Gibbes v. National Hospital Service

• Decision Date: 23 February 1943
• Docket Number: 15509.
• Citation: 24 S.E.2d 513,202 S.C. 304
• Parties: GIBBES v. NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE, INC.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

24 S.E.2d 513

202 S.C. 304

GIBBES v. NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE, INC.

No. 15509.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 23, 1943

Appeal from Common Pleas Court, of Aiken County; E. H. Henderson Judge.

Action by Mrs. Virginia Gibbes against National Hospital Service Inc., on a hospitalization policy. From a judgment affirming judgment of a magistrate in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $68, defendant appeals.

The order of Judge Henderson directed to be reported is as follows:

Order of Judge Henderson:

On July 15, 1939, the defendant National Hospital Service, Inc. issued a policy, known as a hospitalization policy, insuring the plaintiff, Mrs. Virginia Gibbes, against loss by reason of hospitalization.

This action was begun in the Court of Magistrate Dorcey K Lybrand, at Aiken, to recover for a loss under the policy. The defendant made a special appearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, and raises the point that Aiken County is not the place of defendant's residence. The Magistrate held that he had jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial of the case, resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of Sixty-eight Dollars.

In Article 5, Section 23, of the Constitution, it is provided: "Every civil action cognizable by Magistrates shall be brought before a Magistrate in the County where the defendant resides."

This is not a complex question where the defendant is a natural person, but is more difficult in cases involving a corporation.

"Corporations have no domicile, residence, or citizenship in the sense in which those words apply to natural persons, but only in a metaphorical sense." 18 C.J.S., Corporations, § 176, p. 583.

"Residence is an attribute of a natural person, and can be predicated of an artificial being only by a more or less imperfect analogy. Strictly speaking, a corporation can have no logical residence or habitation. It has been said that a corporation is a mere ideal existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law--an invisible being which can have, in fact, no locality and can occupy no space, and therefore cannot have a dwelling place. However, the sovereignty creating the corporation may give to it a local habitation or residence in law, if not in fact." 13 Amer.Juris., 281, Section 147.

The Constitution does not define the word "resides," and the Legislature has power to declare the residence of corporations for the purposes of suit. 19 C.J. S., Corporations, § 1296, p. 976. And a domestic corporation may have more than one place of residence. Miller v. Boyle Construction Co., 198 S.C. 166, 17 S.E. 2d 312, 313.

The Miller case very clearly sets forth the law as to the residence of domestic corporations.

"We said in Morris v. Peoples Baking Company, 191 S.C. 501, 5 S.E.2d 286, 287: 'The residence of a domestic corporation has been declared to be, and such corporation may be sued (1) in the county where its principal place of business is fixed by its charter, and (2) in any county where it has and maintains a place of business, or an agent engaged in conducting and carrying. on the business for which it exists. ***'

*****

"We have thus far considered and discussed the point at issue with reference to the applicability of Section 422, 1932 Code, and in the light of the decisions hereinabove cited. We think, however, that the question raised by the appeal is also governed and controlled by the proviso in Subsection 1 of Section 434 of the Code, which reads as follows: 'Provided, further, That in the case of domestic corporations service as effected under the terms of this section shall be effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic corporation in any county where such domestic corporation shall own property and transact business regardless of whether or not such domestic corporation maintains an office or has agents in that county."'

The defendant is a domestic insurance corporation, with its principal place of business at Columbia, in Richland County. The record shows that it has no agent in Aiken County. The group treasurer who collects the premiums from the policy holders there represents the insured persons, and not the defendant. The Company has no place of business in Aiken County.

Does the defendant own property and transact business in Aiken County?

At one time, before the institution of this suit, the defendant had a resident agent in Aiken County, who wrote a number of policies in favor of Aiken County residents, and some of these are still in force, the premiums being paid directly to the Columbia office of the Company by mail. When the Company approves a claim which has been assigned to a hospital by a policyholder, it sometimes pays the claim directly to the hospital.

The Magistrate held that the defendant owned property and transacted business in Aiken County, since it has policy contracts there yielding premiums, and it has claims arising in the county which it pays or refuses to pay. The defendant contends that the policies are not property of the Company, but of the insured persons; that the chose in action, or right to sue, is properly at its home office at Columbia; and that an insured does not really promise to pay the premiums.

The word "property" is not confined to tangible or corporeal objects, but is a word of unusually broad meaning. "Property is a general term to designate the right of ownership; and includes every subject, of whatever nature, upon which such a right can legally attach. It is not necessary that the subject of it should be either lands, goods or chattels; for it extends to money and securities." Pell v. Ball, Speer Eq. 48, at page 83.

In McLemore v. Blocker, Harp. Eq. 272, it said that "the word property, is of very extensive meaning," and includes choses in action.

"The term 'property' is, in law, a generic term of extensive application. It is a term of large import, of broad and exceedingly complex meaning, of the broadest and most extensive signification, a very comprehensive word, and is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used. The term is often called 'nomen generalissimum,' and is employed to signify any valuable right or interest protected by law, and the subject matter or things in which rights or interest exist." 50...