Defendant Ghiazza, residents of New York State, are the children of Lawrence W. Ghiazza, Sr. and Helene A. Ghiazza (the "Parents"). (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9, 15-16.) At some point prior to the initiation of the case, Plaintiff performed renovations on the mobile home property of the Parents, for which the Parents owed Plaintiff approximately $13,650. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 17.) The Parents then transferred title of their boat, the "Lucky Four," to Plaintiff in partial payment of the debt. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Lucky Four, which is registered with the U.S. Coast Guard, was valued at approximately $3,600, leaving a balance of approximately $10,050 still due to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 18.) While Plaintiff maintains that the Lucky Four "was suppose[d] to be delivered . . . free and clear of all encumbrances," Plaintiff has since discovered that the Anchorage Defendants had placed a lien on the boat. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

Subsequently, the Parents died and Defendant Ghiazza was named executor of their estate. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 22.) While Plaintiff believes that Defendant Ghiazza has "settled the [P]arents['] estate," Defendant Ghiazza has not arranged for payment of the Parents' unpaid debt to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 10.) Specifically, Plaintiff believes that Defendant Ghiazza "had a fiduciary duty" to pay the Parents' debt to Plaintiff and to deliver the Lucky Four to Plaintiff "free of all encumbrances," and that Defendant Ghiazza failed to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) The Lucky Four currently "remains in the possession of" the Anchorage Defendants who are "claiming storagefees, and ha[ve] placed a legally defective lien on the vessel seeking to collect storage fees." (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff believes that the lien is defective because the Lucky Four is "a U.S. Coast Guard Documented Vessel" and thus not subject to state court jurisdiction. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.) The Anchorage Defendants have since advertised the sale of the Lucky Four in a "distant Greek [n]ewspaper," which (Plaintiff believes) demonstrates their "bad faith" and intent to prevent Plaintiff from "lawfully claiming the vessel." (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Anchorage Defendants have charged "inflat[ed]" and "exaggerated storage fees" for storing the Lucky Four. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment "clearing the Title of the Boat in controversy and releasing the Boat to [P]laintiff, free of all encumbrances." (Id. ¶ 14.) He also pursues claims for fraud and unjust windfall against the Anchorage Defendants, (id. ¶¶ 31-33, 43-44), and for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract against Defendant Ghiazza, (id. ¶¶ 34-42).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 28, 2019. (See Compl.) On April 29, 2019, Defendant Ghiazza filed his Answer, and the next day, the Anchorage Defendants filed theirs. (See Dkt. Nos. 5-6.) On May 13, 2019, Judge Koeltl, to whom the case was first assigned, held a conference, after which the case was reassigned to this Court. (See Dkt. (minute entry for May 13, 2019).) On June 3, 2019, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause by June 28, 2019 explaining why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 14.) On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter arguing, inter alia, that the case presented "a unique federal question" because "the boat in controversy is a [f]ederally [d]ocumented [v]essel, under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security." (Dkt. No. 18.)

On June 11, 2019, the Court adopted a briefing schedule for Defendants' anticipated motions. (Dkt. No. 20.) On July 10, 2019, the Anchorage Defendants attempted to file their Motion and accompanying papers, and the next day Defendant Ghiazza attempted to file his Motion and accompanying papers. (Dkt. Nos. 22-23.) However, both attempts resulted in filing errors. (Id.) On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Opposition. (Dkt. No. 24.) On October 22, 2019, Defendant Ghiazza successfully refiled his Motion and accompanying papers. (Not. of Ghiazza Mot.; Decl. of Russel A. Schindler, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 26); Def. Ghiazza's Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 27).) One week later, the Anchorage Defendants also successfully refiled their Motion and accompanying papers. (Not. of Anchorage Mot.; Aff. of Eric M. Kurtz, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. ("Kurtz Aff.") (Dkt. No. 30); Aff. of Julie Swarthout in Supp. of Mot. ("Swarthout Aff.") (Dkt. No. 31); Anchorage Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 32).) As Plaintiff filed his Opposition to identical versions of these Motions, and as Defendants have filed no Replies, the Court deems the Motions fully submitted.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Rather, acomplaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and "draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff," Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). However, when the complaint is from a pro se plaintiff, the Court may consider "materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must "construe[] [his] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to...