Gibbs v. Berger

• Decision Date: 10 November 1977
• Parties: In the Matter of Louise GIBBS, as mother and natural guardian and as Conservator of the Property of Sharon Louise Gibbs, an Adult under a Disability, Petitioner, v. Stephen BERGER, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 304

399 N.Y.S.2d 304

59 A.D.2d 282

In the Matter of Louise GIBBS, as mother and natural

guardian and as Conservator of the Property of

Sharon Louise Gibbs, an Adult under a Disability, Petitioner, v. Stephen BERGER, as Commissioner of the New York State

Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Nov. 10, 1977.

Mona R. Nedlik, Binghamton, for petitioner, Broome Legal Assistance corp.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Clifford A. Royael and Jean M. Coon, Albany, of counsel), for Stephen Berger, respondent.

Thomas B. Oakes, Binghamton, for Peter Di Mitri, respondent.

Before SWEENEY, J. P., and MAHONEY, LARKIN, MIKOLL and HERLIHY, JJ.

MAHONEY, Justice.

A resolution of the issues herein requires a brief recitation of factual background.

Sharon Gibbs was born and raised in Endicott, Broome County, New York, where she resided with her parents until age 23. At that point she left home and for a period of approximately five years resided in several western states. Each year she returned to New York to visit her family for varied lengths of time. In December, 1974, Sharon returned home with all her personal possessions with the apparent intention of remaining permanently. However, a young man persuaded her to return to California, the state of her last residence, with the prospect of an early marriage. She returned to California where for the first five months of 1975 she shared an apartment, paying her share of the rent. She obtained employment, purchased a new car and paid California income taxes for the year 1974. In April, 1975, she called her mother in Endicott to inform her that she was not going to marry and planned to return home "shortly thereafter". On May 19, 1975, she was involved in a serious one-car accident wherein she sustained a severe brain stem injury which rendered her comatose, a condition that presently persists. Sharon was hospitalized in California from May 19, 1975 until June 25, 1975 when her mother brought her to New York and admitted her to the Wilson Memorial Hospital. While hospitalized in California, Sharon was awarded Medical Assistance Benefits (Medi-Cal) for the months of May and June, 1975. California discontinued benefits as of June 30, 1975 on the ground that Sharon was no longer a resident of that state. This decision was challenged in California but was affirmed. Louise Gibbs, Sharon's mother, applied for New York Medicaid on July 1, 1975. The application was denied on September 8, 1975 on the ground that Sharon was a resident of California and ineligible for New York Medicaid. On appeal, after a fair hearing, the determination was affirmed on the grounds that Sharon "was a resident of California at the time of her accident and no evidence has been produced as to any intent to change such residence." (emphasis supplied). In addition, it was found that Sharon was ineligible for assistance as "a person temporarily within the state" because her mother transferred her to New York for the purpose of receiving medical assistance. This transferred article 78 proceeding was commenced by Louise Gibbs, as mother and natural guardian, and as conservator of the property of Sharon Gibbs, the mother having been appointed conservator by the Broome County Court on August 6, 1975. ¹

Our review of respondents' determination must begin with an affirmance of the conclusion that Sharon, "at the time of her accident " (emphasis supplied), was a resident of California. With respect to this issue, appellate review is restricted to the question of whether the determination below is rational (CPLR 7803, subd. (4); Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839, 313 N.E.2d 321, 325) and interference with such determination is always withheld in the absence of irrationality traceable to unsupportable proof or clear errors of law. No such reversible nexus is present here.

We turn now to the more troublesome problem of whether an individual, concededly incompetent, though not so declared judicially, may reestablish residency in New York, her domicile of origin, so as to be eligible for medical assistance under section 366 (subd. 1, par. (b)) of the Social Services Law. ² This section provides that medical assistance shall be given to a person who "(b) is a resident of the state, or, while temporarily in the state, requires immediate medical care which is not otherwise available, provided that such person did not enter the state for the purpose of obtaining such medical care." Had Sharon not been rendered unable to form an intent and, further, because of the gravity of permanent physical injuries, decided to return to her parents' home in Endicott, New York, there to be hospitalized, we would have little difficulty in concluding that in so doing she would have established residency in this State for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility. In Matter of Corr v. Westchester County Dept. of Social Serv., 33 N.Y.2d 111, 350 N.Y.S.2d 401, 305 N.E.2d 483, an 89-year-old petitioner who had resided in New York for the first 78 years of her life, returned to this State after a nine-year absence, with the purpose of being hospitalized near her daughter and other close relatives. The Court of Appeals, in determining that petitioner had acquired a New York residence for purposes of qualifying for medical assistance, premised its conclusion on petitioner's long connection with this State, the fact that she returned not only to be hospitalized but to be near her family and the fact that she had no other abode other than the nursing home where she was confined. The Court found that such objective criteria established the bona fides of her residence in New York (id., p. 117, 350 N.Y.S.2d p. 405, 305 N.E.2d p. 486). In the case at bar, Sharon lived the first 23 years of her life in Endicott, New York, and while residing elsewhere during the next ensuing 5 years she always returned...